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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the emergence of executive remuneration consulting as a 
distinct occupation from the 1990s, and the co-emergence of remuneration 
consultants and remuneration committees from the early 2000s. These actors, 
their work processes, norms and interlinkages are studied within the context of 
key social, economic and political factors, which shape the fields of remuneration 
consulting work and remuneration governance.  
 
In light of recent conflicting governance recommendations, it is important to 
evaluate the system of governance in relation to the historical reference points 
which have shaped executive pay practices. In so doing, this thesis analyses the 
dynamic processes in which numerous actors (remuneration committees, 
executive directors, Reward/HR directors, remuneration consultants and 
institutional investors), documents (corporate governance codes, governance 
guidelines and regulations) and tools (market trends analysis and pay 
benchmarking) are collectively engaged.  
 
Executive remuneration has overwhelmingly been researched from the agency 
perspective, delineated into two theoretical points of departure: optimal 
contracting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and managerial capture (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003; 2004). Despite managerial capture theorists seeking to address 
perceived shortcomings in optimal contracting, both result in 
an undersocialised (Granovetter, 1985; cf. Main, 2006) view of executive pay 
practices.  
 
Drawing on a genealogical approach (Foucault, 1971), Chapter 3 studies the 
emergence of executive remuneration consulting, while Chapter 4 examines the 
co-emergence of remuneration consultants and remuneration committees. 
Drawing on a field-based study at a leading remuneration consultancy, Chapter 5 
presents the day-to-day work processes of executive remuneration consultants, 
and the ways in which consultants have produced their relevance in executive pay 
design and governance. Chapter 6 problematizes the market for executive talent 
and presents a conceptualisation of pay benchmarking practice. Chapter 7 argues 
that a dominant logic of risk has gone undocumented; that it is risk and risk 
management that ‘percolates and pervades’ (Power, 2004) executive remuneration 
governance.  
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Chapter 1 
Bringing the ‘Social’ in 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Repeatedly over the past 25 years, the pay packages for public company 
executives have been subject to public and political ire. Often seen to be 
egregious and unjustified, executive pay packages have triggered moral panic in 
British society. In response to this, and often in the wake of corporate failings, 
politicians have sought to quell public anxiety by introducing governance codes 
and statutory regulation. From the 1990s, institutional investors, investor 
representative bodies, and proxy advisors have entered the fray, wielding 
substantial clout in executive pay design and governance. From within the ‘ivory 
tower’ of corporate Britain, remuneration committees (RemCos) have emerged as 
central in setting and monitoring executive pay, and critically placed to advise the 
RemCo are their appointed executive remuneration consultants.  
 
Although executive pay remains one of the most emotive and recurrent topics in 
corporate governance, few researchers have investigated the dynamics processes 
involved in pay design and governance, or the social interactions amongst the key 
actors engaged in these processes. Furthermore, while there is consensus that 
executive remuneration consultants are pay experts (Murphy and Sandino, 2010; 
Conyon et al., 2011; Bender, 2012; Gallani, 2015), and remuneration committees 
are central in pay governance, little is known of how these actors attained their 
relevance in executive pay design, or how they reproduced their relevance when 
their legitimacy was challenged.1  
 
This study addresses the undersocialised (Granovetter, 1985; cf. Main, 2006) view 
of executive pay practices, which arguably pervades much of the extant literature. 
In the chapters that follow, the study investigates (i) the emergence of 
remuneration consulting work at the interface of key governance episodes, (ii) the 
day-to-day activities of executive remuneration consultants, and (iii) the 
interrelationships between consultants and other key actors. This study aligns 
strongly with the research agenda that have sought to study accounting practice                                                         1 Remuneration consultants have been implicated in the upward ratchet of pay, especially 
in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. This will be elaborated in Ch.4 of the thesis.  
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within its social, organisational and institutional contexts. As such, it is deeply 
interested in the emergence of executive pay practices in ‘particular, localised 
historical settings, (and) the ‘how’ of such processes’ (Miller, 1994, p. 20).  
Accounting researchers, attentive to practice and its meaning are keenly aware of 
the importance of ‘analysing the complex interplay between the multiple arenas’ 
(Miller, 1994, p. 27) within which practices emerge. An interest in practice, 
especially is organisational settings, has also garnered a significant research 
following in recent decades.2 Influenced by these traditions, this study is both 
attentive to the historical specificity of contemporary practices as well as the 
study of practice in its natural environment; ‘as embodied, materially mediated 
arrays of human activity centrally organised around shared practical 
understanding’ (Schatzki, 2000, p. 2). Thus, the research questions at the core of 
this study are as follows: 
 
(I) How did executive remuneration consultants become central 
in the design and governance of executive pay in UK public 
companies? 
 
(II) How do remuneration consultants design and govern 
executive pay?   
 
The first two substantive chapters – Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 – address research 
question (I).  Chapter 3 explores the emergence of executive remuneration 
consulting as a distinct occupation from the 1990s, while Chapter 4 studies the 
emergence of the independent non-executive director in Britain and later the rise 
of the RemCo in pay governance, prior to analysing the interplay between 
RemCos and executive remuneration consultants. Studying these histories enables 
the claim that the consultant and committee co-emerge from the early 2000s; their 
design and governance work mutually dependent and inextricably linked. In these 
two chapters, the historical emergence of these actors, their practices, norms and 
interlinkages are importantly analysed within the context of key social, economic 
and political episodes.   
 
                                                        2 See Schatzki et al. (2001) for a summary of the ‘practical turn’ or ‘practice 
approach’ in Sociology.  
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The latter two substantive chapters – Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 – investigate the 
contemporary pay practices of executive remuneration consultants, and the role of 
these practices in the production of pay expertise and the pay benchmark, 
respectively. Chapter 5 - based on a participant observation and 20 interviews 
with consultants at a leading executive remuneration consultancy - describes 
consultants work activities, and in so doing, problematizes the divide between 
mundane and expert tasks, as well as routine and knowledge work. Chapter 6 
studies the emergence of executive pay benchmarking practice; problematizing 
both the market for executive pay and the upward ratchet of executive pay.  
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the substantive chapters3 (and their longitudinal ranges)  
 
 
The longitudinal range as well as the level of analysis (individual, group, 
organisational, institutional) varies across the four chapters. The methodological 
approach and research methods also differ across the chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 
take a genealogical approach and draw on archival and interview-based methods. 
In Chapter 5, ethnographic methodology influences the way in which the 
participant observation was designed and carried out.  Chapter 6 draws on a social 
constructivist perspective, weaving together archival, interview and field-based 
data in order to construct an account of pay benchmarking practice. The various 
methodological approaches are detailed in Section 1.2, while the research 
methods are described in Chapter 2.  
 
In light of the differences in methodology, research methods and the longitudinal 
range of the chapters, it was somewhat surprising to the researcher that there 
emerged a common thread, which linked all four substantive chapters. This 
common thread was the recurring evidence of risk, risk concerns, and risk                                                         
3 The numbers in the diagram correspond with the chapter numbering in this thesis. 
Emergence of Remuneration Consulting
1970s - 2002
3 Co-Emergence of RemCos and Consultants
1970s - 2015
4 Field study of Rem Consulting Work
March - June, 2016
5 Executive pay Benchmarking
1920s - 2017
6
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management, in the design and governance of executive pay. It was through the 
process of interpreting the data, writing the chapter narratives, and then 
connecting these narratives with broader academic discourses, that the logic of 
risk emerged as centrally important in the analysis of executive pay practices. 
Chapter 7 was written to explore the role and pervasiveness of risk in 
remuneration governance as well as to position these findings within the broader 
discourses of risk in society and risk management in corporate governance.  
 
In summary, this thesis is neither monograph, nor paper-based in style.4 Rather, it 
is something of a hybridized format. There is an overarching research objective - 
to investigate the dynamic processes of executive pay design and governance – as 
well as a central actor of concern - the executive remuneration consultant. At first 
glance, the mosaic of methodologies and methods may appear more hodgepodge 
than systematic, but then systematising the organic and serendipitous nature of 
social research would prove challenging to any disciple of qualitative research.   
 
The following section, which reviews the extant literature, also provides some 
insights into why fresh methodological approaches are needed in this area of 
research. It is worth noting that the remuneration (or compensation5) literature is 
vast, and while an initial overview of the literature is provided (cf. Murphy, 1999; 
Devers et al., 2007), the focus narrows to more specifically review the social and 
governance influences on executive pay design and determination. The limitation 
of this narrow focus is addressed in Chapter 8.    
 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
 
In his review of the literature, Kevin Murphy described the modern history of 
executive compensation research as beginning in the early 1980s6, paralleling ‘the 
emergence and general acceptance of agency theory’ (Murphy, 1999). In his 
comprehensive review of the extant literature for the Handbook of Labour 
Economics in 1999, Murphy describes the research areas in which compensation                                                         
4 In paper-based theses, each paper might stand independently of the other, with little or 
no reference made to the other paper(s).  5 Compensation is the term typically used in US-based academic literature.  6 Hallock and Murphy (1999), drawing on the Social Science Citation Index database, 
find CEO pay research rising from 1-2 papers per year prior to 1985 to 60 papers in 1995. 
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studies had taken flight, including accounting, economics, finance, industrial 
relations, law, organisational behaviour and strategy. Interestingly, Murphy 
(1999) noted that there was scant evidence of compensation research by labour 
economists. Instead, research had flourished in the following four areas:  
 
Figure 1.2 Focal areas of executive compensation research (1999) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Murphy (1999, p. 2488) and tabularised by the researcher  
 
 
Overwhelmingly across the areas of research, the dominant theoretical lenses 
were optimal contracting theory and managerial capture theory. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)’s seminal work on the agency problem7 was instrumental in 
popularising the optimal contracting research agenda. Executive compensation 
was seen to be the ideal ‘real-world’ example of how principals could align their 
agents’ interests via contracting. Optimal contracting theorists assumed that the 
principal would ex ante formulate the optimal pay-out for eventual superior 
performance. Therefore, the incentive contract could correct for the principals’ 
inability to monitor the agents’ actions.  
                                                        
7  The agency problem can be described as the divergent interests of shareholders 
(principals) and managers (agents). Shareholders, as residual claimants, seek the 
maximum net present value for the firm, while managers seek maximum utility. 
Accounting
Accounting-based bonuses and earnings manipulation
Relative efficacy of accounting-based vs. stock-based performance measures
Financial Economics
Association between executive compensation and corporate performance, investment decisions, capital structure, dividend policies, mergers and diversification.
Industrial Organization Economics
Effects of regulation and deregulation on executive compensation
Game-theoretic effects of strategic interaction on compensation policy
Sociology and Org behaviour
Non-agency-theoretic issues such as social comparisons and the behavioural effects of wage dispersion
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Those scholars within the “efficient contracting” camp (Murphy, 2013, p.214) 
largely focused on identifying the determinants of pay and evaluating the linkages 
between pay and performance. The use of multiple regression analysis enabled 
researchers to make general claims about the characteristics that determined pay.  
Although researchers agreed that executive pay was determined8 by firm size9 and 
firm complexity, ‘the failure to document a consistent and robust relationship 
between executive pay and firm performance has frustrated scholars and 
practitioners’ (Devers et al., 2007, p. 1016). In search of explanations for the 
inconsistent results (Pepper, 2014), scholars argued for the research focus to be 
broadened, in part suggesting that undocumented and untested political and social 
explanations might account for divergent findings  (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Gomez-Meija and Wiseman, 1997; Murphy, 1999).  
 
Whether or not in response to these calls, there emerged in the early 2000s, a 
second research agenda. This was largely influenced by the work of Bebchuk et 
al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) on managerial capture theory. The 
“managerial power” camp (Murphy, 2013, p.214) argued that the level and 
composition of pay was determined by captive board members (and later captive 
remuneration consultants) catering to rent-seeking executives, as opposed to 
contracts being set by competitive market forces. The managerial capture camp 
grew to include event studies, which sought to determine the impact of changes in 
governance and regulation on either the stock market or executive pay (see Ferri 
and Maber, 2013 as an example), or the characteristics of boards, RemCos and 
consultants on the quantum and structure of executive pay.  
 
Thus, within a decade of Gomez-Meija and Wiseman (1997) and Murphy (1999), 
the executive compensation literature had exploded. An updated literature review 
by Devers et al. (2007) analysed 99 executive compensation studies10 published in 
                                                        
8 In multiple regression analyses, where executive pay is the dependent variable, firm size 
and firm complexity have repeatedly been tested and confirmed as the strongest 
determinants of pay, that is, the strongest independent variables.  
9 For example, Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia (2000) found firm size accounted for 
over 40% of the variance in total CEO pay & firm performance contributed less than 5%.  
10 Of the 99 articles reviewed in Devers et al. (2007), 44% were from management 
journals, 34% were from finance journals, 12% were from accounting journals, and the 
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the most widely cited journals from 1997 to 2007. Devers et al. (2007) categorised 
the main areas of compensation research as follows: 
 
Table 1.1: Devers et al. (2007) Review of Executive Compensation Literature 
 
I. Relationships between pay and performance  
 
A. The influence of performance on pay  
1. Principal-agent model influences  
2. Performance surprises  
3. Governance influences  
 
B. The influence of pay on performance  
1. Pay plan adoption  
2. Elements of pay  
3. Top management team pay and pay dispersion  
 
II. Relationships among pay and behaviours  
 
A. The influence of pay on executive actions  
1. Goal alignment  
2. Strategic choices  
3. Individual choices  
4. Goal misalignment 
5. Risk preference alignment  
6. Contextual influences  
7. Stock options  
 
B. The influence of executive actions and other factors on pay  
1. Contextual influences  
2. Governance influences  
3. Human capital and social influences 
 
Source: Devers et al. (2007, p. 1017-1018) 
 
 
In the categorisation of the dominant research strands in Table 1.1, three 
subsections – see highlighted – particularly overlap with this study’s interest in 
the social factors which shape executive pay practices. In the category of research 
on governance influences on pay for performance, Devers et al. (2007) criticised 
these studies for overlooking two key factors, (i) labour market considerations11 
and (ii) regulation (such as tax and accounting treatments on pay). With respect to 
regulation, Murphy (2013) also noted that researchers had largely ignored                                                                                                                                                        
remaining 10% were from economics, psychology, or other journals (Devers et al., 2007, 
p. 1017) 
11 Labour market considerations, such as executive reputation, human capital, discretion, 
industry mobility, and industry pay.  
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government intervention12 in executive pay, yet such interventions had been ‘a 
major driver of time trends in CEO pay’ (p. 215). Arguably, these ‘variables’ 
were likely missed or omitted from empirical quantitative studies, as they are 
difficult to measure.  
 
In the category of research on governance influences on the design and 
determination of pay (i.e. behaviour-focused research), findings once again 
proved divergent. Daily et al. (1998) found no support for the hypothesis that 
compensation committee composition influenced CEO pay levels. On the other 
hand, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) found that CEOs earned more under 
weak governance structures. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) more 
specifically found that CEO compensation was higher when the CEO was also the 
board chair, the board was larger, there was a greater percentage of the board 
composed of outside directors (and the outside directors are appointed by the 
CEO), when outside directors were older and served on more than three other 
boards (p. 371).  
 
Research on the human capital and social influences on pay determination drew 
on a plethora of theories, including managerialist theory (or managerial capture 
theory 13 ), social comparison theory 14  (Festinger, 1954), tournament theory 15 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981), equity theory16  (Adams, 1965) and human capital 
theory17. Key research contributions using these theories are reviewed below.                                                          
12 Murphy (2013) is likely making a distinction here between government intervention 
and the introduction of regulation.  
13 Due to the parameters used in Devers et al. (2007), Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) was missed in the review.   14 In 1954, Leon Festinger laid out the foundation of social comparison theory in the 
format of several hypotheses, corollaries and deviations that described the situations in 
which people evaluate and compare their opinions and abilities with others. In the context 
of executive remuneration research, social comparison theory has been used to explore 
the ways in RemCo members engage in social comparison for the determination of 
executive pay packages.  
15 O’Reilly et al. (1988), in describing tournament theory, state that ‘executive salary 
structures can be likened to a series of tournaments or lotteries among contestants (Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981). Winners of the tournament at one level are allowed to enter the next 
tournament. In this scheme, the compensation of the CEO represents the prize in the 
lottery’ (p.257) 
16 In Ezzamel and Watson’s (2002) summary of Adam’s equity theory, the authors state 
‘an individual gives something (input) in return for something (outcome). If input is not 
recognized as relevant or ‘appropriately’ valued by the other party in the exchange, then 
inequity is perceived to occur’ (p.212). In the context of their research, it’s not the case 
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O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) tested a tournament model and a social 
comparison model to explain CEO pay. While the tournament test returned 
insignificant results, the social comparison test found that the ‘presence of highly 
remunerated outside board members is related to high CEO salaries in a 
statistically significant manner. And these results hold even when there are 
controls for the fundamental economic characteristics of the corporation such as 
size, profitability and industry’ (p. 269). Also drawing on social comparison 
theory, Ezzamel and Watson (1998) suggest that compensation committees pay 
executives at least at the going rate and deviations from that rate influence 
subsequent pay. They also found that there was a significant adjustment toward 
the going rate for underpaid executives, thus reducing external market pay 
anomalies. Later work by Ezzamel and Watson (2002), drawing on both social 
comparison theory and equity theory, suggests that external labour market and 
board pay comparisons were important in explaining both CEO and directors' pay 
rewards. Further to these, Malsch et al. (2012) draw on culture theory and 
specifically the cultural logics for remuneration committees determining 
executive pay in the Canadian context.  The authors found that committee 
members ‘are genuinely doing their best to fulfil their responsibilities, according 
to their cultural beliefs.’  
 
Studies on the role of the consultant include Conyon et al. (2010), which used a 
multi-theoretic approach incorporating economic, institutional, managerial power 
and social comparison literatures to study the role of external consultants on pay 
setting. The authors mostly drew on neo-institutional theories, with an emphasis 
on the embeddedness of institutional actors such as the pay consultant, and the 
isomorphic effects on compensation outcomes. Conyon et al. (2010) suggest that 
consultants facilitate homogenization of compensation contracts. Gallani (2015) 
similarly sought explanations for these isomorphic tendencies (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Drawing on Granovetter’s work in social network theory, Gallani 
examines how compensation consultants as interfirm networks are likely to                                                                                                                                                        
that an increase in one executive’s pay quantum must be matched for other executives. 
Equity is assessed based on pattern changes in compensation, and not necessarily 
magnitude.   
17 Devers et al. (2007) state ‘human capital theory suggests that pay is driven by unique 
abilities and skills’ (p. 1035)  
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‘facilitate information transfer and knowledge creation regarding the design of 
executive compensation packages’ (Gallani, 2015). Using a vectorial approach, 
Gallani found that firms connected by board interlocks, hiring the same 
compensation consulting firm, or sharing a blockholder, exhibit a higher degree of 
similarity in the design of executive compensation contracts than what would be 
predicted by similarities in organizational characteristics. Adamson et al. (2015) 
employed an interview-based approach and mobilised the concept of institutional 
work in analysing the internal dynamics of executive remuneration consultants’ 
professionalisation project. Through an exploration of the macro organizational 
level and the micro individual level of remuneration consulting, the authors find 
inconsistencies, which call into question the extent to which the occupation is in 
fact seeking to professionalise. However, Adamson et al. (2015) remain wedded 
to the analytical construct of the professionalisation project. 
 
In the UK setting, two scholars have contributed substantially to our 
understanding of remuneration committees and remuneration consultants, and the 
dynamics between the two: Brian Main and Ruth Bender. Brian Main has made 
significant contributions to the study of executive pay setting and governance in 
British public companies. Over a career span of 30 years, Main has provided 
insights on the relationships between pay and performance (1991), the inner 
workings of remuneration committees (1993), the implications of changes in 
institutional investor governance guidelines (2006), and (with O’Reilly) economic 
and psychological perspectives on CEO pay (2010).  In drawing on tournament 
theory, Main, and his co-authors, argued that optimal contracting theory provided 
no plausible explanation for the continued rise in remuneration. Bender’s early 
work focused on the remuneration committees and their role in pay determination 
and governance. Her later work centred on remuneration consultants and their role 
in pay design and governance. In both instances, the research drew on ‘economic 
and social-psychological theories’ (Bender, 2003).  
 
There are similarities with respect to the methods used in this research project and 
studies conducted by Ruth Bender and Brian Main. Both Bender and Main have 
employed archival and interview-based methods in studying social problems 
plaguing executive pay design, determination and governance. Their studies have 
included single actor studies, single event studies (e.g. introduction of an advisory 
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vote in 2002, or the ABI’s 1999 governance guidelines), as well as cutting across 
multiple actors. Neither scholar has studied executive pay tools or the dynamic 
interlinkages among actors, documents and tools, which is an important 
contribution of this thesis. 
 
 
1.2 Fresh perspectives 
 
Executive pay has overwhelmingly been studied through the lens of optimal 
contracting and managerial capture theories. As Murphy (2013) noted, ‘viewing 
executive compensation as a “horse race” between efficient contracting and 
managerial power ignores other forces that may be even more important in 
explaining trends in pay’ (p.322). Devers et al. (2007) similarly summarised that 
‘there is a need for research that more thoroughly examines how different board 
configurations and various governance contexts and situations influence executive 
pay’ (p. 1036). 
 
To unearth and analyse these underexplored and unexplained factors, approaches 
are needed to elucidate the ways in which actors, documents (e.g. white papers, 
governance codes and statutory regulations), and tools (e.g. market trends analysis 
and pay benchmarking) are collectively engaged in executive pay design and 
governance.  As Murphy (1999) surmised, research may describe the prevalence 
of stock options in executive pay packages, but it does not answer why stock 
options became an important part of the compensation package. Explanations for 
why a new incentive scheme is adopted or how new practices are institutionalised 
is not captured in the discrete columns of pay data. Rather, it is played out in the 
complex networks in which pay design is negotiated. In essence, there has been 
inadequate emphasis on investigating who designs pay, and how and why they go 
about doing so. As Main (2011) noted: ‘of course, at the end of the day, 
determining remuneration through a remuneration committee remains a human 
process subject to all the cognitive bias and social influence effects to which 
people are prone’ (p.5).  
 
Considerable research is still needed to elucidate the social, political and 
governance influences on executive pay. Thus, this thesis draws on social and 
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historical perspectives in the study of executive pay practices, and in particular, 
remuneration consulting practices. In order to develop an account of the field of 
remuneration consulting practices, this study is first attentive to the historical pre-
conditions of the consultants’ contemporary pay practices. History has been 
investigated in a multitude of ways. The following section describes the 
genealogical approach taken in Chapters 3 and 4. 
  
1.2.1 Genealogical approach 
 
In the opening sentence of his 1971 essay entitled ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History’, Foucault describes genealogy as ‘gray, meticulous and patiently 
documentary’ (Foucault, 1971, p. 76). Standing in opposition to the idea that 
history is linear or evolutionary, Foucault dispels with any pursuit of ‘origins’ and 
suggests instead, that through extensive and thorough data collection – ‘the vast 
accumulation of source material’ (ibid) - that the researcher can ‘recognize the 
events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable 
defeats’ (p. 80).   
 
The practices and processes observed and the emergence of remuneration 
consulting work are not assumed to be static or absolute, rather they are 
temporally stabilised and constantly subject to change and transformation. A 
genealogical approach destabilises that which appears to be immutable; actors 
who are taken as self-evident, documents and events, which are presented as 
natural features of the governance landscape.   
 
In a similar vein to Miller and Napier (1993), this study draws ‘attention to the 
different meanings that have been attached to practices at different moments in 
time, rather than taking contemporary practices and the meanings currently 
attached to them as historical constants’ (p. 632). What appears self evident and 
unquestioned are in fact contingent on turns in history, which must not be 
detached from our understanding or analysis of the present. 
 
 
Just as a genealogical approach shaped the researcher’s engagement with 
historical events in Chapter 3 and 4, ethnography shaped the researcher’s 
engagement with the fieldsite (Chapter 5). The following subsection describes the 
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influence of ethnographic methodology on the design of the field-based 
participant observation.   
 
1.2.2 Ethnographic influence  
Ethnography, when interpreted epistemologically, has been described as a 
‘philosophy of research’ (Anderson-Levitt, 2006), or ‘an attunement, a way of 
being in the world’ (Ingold, 2001). As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) have 
noted, the social world - as far as possible - should be studied in its natural state. 
A natural setting affords the capturing of empirical richness in terms of context, 
complexity and ‘mess’. The researcher will be ‘focused not just on what people 
do but also on understanding the meaning and function of the activities, decisions 
and actions people undertake in the context in which they are embedded’ (Hall 
and Messner, 2018). 
 
The terms ethnography and participant observation are often conflated, partly 
because their meanings are difficult to pin down. In this study, the distinction is 
made as follows: ethnography is a methodological approach and participant 
observation (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) is the method employed in 
ethnography.  
 
1.2.3 Social constructivist perspective  
A constructivist view is ‘a set of sensibilities’ which the researcher cultivates 
(Power, 2017), and importantly encourages and enables the researcher to question 
and problematise taken for granted practices. At the outset of the study, these 
sensibilities are tenets that guide the researcher’s initial engagement with the 
objects of interest. As the study progresses, these sensibilities advance, enabling 
the researcher to be cognizant and perceptive to the subtle nuances in actors’ 
language, both spoken and unspoken. For example, at a Breakfast Meeting hosted 
in May 2017 by a leading remuneration consultancy, and attended by institutional 
investors, remuneration committee chairs, and heads or reward, among others; 
there was a perceptible shift in the tone of the speakers and the mood of the room 
when proxy advisor Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) was discussed. ISS 
has attracted derision from many within the field for what is perceived as ‘box 
ticking’ in ISS’ governance analysis. The ISS vote recommendations are seen to 
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critically shape the voting decisions of institutional investors, and as such, the 
methodology used is the subject of criticism by consultants, remuneration 
committees and heads of reward.  
 
In the study of complex relations and interactions amongst human and material 
actors, this ‘set of sensibilities’ also enables the researcher to probe ‘blackboxes’ 
whose material action have gone undocumented. This is especially the case in the 
investigation of pay benchmarking practice in Chapter 6. This social constructivist 
perspective, and its intersection with reflexivity and conceptual leaping (Klag and 
Langley, 2013), is discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
 
1.3 ‘Bricolage’ 
 
As detailed above, this study does not drawn on a single theory, but rather is 
shaped or influenced by a genealogical approach to historical research; an 
ethnographic approach to field-based research and a social constructivist 
perspective in problematising taken for granted practices. This mosaic of theories 
and methodologies can be likened to theoretical ‘bricolage’ (Boxenbaum and 
Rouleau, 2011). Bricolage has been described as bringing together different 
concepts from existing theories, thereby giving analytical purchase or shape to an 
empirically rich and complex setting. Boxenbaum and Rouleau (2011), see 
theoretical ‘bricolage’ as particularly well suited to developing new knowledge on 
understudied phenomena (p. 281), as is the case in this study. Arguably the 
theories are more adjacent and complementary than interwoven. The genealogical 
approach shapes the first two substantive chapters, and the ethnographic influence 
and social constructivist perspective shape the latter two chapters. 
 
However, there are two concepts used throughout the thesis. The use of the 
concepts field and logic are more so in line with the notion of bricolage described 
above. The use of these concepts is neither wholly disconnected from institutional 
theory, nor is it orthodox in its application.   
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Field 
 
Within an institutional field, actors take one another into account as they carry out 
interrelated categories of taken-for-granted practices within and across 
organizations (McAdam and Scott, 2005). While the actors themselves may cease 
to question their norms and practices, it is incumbent on the researcher to question 
taken-for-granted practices. Institutional theorists, interested in problematising 
norms, have argued that too many researchers have emphasised the taken-for-
granted practices at the expense of intentional (if bounded rational), directive and 
conflict-laden processes that define fields’ (DiMaggio, 1991, p. 168).  
 
In the emergence of the field of remuneration governance, researchers must be 
attentive to ‘both politics and routine in the structuring’ of fields (Lawrence, 
1999, p. 162). DiMaggio’s conflict laden processes find affinity with the ANT 
agenda, which is also in search of the incommensurable and disruptive activities 
in which actors engage. Lawrence (1999) encourages attention to cohesion and 
disruption, routine and peculiar, as it is the homogeneity and heterogeneity in 
relations and practices, which constitute the field.  
 
Thus, this research seeks to explicate the homogeneity and heterogeneity in social 
interactions. It is social interactions, which sustain institutional fields, by 
producing and reproducing, the values and practices that guide members as to 
how to act and interact (Bell and Haugh, 2015, p. 5). When the values and sources 
of meaning come to be widely held by the group of actors, and these values shape 
cognition and provide a frame of reference for decision-making, scholars have 
described these central organising forces as institutional logics.  
 
Drawing on the example of the remuneration consultant once more, in Chapter 3, 
the emergence of the field of remuneration consulting work is described, and in 
particular the norms and practices which come to represent the occupation. Due to 
a major governance event in 2002, remuneration consultants chose to expand their 
work domains to include remuneration governance work. The collective 
sensemaking that occurred at the field level, which led to consultants absorbing 
governance work, was enabled by a shared logic. As logics provide the lens 
through which actors contemplate problems and their solutions (Thornton & 
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Ocasio, 1999, 2008), when beliefs are shared (and where there are competing 
belief systems), shifts or changes can occur within a field.  
 
Logic 
 
Logics are described as supra-organizational patterns, both symbolic and material, 
that order reality and provide meaning to actions and structure conflicts (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). As stated in Thornton and Ocasio 
(1999): 
(Logics) provide the formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and 
interpretation that guide and constrain decision makers in accomplishing 
the organization’s tasks and in obtaining social status, credits, penalties, and 
rewards in the process (Ocasio 1997). These rules constitute a set of 
assumptions and values, usually implicit, about how to interpret 
organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to 
succeed (Jackall 1988; March and Olsen 1989). (p. 804) 
 
The concept of institutional logic has journeyed considerably from its early 
formulations in Friedland and Alford’s (1991) highly influential paper. No longer 
tethered to institutional orders, research on the emergence, adoption and 
transformation of logics has considerably developed and empirically informed the 
concept. Recent research has been attentive to the role of competing or conflicting 
logics in bringing about institutional change. This attention to a multiplicity of 
logics is appealing in this study. This is epically the case given the numerous 
actors engaged in remuneration governance.  
 
This study is also attentive to the transposition of logics from adjacent fields, and 
the work of key actors in adopting and transforming such logics. As will be 
described in Chapter 4, a gatekeeping logic was transposed from the field of 
corporate governance into remuneration governance. This logic centred on the 
notion of independence. In this case, when independence first appeared in the 
field of remuneration governance, it was a rhetorical device with the potential to 
organise discourse, but not necessarily underlie action. The remuneration 
committee and consultants importantly enabled ‘independence’ to take root, 
thereby attain symbolic and material meaning within the context of the field.  
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Overall, fields are not assumed to exist a priori; they were discovered through 
empirical inquiries (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Similarly, although logics are 
described as the invisible structures, which reinforce and sustain fields, it becomes 
to researcher’s work to empirically ground the emergence and transformation of 
core logics. Academic research on the emergence, re-emergence, and adaptations 
of institutional logics are relatively novel and unexplored topics (Thornton et al., 
2012). It has also been observed that ‘while actors may reproduce behaviours 
consistent with existing institutional logics, they also have the capacity to 
innovate and thus transform institutional logics’ (Thornton et al. 2012, p. 4). As 
such, the study implicitly engages with the concept of logics in three ways; how 
logics emerge within a field, how logics focus attention and shape action, and how 
actors within the field transform logics.   
 
1.4 Key actors 
 
The key actors were identified through an examination of media articles, 
governance guidelines and regulatory documents, and also through the interview 
process as actors described their work, and ultimately those they worked with.  
  
Regulators, institutional investors and investor representative bodies, proxy 
advisors, remuneration committees, executive remuneration consultants, heads of 
reward, and executive directors were identified as the key actors engaged in the 
design and governance of executive pay. This subsection briefly describes these 
actors.  
 
1.4.1 Executive Remuneration Consultants 
 
Importantly advising FTSE 350 remuneration committees are the executive 
remuneration consultants. The consultants use their knowledge of the ‘talent 
market’ and expertise in pay-related tasks (such as pay benchmarking and market 
trends analysis) to recommend appropriate pay levels and design and introduce 
new incentive systems (Bender, 2012; Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Conyon et al., 
2011; Gallani, 2015). They are seen to be experts in executive remuneration-
relevant accounting and tax laws, corporate governance and statutory regulations 
(Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Cadman et al. 2010).   
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1.4.2 Remuneration Committees 
 
At the centre of pay governance are remuneration committees, which is the board 
sub-committee principally responsible for the oversight of executive pay setting. 
The remuneration committee emerged an increasingly common feature of UK 
public companies following recommendations made in the Cadbury Report 
(1992). It is the remit of the remuneration committee (or RemCo) to recommend 
and monitor the level and structure of executive remuneration, with the goal of 
promoting long term success for the company, while managing conflicts of 
interest with executives and the risk of pay ratcheting and pay-performance 
misalignment (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2006, 2014).  
 
1.4.3 Human Resource/ Reward Function 
 
While a number of the executive remuneration consultancies operate within 
human capital-focused18 psfs, the human resource or reward function in this case 
refers to the team situated within the corporation, and responsible for executive 
remuneration, broad-based remuneration or both. Some firms will operate distinct 
HR and Reward function, where the former focuses on workforce pay while the 
latter focuses on executive pay. This is often the case for the largest FTSE 
companies. It is more typical for FTSE companies to operate on internal HR team, 
under which the Executive compensation and benefits director works.    
 
 With the falling demand for industrial relations (given the de-recognition of the 
unions), and separately the rise of the company secretary, the HR function was 
slow to create a role for itself in executive remuneration design. During the 2000s, 
the field of human resource management began vying for greater visibility and 
voice in board matters and executive pay decisions. In the largest FTSE 
companies, Heads of Reward are increasingly engaging with their company’s 
largest institutional investors, accompanying remuneration committee chairs to 
shareholder meetings, and designing executive pay packages for the company. 
This is a group that has been overlooked in the extant literature, and remains 
under-examined in this study. This is partly because access to these individuals 
proved challenging, with ‘cold’ interview requests sent by the researcher going 
unanswered. Three interviews with Head of Reward/ HRDs were made possible                                                         18 Alternative terms include Talent, Human Resource, or Reward 
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through introductions enabled by the researcher’s personal and alumni networks. 
Going forward, it is the aspiration to interview many more members of the 
internal HR function, as well as engage more fully with the reward management 
and human resource academic literatures. 
 
1.4.4 Statutory Regulators 
 
The Business Secretary’s Department is the epicentre of statutory regulatory 
change with respect to corporate governance. This Department has undergone 
several name changes over the decades. From Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), to Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and most recently 
the Department for Business, Environment, Innovation and Skills (BEIS). There is 
also a broader political discourse, which shapes regulatory attention. This 
discourse is largely shaped by the political party in power; and often the views of 
the Prime Minster (as is currently the case) or an influential Cabinet Minister, as 
was the case when Sir Vince Cable was Secretary of BIS from 2010-2015. 
 
1.4.5 Institutional Investors and Investor Representative Bodies 
 
Institutional investors are broadly defined as organizations that invest on behalf of 
its members; common examples include pension funds, hedge funds, mutual 
funds, and asset managers. The larger asset and fund managers typically have in-
house teams dedicated to corporate governance analysis. Often in tandem with in 
–house advice, institutional investors subscribe to external proxy advisory firms, 
which supply governance analysis and AGM voting recommendations.  The main 
players include Institutional Voting Information Services (a part of the Investment 
Association19), and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). ISS is widely known 
by FTSE companies and has become hugely influential in shaping AGM vote 
outcomes. It was founded in the US, and deems itself ‘the world’s leading 
provider of corporate governance solutions’ (ISS website, 2017).  
 
Up until the 21st century, institutional investors, generally, were dominated by 
pension funds and insurance companies; their percentage of share ownership 
having collectively grown from 9 per cent in 1957 to 33 per cent in 1975 and 51                                                         19  The Investment Association (formerly the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
represents the collective interests of its clients, which historically and typically consist of 
the insurance industry. 
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per cent in 1991. By 2001, institutional investors were of such political and 
economic importance that the UK government commissioned an investigation into 
the corporate governance responsibilities of institutional investors to UK capital 
markets and British capitalism more generally.  As Lord Myners noted in his 2001 
report; ‘institutional investors – particularly pension and life funds – ‘own’ and 
control most of British industry (Myners, 2001). However, the institutional 
investor landscape has changed drastically since the Myners Report. Within a 
decade of the report, pension and insurance companies had drastically reduced 
their holdings. Thus, the majority of FTSE company shares are now held by 
foreign institutional investors (See Figure 1.3). Holding periods have also 
changed markedly. In 1950, shares were held for an average period of six years. 
This average had fallen to six months by 2017.  
In spite of Myners’ effort, institutional investors were seen to fall short of the 
stewardship ideal, and a second report was commissioned in 2012. The Kay 
Review of UK equity markets and long-term decision-making appears has met 
with similar challenges to its uptake.  
 
Figure 1.3: Shareholder Structure in the UK 
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In the context of this study, the term ‘Institutional Investors’ encompasses the 
investors themselves, their representative bodies and the external governance 
analysts and proxy advisors. While a more nuanced treatment of these varied 
actors is desired going forward, for the purposes of this study, there is more 
commonality amongst these actors than differences, and as such, the grouping is 
justified in this instance. 
 
Table 1.2: Institutional investors, representative bodies and proxy advisors 
 
Fund/Asset managers Institutional investor 
representative bodies 
Proxy advisors  
 
Legal and General 
Morley 
Scottish Widows 
Fidelity  
Blackrock 
Schroder 
Capital 
Standard Life 
 
ABI 
RiskMetrics 
PIRC 
Pensions and Lifetime Savings 
Association20 (PLSA) 
 
Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) 
Glass Lewis 
Investment Association (IVIS) 
 
Figure 1.4 maps some of the key interactions between the actors described above. 
These interactions, interdependencies, and interlinkages are developed in depth in 
the substantive chapters.  
 
Figure 1.4: Actions shaping executive pay design and governance 
 
                                                         
20 Formerly the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). The Association’s name 
was changed in 2015 to reflect a broader remit representing workplace pension 
schemes as well as lifetime savings issues.   
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To this point, the chapter has detailed the motivation for research from the 
standpoint of the academic literature. This research is also motivated by the public 
policy agenda for executive pay governance. The following section details the 
recent tone and events in Britain, as they relate to executive pay, the actors who 
govern pay and how they govern pay.   
 
1.5 The executive pay problem 
 
The governance of executive remuneration has recurrently been the object of 
political censure and public policy interest over the past 25 years. Attention 
increased markedly in the wake of the global financial crisis as incentive systems 
were implicated in excessive risk taking and subsequent bank failings. The initial 
response to the crisis resulted in the Walker Review (2010) and Enterprise 
Regulatory and Reform Act (2013), yet the appetite for governance has not 
abated. From July 2016 to April 2017 - four reports have called for changes to the 
design and governance of executive pay. In all four instances, the pay problem 
was described differently, resulting in conflicting recommendations as well as 
bold attempts to fundamentally alter or abolish long established pay practices.  
 
Public, political and media attention to the issue of executive pay has ebbed and 
flowed since the 1980s, with political condemnation invariably triggered by 
events such as corporate failings, the financial crisis, stagnating wages, and 
growing concerns over labour inequality. Figure 1.3 illustrates the frequency with 
which the term ‘directors remuneration’ appeared in leading British newspapers, 
from 1982 - when the term first appeared - to 2014. The graph is intended to give 
the reader a sense of the cycles of media interest in executive pay. The main 
regulatory and governance initiatives - the Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury 
Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Directors Remuneration Report 
Regulations (2002), and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (2013) – are 
detailed in a timeline below the bar graph. These governance events 
unsurprisingly correlate with surges in media attention on the issue of pay. 
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Figure 1.5: Frequency of ‘Directors Remuneration’ in UK Newspapers 
 
With the exception of the DRR (2002) and the ERR (2013), the approach to 
governance of executive pay has largely rested with best practice corporate 
governance codes, established by industry-led committees or institutional investor 
representative bodies such as the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the 
National Association for Pension Funds (NAPF). Shareholders and particularly 
institutional investors have been cast in an oversight role since the 1980s. 
Thatcher’s enterprise culture, premised on less state intervention in private sector 
and market functions, meant that shareholders – those with ‘skin in the game’ – 
were called upon to monitor and actively participate in governance systems. 
Shareholders’ ‘voices’ were later bolstered by the DRRR (2002) and the ERR 
(2013) which introduced a mandatory non-binding vote on the remuneration 
report and a binding vote on the remuneration policy, respectively.  
 
Given the significant regulatory changes introduced in the ERR (2013), in 
particular, it was somewhat surprising that less than two years later, the 
Investment Association established the Executive Remuneration Working Group 
(ERWG), an independent panel, to address concerns with complexity in executive 
pay design. Concurrently, the Big Innovation Centre21 convened the Purposeful                                                         
21 The Big Innovation Centre is a British based open innovation hub. Open Innovation 
is "a distributed innovation process based on purposively managed knowledge flows 
across organizational boundaries, using pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms in line 
# of ar
ticles 
 34 
Company Task Force in 2015. This was followed by two state-led initiatives, a 
BEIS Parliamentary Select Committee report and a BEIS-led consultation on 
corporate governance in 2016. The following subsection describes these 
initiatives in further detail.  
 
No solution in sight 
 
There is consensus amongst business leaders, institutions, think tanks, boards and 
politicians that executive pay should be aligned with the long-term strategy of the 
company, incentivising the generation of long-term value while dis-incentivizing 
the pursuit of short-term results at the expense of long-term results. Recent 
discourse, both locally and internationally22, has centred on stewardship, long 
termism and a broadened stakeholder concept (Economist, 2016; WEF, 2016; 
May, 2016) as critical for the improvement of executive pay design and 
governance. Yet, this is where the similarities end. 
 
Political interest in corporate governance surged in response to ‘failings’ at Tesco, 
BHS, and Sports Direct. These governance failings ignited a fierce debate on 
executives’ corporate responsibilities and the extent to which these include 
worker and societal interests. Concerns with corporate governance has also been 
voiced recently in academic and policy circles due to the perceived entrenched 
wealth for the top 1% (Piketty, 2013; Oxfam, 2016) or the ‘privileged few’ (May, 
2016), and the implications for ‘social cohesion’ in Britain (TPC, 2017). The 
incredible growth in executive pay over the last 30 years contrasts sharply to 
stagnating or declining real pay levels for the broader workforce. While concerns 
with pay inequality have been associated with executive remuneration in the past 
                                                                                                                                                       
with the organization's business model" (Chesbrough and Bogers, 2014). This particular 
innovation hub is a space for businesses, national public agencies and universities to pool 
and share resources, including technology, IP, data, skills, space, entrepreneurial finance. 
22  Examples include: (1) Report publication in September 2016 by the International 
Business Council of the World Economic Forum entitled The New Paradigm: A 
Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and 
Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth. (2) The Investor 
Forum - representing approximately 35% of the FTSE all share market cap – was 
established to ‘promote a longer-term approach to investing in UK companies.’  (3) 
Martin Sorrell, CEO of WPP, and one of the most controversially paid executives in 
Britain, reiterated the need for long termism in the Economist Special Issue on ‘The 
World in 2017.’  
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(The Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth23, 1975), the 
link has been substantially reinforced in the wake of the global financial crisis, the 
growing anti-capitalist and anti-corporatist Occupy movements in the UK.  
 
Despite the consensus described earlier, non-state actors have conceived of the 
pay problem differently and subsequently tabled solutions, which stand in 
opposition to key government proposals. In September 2015, leading institutional 
investor body, the Investment Association, launched an Executive Remuneration 
Working Group to radically simplify executive pay. The group’s final report24 
identified the problem with executive pay as follows: 
 
Executive pay is opaque to the outsider and difficult even for some 
participants, remuneration committees and shareholders to understand. 
Growing complexity has contributed to poor alignment between executives, 
shareholders and the company, sometimes leading to levels of remuneration 
which are very difficult to justify. 
 
A central cause of this complexity is that companies feel they are forced to 
adopt a one-size-fits-all LTIP model. 
 
The ERWG recommended three solutions to the LTIP problem: an improved 
LTIP Model, the payment of deferred bonuses in shares, and/or the introduction 
of Restricted Share Awards.  
 
Concurrently, the Big Innovation Centre convened the Purposeful Company Task 
Force. The Task Force, a collaboration of academics and executive remuneration 
practitioners, published The Purposeful Company Policy Report in February 
2017. The Report made a strong case for the de-emphasis of performance-based 
incentives, arguing that evidence demonstrated that incentive plans based on 
performance targets over periods of 1 to 3 years may cause short term behaviour 
to the detriment of purpose and long-term value. The report encouraged the use of 
long-term equity and debt holdings, with equity released to executives in phases 
over 5 to 7 years.  
 
                                                        
23 Also known as the Diamond Commission   
24 The final report was published in July 2016 
 36 
As noted earlier, in 2016, the state was catalysed into action by corporate failings 
at Tesco, BHS and Sports Direct. In her bid for party leadership, Theresa May 
homed in on corporate governance in order to demonstrate her commitment to 
righting the corporate wrongs. May stated that ‘there is an irrational, unhealthy 
and growing gap between what these companies pay their workers and what they 
pay their bosses’ and further stated: 
 
The people who run big businesses are supposed to be accountable to 
outsiders, to non-executive directors, who are supposed to ask the difficult 
questions, think about the long-term and defend the interests of 
shareholders… as we have seen time and time again – the scrutiny they 
provide is just not good enough. 
 
May went on to suggest a binding vote on remuneration policy, full disclosure of 
bonus targets and the CEO pay ratio, and consumer and employee representation 
on boards. On all these points, she received push back from think tanks, the 
Institute of Directors, institutional investors or corporations. 
 
The Government’s Green Paper on Corporate Governance was released in 
November 2016 25  and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS) report entitled ‘Corporate Governance’26 was published in April 
2017. In contrast to the ERWG and Task Force reports, the BEIS committee 
report recommended the abolition of LTIPs altogether by 2018 and the re-
introduction of deferred stock options. The BEIS report also recommended the 
publication of pay ratios, and the inclusion of employees on the remuneration 
committee, items that met with objection when proposed by Theresa May.  
 
Some have voiced concerns that statutory regulation should be limited or targeted 
(Ferrarini et al., 2010), or it is not yet warranted given the recency of the 2013 
statutory changes, and its unproven effectiveness. Where the government has, in 
recent decades, adhered to a practice of evaluating regulatory effectiveness after 
major legislative change, and/or prior to further regulatory action, this latest                                                         
25  The Green Paper, issued by Business Secretary Greg Clark, called for views on 
executive pay, strengthening employee and customer voice, and corporate governance in 
large private businesses. The consultation period ended in February 2017, and the final 
report is pending.  
26 The BEIS report was produced by a Commons Select Committee, Chaired by Labour’s 
Iain Wright.  
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iteration in government intervention does not appear to have adequately assessed 
the previous round of regulatory changes. With only one AGM season of 
shareholder voting on the remuneration policy having elapsed, there is limited 
evidence on the effectiveness of the mandatory voting mechanism introduced in 
2013.   
A rushed regulatory response to public indignation threatens to overlook key 
concerns. Contemporary practices in executive design are the product of complex 
social, economic and political conditions; 30-year histories of establishing norms, 
structures and practices. These pre-conditions have often been subordinated in the 
extant literature, with researchers listing key governance events as a summary of 
the institutional environment in which executive pay is designed and governed. 
The following section reviews the academic literature, further highlighting the 
need for a more careful and in-depth examination of the system of remuneration 
governance, both past and present.   
 
1.6 Key Contributions 
 
The substantive chapters contribute to several academic discourses.   
Table 1.3 Contributions to academic discourse 
 
Chapter Overview Academic research 
3 The emergence of executive 
remuneration consulting 
 
The emergence of occupations, the 
sociology of occupational groupings 
 
4 The co-emergence of 
remuneration consultants and 
remuneration committees 
 
Auditor independence; Accountability, 
Gatekeepers and corporate governance 
5 Field based study of 
Remuneration consulting 
work 
Social construction of knowledge and 
expertise; Elite identities; Knowledge-
intensive firms, organizations and work 
(KIFOW) 
  
6 Pay benchmarking practice Social processes of commensuration, 
Theory of pay benchmarking 
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First and foremost, much has been assumed of remuneration consultants with 
respect to their role in the upward ratchet of executive pay. Yet, there has been 
little in depth study of these critically placed actors. This thesis not only studies 
the historical emergence of executive remuneration consulting, but also the 
consultants’ situated practice. Neither a comprehensive history of the occupation, 
nor a field-based study of executive remuneration consulting is known to the 
researcher; thus, the contributions are manifold. There are two key findings when 
analysing the historical emergence of the occupation. First, consultants (or rather 
the lawyers, accountants and actuaries who first carried out executive pay 
advisory work) were not pursuing a professionalisation project (Larson, 1977). In 
its place, a dominant market logic propelled the formation of the field of 
remuneration consulting practice. Later, as regulation of executive pay disclosure 
exploded in 2002, the occupational grouping appealed to a gatekeeping logic, 
thereby broadening their work domain and producing their relevance in 
remuneration governance work.  
 
The study of consultants’ day-to-day tasks informs two discourses. In the 
sociology of professions and occupations, there has been a lengthy debate on the 
production of knowledge and expertise, and the means by which market closure is 
achieved and legitimacy sustained in the absence of abstract knowledge, 
licensure, or accreditation processes. Existing with neither abstract knowledge 
(Abbott, 1988) nor accreditation, the thesis contributes to our understanding of 
how vulnerable occupations buttress their expert claims. Taking a deeper dive - in 
Chapter 6 - with respect to studying the practice of pay benchmarking, the thesis 
describes the mechanisms by which the ratchet occurs in pay benchmarking work, 
and the cultural logic, which propels it.  
 
By investigating the broader network of human and material action, and 
explicating the linkages and interdependencies within the network, the thesis 
enriches our understanding of the dynamic processes involved in executive pay 
practices. It is in analysing these linkages that scholars can make sense of the 
executive pay packages and practices, which have become increasingly 
controversial in recent decades. The contributions of each chapter are presented in 
further detail in Chapter 8.  
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1.7 A brief note on chapter overlap 
 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 6, where key governance episodes or events are important 
pre-conditions for the emergence of norms and practices, there is a tendency for 
the historical narratives to include redundant information. Where possible, such 
overlap is avoided. However, as the chapters are also sufficiently distinct, often 
with stand-alone literature reviews and different conceptual frames, repetition is 
preferred to the underdevelopment of the narrative.  Figure 1.6 below illustrates 
the historical overlap. 
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Figure 1.6: Timeline of key executive pay-related events and governance episodes 
 
 
   Source: Researcher  
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Chapter 2 
Research Methods 
 
 
2.0 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 1, the study is described as one deeply interested in the social 
dynamics of executive pay design and governance in UK public companies. 
However, when the study was initially proposed for doctoral research, it was 
fitted with a different methodological point of departure. While changing a 
study’s methods is neither surprising nor unusual in the course of doctoral 
research, fundamental changes to the methodological approach are less common. 
Although methodology has been described as ‘a general approach to the study of 
research topics’ (Silverman, 1993), there is arguably little that is ‘general’ when 
comparing and contrasting methodologies.  
 
The methodological approach taken by a researcher provides insights as to the 
philosophical underpinnings, which shape and guide the research project. 
Methodology influences how the researcher puzzles over phenomena, the 
questions designed to explore the phenomena, and the data collected, interpreted, 
theorised and re-presented in written accounts. The critical re-directions taken in 
this research were integral in shaping the research study and design, and 
importantly, the researcher.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 briefly describes the original 
formulation of the study and the reasons it was re-formulated. Section 2.2 briefly 
summarises the methodological approach, and Section 2.3 describes the research 
design. Section 2.4 details the data sources, Section 2.5 describes the approaches 
taken in analysing the data and writing the chapters.  
 
 
2.1 Original project formulation  
 
From the study’s first conceptualisation in early 2012, executive remuneration 
design and determination in large public companies was the object of interest. The 
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initial formulations of the research question sought answers to the effects of 
regulation on executive pay packages. The methods - though loosely specified – 
were ‘mixed’, suggesting both qualitative and quantitative methods would be used 
in the study. There was the idea that interviews and/or surveys could supply data, 
which could then be coded into quantified or binary data points. These data points 
in turn could be used in multiple regression analyses. Regression analysis held the 
potential to elucidate causal relationships between executive pay and key features 
of the institutional environment. Specifying the independent variables for the 
regression analysis required a sound understanding of the institutional 
environment in which public company executive pay was designed.  
 
Through an examination of the remuneration literature within the fields of 
accounting, economics and finance, it became evident that accounts of the 
institutional environment failed to critically engage with who, why and how 
questions. Such as: Who designs pay? How is pay designed? What work tasks are 
involved in designing pay? And then at the more granular level: Why are 
performance share plans chosen over stock options? Why is total shareholder 
return used over earnings per share when measuring performance for triggering 
incentive payouts?  
 
These are just a small sample of the questions, which went unanswered as the 
study progressed. This raised concerns about building an empirical model upon an 
incomplete or rather inadequately researched foundation. Adding to the concerns 
was the awareness that the results from prior empirical quantitative studies were 
largely ambivalent. The theoretical and conceptual reliance on optimal contracting 
theory and ‘managerial capture’ cast a long shadow on research questions and 
research design. The extant body of research was what Miller and Power (2013) 
might describe as methodological reductionism 27  (p. 575). 28  Furthermore, 
executive remuneration research was stagnating. New research projects were often                                                         
27 Italics in original 28 This study is not at attempt to engage in a critique of empirical quantitative methods 
(or market based accounting research). The researcher recognises the limitations of these 
studies, in particular, where accounts are ‘behaviourally thin’ (Miller and Power, 2013, 
p.575), where assumptions are oversimplified or key actors are altogether omitted from 
the research. 
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premised on the latest change in regulation, such as the introduction of a 
mandatory non-binding vote on the remuneration report in 2002 or the 
introduction of a mandatory binding vote on remuneration policy in 2013.  
 
As Coffee (2006) described in his influential book, ‘academics tend to plough and 
re-plough the same furrow over and over’ (p.1), thereby overlooking a host of 
actors and action. In corporate governance research, Coffee identified several 
examples, including security analysts, credit-rating agencies and investment 
bankers, and their under-researched role in corporate gatekeeping. In 
remuneration governance research, rich accounts of executive remuneration 
consultants, reward and human resource managers, institutional investors and 
remuneration committees would advance this field of research. Yet, behaviourally 
rich accounts were impeded when researchers ‘paint’ actors with the same broad 
(corporate governance) brush. This particularly occurs in remuneration 
governance literature when the conflicts of interest anticipated for an auditor’s 
gatekeeping role are assumed to be the same conflicts of interest for remuneration 
consultants or remuneration committee members. Yet, as Covaleski and Dirsmith 
(1990) state: 
 
“Social reality is too complex and ill-structured to be adequately 
represented by any one data set, theoretical perspective, or 
organizational position of social actor studied, because these tend to 
suppress conflict, anomaly and uniqueness.” 
 
Researchers should instead seek social explanations for the choices which actors 
make, instead of conflating meaning across different actor groups.  Ideas such as 
managerial capture should not be taken as self-evident, but empirically grounded 
with respect to the key actors identified in remuneration governance. The study of 
pay design and governance must ‘maximise information, not facilitate 
generalisation’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Indeed, generalisations have a role to 
play within academic research, however, persistent contradictory findings within 
the remuneration literature has undermined the generalisability of research 
findings.  
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It is for these reasons that the project’s initial interest in quantitatively testing the 
determinants of executive pay was abandoned. The object of interest shifted 
toward investigating the key social actors, their actions, and their interactions. It is 
within the web of interrelations that the dynamic and highly negotiated processes 
of executive pay design and governance is revealed. Thus, new research questions 
were created and the research design fundamentally re-imagined.  
 
A new proposal was agreed upon in March 2014, and an interview protocol was 
designed for the first exploratory interviews between March and May of 2014. 
Through these stages, the interest in social interactions amongst actors deepened. 
As established within qualitative research traditions, social reality is constituted 
through social interactions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Lincoln and Guba, 
1985; Power, 2003). A social constructivist perspective emerged as the core 
philosophy guiding the study’s methodological approach. The following section 
unpacks this methodological approach.  
 
2.2 Methodological approach 
 
As described in Chapter 1, Chapter 3 and 4 draw on a genealogical approach to 
studying the historical emergence of remuneration consulting, the emergence of 
remuneration committees and the co-emergence of remuneration consultant and 
RemCos. Chapter 5 is based on a participant observation and interviews. The 
engagement in the field was influence by ethnographic methodology. A social 
constructivist perspective shapes Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
2.3 Research Design 
 
Given that social relations and interactions were of principal interest in this study, 
qualitative research methods were best suited to collecting the empirical material 
needed to answer the research questions posed. Qualitative methods were 
described by Covaleski & Dirsmith (1990) as: 
 
‘an umbrella term applied to a number of interpretive techniques directed 
at describing, translating, analysing, and otherwise inferring the meanings 
of events or phenomena occurring in the social world’  
 45 
However, these methods are not without challenges. Covaleski & Dirsmith (1990) 
describe the paradox for qualitative researchers, ‘that in recognizing the social 
construction of a subjective reality, the objectivity of the research itself becomes 
problematic’ (p. 545). This study is the social construction of a subjective reality, 
and thus rejects the notion that some objective reality exists ‘out there.’  
 
In order to achieve plausibility and trustworthiness of the study, there were a 
number of procedures interwoven from the research phase to bolster the rigour of 
the data collection processes. These included establishing interview protocols 
prior to commencing the interview series. The protocol not only included the four 
interview questions but an adjacent column detailing the rationale for the 
question. The practice of justifying the question and the wording of the questions, 
shed light on possible interviewer biases. They procedures functioned as checks 
and balances on data collection and analysis processes.29 As noted earlier, there 
are three key sources of data: archives, interviews, and fieldnotes.  
 
2.3.1 Archival data 
 
Archival materials provide invaluable insights into historical events, and are often 
the only accounts available of these past events. Archival accounts are ‘not 
neutral, factual, technical documents’ (Van Maanen & Pentland, 1994); archives 
interpret the events that are recorded, upon which the researcher applies another 
layer of interpretation. Rather than a limitation of archival use, these layers of 
interpretation enable the archives’ conditions of possibility. As Ventresca and 
Mohr (2001) describe: 
 
‘the use of archival materials is never innocent or transparent. The 
conditions of their production and of their persistence mean that materials 
often offer partial or contradictory evidence for an interpretation. 
Recognition of the inherently political and residual features of archival 
material is thus a central methodological concern.’ 
 
                                                        
29 For this, I am particularly indebted to Professor Matthew Hall for insisting that I 
develop protocols and procedures for all methods deployed.  
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It is this contradictory evidence and the political and residual features which 
trigger investigation into corollaries adjacent to the document. Thus, the 
interpretative potential of the archive enables the researcher to connect with the 
broader fabric of ‘agencies, arguments and mechanisms’ (Miller, 1991, p.733). As 
Carnegie and Napier (1996) described, but within the context of accounting 
histories: 
  
‘The purpose of widening the scope of the “archive” in this way is to find 
not only evidence of the form of past accounting records but also some idea 
of how those who prepared and used the accounts regarded (or perhaps 
ignored) them.’ (p. 18) 
 
Thus, in this study, it is not enough to review the regulatory and governance 
documents. In order to glean a sense of the broader relevant discourses, archival 
materials were collected from multiple sources. These included the financial and 
mainstream press (e.g. The Financial Times, The Guardian, The Sunday Times), 
governance guidelines (e.g. ABI, NAPF), draft regulations, consultation 
responses, final (and enacted) legislation, transcripts from parliamentary hearings, 
periodicals (e.g. The Economist, The Institute of Directors, the Bank of England), 
the Cadbury Archives (for data specific to directors’ remuneration), academic 
research, and critically, the corpus of corporate governance codes pertaining to 
remuneration governance from the 1970s. Table 2.1 (on p. 47) lists the corporate 
governance codes and regulatory documents reviewed.  
 
In addition to the documents above, the years 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 of the 
Director monthlies, totally 48 magazines, were reviewed to ascertain the Institute 
of Directors’ (IoD) and the industry’s ‘take’ on Thatcher’s income and taxation 
policies and importantly the introduction of executive stock options from 1984. 
Articles that focused on directors pay or pay consultants were read in detail, the 
excerpts from which were stored in a document dedicated to Institute of 
Directors-related materials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
Table 2.1 Corporate Governance Codes and Regulation 
 
 
 
The Cadbury Archives, housed by the Cambridge Judge Business School include 
papers, letters, meeting minutes and hand written notes compiled and stored by 
Sir Adrian Cadbury from his time chairing the Cadbury committee. The archive’s 
documents are coded by theme. Of the top 20 themes, ‘executive remuneration’ 
comprised 35 documents and ‘remuneration committees’ comprised 15 
documents. All 50 documents were reviewed. The letters, meeting minutes, and 
hand written notes, which captured interactions between Sir Cadbury and 
Jonathan Charkham (then Governor of the Bank of England), were of particular 
use in gleaning their views on remuneration within the context of the committee’s 
deliberations and the challenges likely to be encountered with possible 
governance mechanisms (for example, a shareholder vote on directors’ pay).                                                          
30 Formerly the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Year  Report Title 
1973 Watkinson Report: “The Responsibilities of the British Public Company” 
1992 Cadbury Report:  “Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance” 
1995 Greenbury Study: “Directors’ Remuneration” 
1998 Hampel Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
1999 Department of Trade and Industry Consultative Document 
2001 Myners Report: “Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review” 
2002 Directors Remuneration Reporting Regulations 
2003  Higgs Report: “Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors” 
2009 Walker Review (2009) “A review of corporate governance in UK banks and 
other financial industry entities” 
2013  Enterprise Reform Bill 
2016 Executive Remuneration Working Group  
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy30 (BEIS) Green Paper 
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Remuneration consulting field 
 
In order to construct an image of the field of remuneration consulting, the 
researcher created a database of senior consultant profiles. Ten columns were 
created: Name, Current Company, Current Role, Previous (1), Previous (2), 
Previous (3), Previous (4), Qualifications31 , Additional Notes, LinkedIn, (See 
Appendix A for an extract from the ‘Profiles’ database). 
 
The majority of these columns were populated with data from the consultants 
LinkedIn profiles, firm website profiles or biographies, and interview data. The 
title ‘Previous’ referred to the consultants’ prior jobs or roles (if within the same 
firm. The heading ‘LinkedIn’ was populated with the ‘profession’, which the 
consultant selected in creating their LinkedIn profile. As the LinkedIn software 
presents a pre-established list of occupations and careers, of which remuneration 
consultant is not included, the consultants selected from the provided list in 
defining their profession. Thus, the self-declared professions included 
Management Consulting, Financial Services, Accounting, Human Resources and 
Legal Services. In total, 62 profiles were created for consultants working at the 
eight leading remuneration consultancies.  
 
The researcher also created a database to capture key information from the first 
Directors Remuneration Report for FTSE 100 companies. Eighty-three (83) of the 
FTSE 100 companies Remuneration reports were collected, and information 
entered in three columns: Company name, Adviser names, Narrative. The 
‘Narrative’ was the excerpt from the report, which detailed the number of times 
the remuneration committee met, their remit, their advisers, and in some cases 
whether the adviser provided other services, whether the adviser also worked for 
management, and a more detailed breakdown of the services provided (for 
example, market trends, incentive arrangements, benchmarks, pay surveys).  
 
 
                                                         31 The title ‘Qualifications’ was synonymous with designations or accreditation 
programmes, and also included tertiary education.  
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2.3.2 Participant Observation 
 
Participant observation is motivated by the desire to attain practical non-verbal 
knowledge of remuneration consulting work. As Burawoy (1991) stated: 
 
‘Advantages of participant observation are assumed to be not just in 
direct observations of how people act but also how they understand and 
experience those acts. It enables us (the researcher) to juxtapose what 
people say they are up to against what they actually do’ (p.2). 
 
In the request for field access, the researcher requested both elements of 
participation in remuneration consulting work, and observation of work activities. 
While the merits of both participating in work and observing work have been well 
established in the literature, some have argued that the perspectives of participant 
and observer are incommensurable (or oxymoronic) (DeWalt and De Walt, 2011). 
Paul (1953) states:  
 
Participation implies emotional involvement; observation requires 
detachment. It is a strain to try to sympathize with others and at the same 
time to strive for scientific objectivity. 
 
Yet, other researchers see this dichotomising as unhelpful. That observation 
enables only the documentation of the social setting but not an experience of it is 
untenable, ‘because to study the social world we must be part of it (see Atkinson 
and Hammersley 1998). However, there is something to be said for the ability to 
work alongside and in tandem with the key actors at the centre of the social 
phenomena under investigation.  
 
As Hall and Messner (2018) note, participation enables the researcher ‘to gain an 
insider’s understanding by learning to experience it as the members do’. It is 
participation, which allows the researcher to make local practice intelligible 
through interpretations of meaning.  Indeed, the participant must maintain a 
heightened awareness of where they ‘situate’ themselves with respect to the 
interpretation of meaning. This is why reflexivity is paramount in the work of 
qualitative field research. The researcher’s reflexivity is discussed in further detail 
later in the chapter.   
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As Burke (1992) stated of historical narratives, but for which there is applicability 
to field based narratives, the researcher needs ‘to find a way of making 
themselves visible in their narrative, not out of self-indulgence but as a warning to 
the reader that they are not omniscient or impartial and that other interpretations 
besides theirs are possible’ (p. 239).  
 
Thus, the researcher should have authority over the written account; not write an 
authoritative account. The calibre of a written account relies on the plausibility 
and trustworthiness (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1990) of the data collection and 
analysis processes, and the conclusions drawn. Thus, the research design is 
critical in mapping the procedures by which data will be collected, interpreted and 
re-presented in the written account.  
 
Field access 
 
Field access was an early aspiration of the study, and each interview presented an 
opportunity to explore whether the interviewee’s consultancy might entertain an 
internship opportunity. During a May 2015 interview with a principal at one of 
the leading remuneration consultancies, the principal was receptive to the 
researcher’s request for field access. Securing field access took a further 10 
months, during which four senior members of the consulting team interviewed the 
researcher on two separate occasions. The outcome was a 10-week internship 
during which the researcher would work as an entry-level analyst, able to both 
engage with work activities but also allowed to observe work activities. Due to 
the sensitivity of client data, the researcher was not permitted to work directly on 
client communications.  
 
Field study design 
 
Given the short duration of the field engagement, prior to entering the field, the 
researcher targeted certain areas of work for further investigation. As Hall and 
Messner (2018) noted, the question of what to observe is largely driven by the 
research question and interests of the researcher. Given that interviews with 
remuneration consultants had occurred in advance of the participant observation, 
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there was sufficient data to shape the researcher’s ideas about the core activities 
warranting more in depth study. Thus, the scope of the participant observation 
was guided by the following questions: 
 
(i) How are pay benchmarks constructed?  
(ii) What are the sources of pay data? Who collects it? Where is it stored? 
Is it in excel spread sheets? If so, how are the spreadsheets structured? 
(iii) Who is the client? How do consultants interact with clients? 
 
There were also research questions, which links the field-based research to 
broader themes within academic discourse: 
 
(iv) What are the material systems, which enable pay design? 
(v) How is the ‘market for talent’ socially constructed? 
(vi) Is pay benchmarking scientific or based on consultant judgement?  
 
While the research questions (above) provided some direction or guidance for the 
fieldwork, it did not preclude the observation of additional points of interest. It 
was not challenging for the researcher to maintain a sense of what was salient or 
important (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) in remuneration consulting work.  
 
Collecting field data 
 
As Latour (2005) once stated, ‘everything is data’. In order to capture this 
multitude of data, Latour suggested the use of four notebooks, which represented 
different, but connected, purposes. The first three of his suggested notebooks were 
emulated in this research design. Latour’s fourth notebook manifested as a list of 
theoretical themes, which emerged from the data analysis process.  
 
Notebook 1: The first notebook presented a detailed research log of dates and 
times the research would be conducted in the field. The first fieldwork notebook 
was the ‘fieldwork research log’. See Appendix B for a summary of this 
notebook.  
 
Notebook 2: This notebook comprised the researcher’s field notes (Flick, 2014), 
which detailed what was happening and what was being said, and recorded 
nonverbal cues and salient details of the context (Hall and Messner, 2018). For 
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example, in each meeting the researcher attended, the seating plans were quickly 
sketched.  The observations were first recorded descriptively, in order to grasp the 
field’s complexity (Hall and Messner, 2018; Spradley, 1980). The second 
notebook recorded both this ‘expanded’ account, and the ‘condensed’ account 
(Spradley, 1980). 
 
Notebook 3: The third notebook sought to capture the researcher’s thoughts, 
impressions, concerns, and puzzles, particularly as they relate to interactions with 
participants (Hall and Messner, 2018). Rather than a standalone book, a column 
was added adjacent to the ‘expanded’ fieldnotes in Notebook 2. This journal 
enabled the researcher to develop an ongoing reflexive awareness regarding her 
role in and ‘closeness’ to the field as the research unfolded (Gonzalez-Polledo, 
2015). 
 
The fourth notebook suggested by Latour seeks to capture the effect of the 
research on academic ideas, themes, discourse, concepts and theory. As Hall and 
Messner (2018) note: 
‘These notes may be sparked by a particularly interesting or unusual event 
or statement, or seeing a connection between an experience in the field 
and a particular theoretical idea or concept.’  
While a fourth notebook was not explicitly used, the underlying ideology was at 
the forefront of the thematic analysis of the data. While early readings of the data 
generated analytical codes, the second and third readings resulted in a list of 
theoretical codes. The theoretical codes were not ‘concrete’, rather these codes 
were ideas about how the empirical material linked to existing theories and 
concepts. It was an unfiltered and unencumbered process. It was only later that 
these ideas would be ‘tested’ for validity. This process of testing is discussed in 
Section 2.4.  
 
2.3.3 Interview Design 
 
Interviews have been described as the ‘bastion’ of research in the social sciences 
(Briggs, 1986, p. 1). Interviews are seen to be conducive to a qualitative 
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understanding of complex social phenomenon (McCracken, 1988), however, the 
preparation required is not to be underestimated. As Qu and Dumay (2011) 
caution, interviews demand ‘intensive listening and note taking, but also careful 
planning and sufficient preparation’ (p. 239).  
 
Careful planning not only entails the creation of an interview protocol, prior to 
that, the researcher must be clear on their beliefs about the role of interview data 
in the study, and the researcher’s role within the data collection and interpretation 
processes. Alvesson delineates two approaches or interview styles: the romanticist 
and the localist. In the romanticist view, Alvesson describes the researcher as one 
who believes they are uncovering some truth. The localist, on the other hand, 
treats interviews as social encounters, and ‘not merely a neutral conduit or source 
of bias but rather the productive site of reportable knowledge itself’ (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995). It is furthermore an awareness of the researcher’s role in 
constructing that ‘reportable knowledge.’ As Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) 
noted, ‘social phenomena do not exist independently of people’s understandings 
of them.’ This has two dimensions to it; first, how phenomena are understood by 
the actors, and second, how their accounts of such phenomena are understood and 
interpreted by the researcher. Thus, interview data, once interpreted and analysed 
produce distilled or ‘situated accounts of the phenomenon (Alvesson, 2003).  
 
In addition to designing the interview questions to be included in the protocol, 
there are a number of decisions for the qualitative researcher to contemplate, such 
as, which individuals to interview, the target number, and the type of interview 
(i.e. structured versus unstructured) (Doyle, 2004).  With respect to the target 
number of interviews, interview-based researchers have previously made 
reference to a saturation point. That is, the point at which the collection of new 
data sheds no further light in answering the research questions under 
investigation. This is an important distinction as each interview presents new 
information (and therefore potential data), even if at a diminishing marginal rate. 
However, saturation is gauged with respect to the information provided within the 
scope of the research questions. The interviews with remuneration consultants met 
such a point of saturation; however, interviews with the other key actors did not. 
As the study focused predominantly on the emergence of remuneration 
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consulting, the consultants and their work, this is not surprising. However, 
Chapter 7 will address in detail the future steps with respect to interviews with the 
other key actors, and how these interviews will inform research questions 
pertaining to the dynamics processes surrounding executive pay practices.  
 
Biographical Interviews 
 
There were two categories of interviews conducted in this study. The first 
category entailed interviews, which probed the career-biographies of former and 
current managing partners at the leading remuneration consulting practices. These 
eight (8) individuals had careers, which began in the 1970s or 1980s. The 
interviewees also represented the earliest wave of prominent remuneration 
consultants in the UK. In over half of the cases, the respondent was the first lead 
partner of newly formed remuneration consulting practices. The biographical 
flows of these central actors (Padgett and Powell, 2012) were influential in 
constructing the historical narrative presented in Chapter 3.  
 
While the accounts provided by the managing partners were rich and informative, 
Padgett and Powell (2012) have cautioned that often too much explanatory power 
is assigned to key individuals. However, in this case, the very nature of the field 
of remuneration consulting limited this from happening. Due to the high labour 
mobility of senior consultants, key events in the emergence of the consultancies 
were recounted by multiple interviewees. For example, there were three 
collections of the formation of the Remuneration Consultants Group from within 
this category of interviews (and additional accounts from the other category in 
interviews).  This served in bolstering the researcher’s confidence as the narrative 
was constructed. 
 
This unstructured interview style was exclusively used in the biographical 
interviews with the eight partners. In seeking to capture their ‘biographical flows’ 
(Padgett and Powell, 2012), the researcher refrained from directing the 
conversation, and instead interjected where clarification, examples or elaborations 
were needed. 
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Semi-structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used for the second category in the interview 
series. For consultants, remuneration committees, and heads of reward, the 
interview protocol comprised four questions. In the interview request sent to 
potential respondents, the researcher stated that she was interested in 
remuneration design and governance in the UK. Without exception, the first 
interview question posed to respondents was ‘what do you do?’ 
 
The second category of interviews, which entailed a further 54 individuals, 
included interviews with 36 remuneration consultants, 4 remuneration committee 
chairs/members, 2 executive directors, 1 board chairman, 4 heads of reward or HR 
directors, 4 corporate governance analysts, 2 think tank directors, and 1 politician.  
 
Table 2.2 Summary of Consultant Interviews 
 
Consultant 
Interviews 
 
Former 
Managing 
Partner 
 
Managing
/ Lead 
Partner 
 
Partner/ 
Principal 
 
Associate 
 
Analyst 
 
TOTAL 
Big 4 3 2 1 5 4 15 
Actuarial/ 
HR Psfs 1 3 5 5 6 20 
Boutique  1 3 2 1 7 
Sole 
Practitioner  2    2 
TOTAL 4 8 9 12 11 44 
 
 
Table 2.3 Summary of Non-consultant interviews 
 
RemCos 
 
Executive 
Directors 
 
 
Chairman 
 
HoR/HRD 
 
Governance32 
 
TOTAL 
4 2 1 4 7 18                                                         
32 This total includes governance analysts, think tank directors and the politician.  
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Table 2.4 Category I vs. Category II Interviews 
 
Category I 
(Biographical) 
 
Category II  
(Semi-Structured) 
 
 
TOTAL Interviews  8  54  62 
 
Thus, across the two categories, a total of 62 interviews were conducted for this 
study. Three remuneration consultants were interviewed a further 1-2 times 
following their initial interview. These respondents, in particular, could be 
described as informants (Spradley, 1980). They also served as ‘soundboards’ for 
the conceptual and theoretical linkages made with the interview data analysis.    
 
The ‘Interview Log’ detailed the interviewees’ name, contact details, 
date/medium of initial contact (and second or third contact, if applicable) and the 
interview date, location and duration.  
 
Interviews Transcripts 
 
Of the 62 interviews, 58 were recorded and transcribed. In the other instances, the 
respondents either declined being recorded or in one instance, the Dictaphone 
malfunctioned. The shortest interview was 20 minutes33 and the longest was just 
over 2 hours. The majority of the interviews were between 30-45 minutes in 
length, and there are over 500 pages of transcribed interview data.  
 
The first interview was conducted on 18 March 2014, and the most recent 
interview was conducted on 29 August 2017. The bulk of the interviews were 
conducted from January to June 2016.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33 This was an isolated incident. All other interviews exceeded 30 minutes in length 
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2.4 Thematic analysis 
 
The transcripts and fieldnotes were not read as ‘accounts’ of what happened ‘out 
there’, but ‘as an interpretation which is jointly produced by interviewer and 
respondent’ (Briggs, 1986, p. 3). The researcher continuously reflected on her role 
in the field and the interview, and later her role in the interpretation and analysis 
of the data. The analysis of data commenced once the data collection was 
substantially completed, and largely occurred in July and August of 2016, and 
was conducted in stages.34  
 
Stage 1: The (i) interview transcripts and (ii) fieldnotes were read ‘top to bottom’, 
without any highlighting or codes applied. The ‘quick read’ of the transcripts was 
meant to give a sense of the corpus to data derived from the interviews and 
fieldwork. Reading quickly and across the breadth of material also gave the 
researcher a sense of the overarching themes. These themes were jotted down. 
The suggestion was then made for the researcher to also consider and note themes 
that she expected or anticipated finding in the data.   
 
Stage 2: The interview transcripts were read for the second time. This entailed a 
slow and careful reading of each transcript. In this reading, interesting phrases 
were highlighted, and comment boxes created adjacent to the phrase. The 
comments summarised and reduced the highlighted phrase to an empirical code. 
The highlighting, summarising and coding was conducted on pdf-versions of the 
transcripts35 and fieldnotes.  
 
Stage 3: In the third (and often final) reading of a transcript, the analytical codes 
were derived by connecting the empirical codes to broader themes in academic 
and practitioner discourse. There was no a priori theory from which the research 
questions were derived. The data coding adhered to an inductive approach. The 
following table is one excerpt of how transcripts were distilled into codes: 
                                                        34 The data analysis process was critically shaped by Professor Matthew Hall 35 The transcripts were also uploaded to NVivo. In spite of the many features offered by the software, it was ultimately abandoned. The process of distilling the key themes relied on repeated cycles of reading and reflexivity.  
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Table 2.3 Inductive Coding 
Quote I know that if you hang 
your hat on pay for 
performance when all 
the drivers within the 
company then say well 
we’re all top 
performers that means 
we all get top pay. 
You’ve actually just 
shot yourself in the 
foot. 
 
(Sole practitioner) 
In order to sell those 
changes in pay levels, 
rather than saying it 
was just the reality of 
market forces, we 
created this story that 
it was around 
performance. Investors 
in particular required 
those additional 
amounts of pay, only to 
be for the achievement 
of [quite 00:12:44] 
stretching performance 
conditions. 
 
(Managing partner, 
Big4) 
For a period of time, it 
was in everybody's 
interest to believe that 
this was true, that it 
was genuinely an 
increase in 
performance related 
pay, that was driving 
increased pay [content 
00:12:57]. The problem 
is, as a result of that, 
we ended up with 
levels of variable pay 
that were 
unrealistically high, and 
implied a level of 
volatility that most 
executives would not 
accept. We've ended 
up with variable pay 
that isn't very variable 
as a result. 
 
(Managing partner, 
Big4) 
 
Code (i) Role of pay for 
performance (pfp) in 
the upward movement 
of pay. 
 
(i) Using pfp to justify 
high pay 
(ii) stretch targets 
contribute to higher 
pay levels 
(i) role of variable pay 
in upward movement 
of pay 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Reflexivity, Writing and Theorising  
 
Theoretical points of connection emerged in the latest stages of the study, and 
were importantly enabled by the process of constructing the narratives in each 
chapter. The process of establishing linkages between the empirical material and 
theory, as well as identifying anomalies and inconsistencies relied on the 
researcher’s reflexivity. The term ‘reflexivity’ has been a source of some 
contention within the social sciences. As Latour (2005), quips: 
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‘Reflexivity is not a birthright you transport with you just because you are at 
the LSE! You and your informants have different concerns—when they 
intersect it’s a miracle. And miracles, in case you don’t know, are rare’ (p.151) 
 
Reflexivity is not a process of revealing a true account to be packaged and re-
presented to the informants. Latour (2005) is reminding researchers that they have 
their own agendas, and must remain mindful of this. The researcher’s reflexivity 
is meant to achieve a depth of interpretation and analysis not possible otherwise. 
As Alvesson (2003) helpfully states:  
‘Reflexivity operates within a framework that stimulates an interplay 
between producing interpretations and challenging them. It includes opening 
up the phenomena through exploring more than one set of meanings and 
acknowledging ambiguity in the phenomena and the line(s) of inquiry 
favoured, and it means bridging the gap between epistemological concerns 
and method’ (p.14) 
 
The researcher most acutely experienced reflexivity during the late stage date 
analysis and write-up. Researchers have their strengths and their weaknesses. 
Amassing data – whether painstakingly or not – was a key strength of the 
researcher. Interpreting and analysing the data, initially weak, strengthened over 
the duration of the study. Theorising from the data, however, proved profoundly 
challenging.  
 
Scholars, in different ways, have spoken of the iterative process involved in data 
analysis, writing and theory development. Whether it is ‘tacking back and forth 
between the study participant and academic worlds’ (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 138), 
or ‘moving from the general to the local to the general’ (Baxter & Chua, 1998, p. 
80), ‘problem, theory and data influence each other throughout the research 
process’ (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 837). Davide Nicolini’s (2009) notion of 
‘zooming in and out’ is another take on the idea of ‘tacking back and forth 
between’ (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 138) empirical accounts and theory, and one 
which proved useful in making sense of how the researcher theorised from her 
data. As Nicolini (2009) states: 
 
By using empirical methods such as shadowing and historical analysis, and by 
employing notions such as that of translation and practice networks, we can 
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extend our articulative and practice-based investigation well beyond the 
accomplishment of practice and into the realm of the translocal and durable. 
Practice becomes in this way a convenient and usable ontological unit for 
making sense of a variety of organizational phenomena, from the existence of 
local forms of co-ordination to complex organizational arrangements such as 
large corporations, multinational firms and other highly institutionalized forms 
such as markets (Knorr-Cetina 2004) - all without having to forfeit the idea 
that ‘it is practices all the way down’ (p. 1411).  
 
In this study, the researcher never extracted herself from academic readings. 
However, the academic readings at times were overwhelming as the different 
dimensions of the study connected with different discourses. Yet, there was a 
mindfulness that an empirical account that remains untethered to a broader 
discourse is of limited value to scholars. Nicolini (2009) reminds researchers that 
empirical accounts must have ‘something’ to offer the academic discourse. This 
‘something’ is ‘the conceptual product of research’ (Klag and Langley, 2013, 
p.150). As Klag and Langley (2013) state: 
 
‘Making a conceptual leap involves bridging the gap between empirical 
data and theory: moving from the mass of words and other data (the world 
of the field), through and beyond the mechanics of analysis to an abstract 
and explicit set of concepts, relations and explanations that have meaning 
and relevance beyond the specific context of their development (the world 
of ideas)’ (p. 150) 
 
The lesson, for which no academic paper or methods course can adequately 
prepare one, is the duration and frustrated intensity of the period, which precedes 
the conceptual insight that ultimately leaps beyond the data. The period in 
anticipation and preparation for conceptual leaping, differed across the chapters.  
 
Chapter 3, for example, was re-worked (or re-written) five times. In fact, Chapter 
3 and 4, in an earlier iteration, was one narrative account, seeking to present a 
synthesized history of remuneration consultants from the early 1970s to 2015. 
However, as a single narrative account, it was untenable. It was only in creating 
two accounts instead of one that the tension was relieved; the emergence of 
consulting work needed to precede the co-emergence of the committee and 
consultant. For Chapters 3 and 4, the challenge in constructing the historical 
narratives were two fold; managing voluminous archival data sources through 
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copious timeline diagrams, while overlaying the biographical interview data onto 
those timelines.  
 
In Chapter 5, the notebooks were essential in constructing the narrative. However, 
the decision to include Notebook 3 as a column alongside Notebook 2 proved to 
be problematic in the latter stages of analysis as the insights from the informants 
at times sat too closely to the insights from the researcher, thereby impacting the 
clear articulation of the field experience vis a vis the researcher’s interpretation of 
the field experience. This is more so a lesson for the researcher in writing up the 
field-based account rather than a lesson in delineating the voice of the informant 
versus the voice of the researcher.  
 
Chapter 6 - more so than any other chapter - was constructed on the ‘set of 
sensibilities’ described in Chapter 1. The accepted notion that the market for 
executive talent and the pay benchmark existed as objective facts, as well as the 
implication that consultants were involved in the upward ratchet of pay 
constituted the dominant discourse. Yet, the data and data interpretation linked to 
these concerns contested these unquestioned and taken for granted ‘facts’. 
Challenging existing theory proved to be the researcher’s greatest obstacle, yet 
once overcome, the contributions made toward theorising pay benchmarking 
practice presented the greatest reward in the academic training of the researcher.  
 
How was this obstacle overcome? As a function of the study’s data collection and 
analysis, (i) the genealogy of executive pay surveys, (ii) the field notes on pay 
benchmarking practice, and (iii) the archival account on the role of regulation in 
‘shaping’ the market for executive pay, all now existed. To leap, these three 
seemingly distinct yet related accounts had to be linked.  And in so doing, the 
ability to theorise from the interconnected written account was made possible. It 
took gut and gumption. The chapters that follow exhibit a similar pattern – 
empirical account and then conceptual leap. In the future, these leaps will be made 
a little more boldly, and hopefully a little faster.  
 
 
 
 
 62 
Chapter 3 
The Emergence of Executive Remuneration Consulting 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
"You've got the strategy consultant knocking on the door of the CEO and the 
CEO is not answering. The Rem consultant is going up the back stairs straight 
into the boardroom."36 
 
In 1987, the term ‘remuneration consultant’ appeared in the Financial Times for 
the first time. In the thirty years that ensued, remuneration consultants became 
central actors in the design and governance of executive remuneration in FTSE 
350 companies. This chapter studies how the ‘Rem consultant’ attained relevance 
in executive pay design from the 1980s, and relevance in pay governance from the 
early 2000s. Tracing the emergence of executive remuneration consulting means 
elucidating the ‘multiple conditions and sources of beginning’ (Power, 2015) and 
the ‘contingent turns of history’ (Foucault, 1971) which shaped remuneration 
consulting work and the actors engaged in it. In so doing, the chapter sheds light 
on the social, economic and political pre-conditions critical to the formation and 
stabilisation of this new occupational grouping. 
 
Taking a genealogical approach, this chapter problematizes the linear, 
evolutionary and ‘rationally inevitable trends’ (Foucault, 1971) often assumed to 
unfurl in the emergence of a new occupational field.  Where related fields of 
management consulting and human resource management sought the classic 
hallmarks of a profession – accreditation, degree programmes, self-regulatory 
bodies - remuneration consultants did not pursue a ‘professionalisation project’ 
(Larson, 1977), or abstract their knowledge (Abbott, 1988) to prevent 
‘commodification or colonization’ of their work (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001). 
Rather than taking these seemingly natural steps in securing market closure and 
social prominence, executive remuneration consulting work was predominantly 
built upon a market logic. The field emerged from the divisions of established and 
accredited professionals claiming competence in new work domains, and namely 
executive pay advice. In 2002, the state introduced regulation for executive pay                                                         
36 Interview with Principal, Professional Service Firm 
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disclosure and governance, the nascent field of remuneration consulting 
opportunistically absorbed governance related work tasks, by appealing to a 
‘gatekeeping’ logic (Coffee, 2006).  This gatekeeping logic initially complements 
their dominant market logic, while inadvertently setting the stage for the later 
allegations of the consultants’ role in the upward ratchet of executive pay.  
 
Executive remuneration consulting is also an interesting setting in which to study 
the formation and stabilisation of a new occupation, as it occurs within the ‘walls’ 
of professional service firms. Researchers are increasingly interested in how 
practices begin, and how new occupational groupings formalise within the psf 
setting (Hinings et al., 2015). The chapter presents insights into the strategies 
employed by competing psfs as they sought to gain a foothold in new spheres of 
work. Perhaps more interestingly is the finding that the leading remuneration 
consultancies appear remarkably similar – both structurally and culturally - 
despite their emergence occurring in varying psf settings, suggesting the 
homogeneity in norms, structures, and practices across psfs.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 describes the period before 
executive remuneration consulting existed as an occupational field, and the 
important efforts by Towers Perrin to provide pay data to British companies. 
Section 3.2 describes key Thatcher’s economic and public policies, which 
triggered the proliferation of executive stock options and revolutionised executive 
pay in Britain. Section 3.3 details the formation of remuneration advisory practice 
within and alongside professional service firms. Section 3.4 establishes links 
between the Cadbury Report and the rise of remuneration governance. Section 3.5 
describes the emergent occupation, detailing the stabilisation of remuneration 
consulting work within psf settings. Section 3.6 examines the socio-economic 
climate, which triggered social anxiety on the issue of executive pay, prompting 
the convening of the Greenbury Study Group. Section 3.7 details the political and 
economic pre-conditions which influenced the introduction of statutory 
regulation. Section 3.8 describes the corporate governance work for which the 
consultants made themselves relevant. And Section 3.9 analyses the multiple 
logics, which shape remuneration consulting work. 
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3.1 Remuneration advice in the 1970s 
 
‘We'd had vast amounts of pay controls in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s… 
Basically, executive pay, as a separate thing, didn't really exist at all.’37 
 
Wright is describing an era in which executive pay advice did not exist as a 
standalone service or niche practice. While remuneration advice indeed existed, it 
was not yet the tripartite of base salary, short term incentive and long term 
incentive that would later become commonplace.  
 
Importantly limiting the diversity in executive remuneration packages was 
Britain’s tax regime; then considered to be one of the most punitive in the 
world. From 1960 to 1979, successive governments maintained income policies as 
a means of managing the economy (Williamson, 2004), imposing limits on the 
rate of wage increases throughout the workforce. The stagnant pay levels and a 
top rate of income tax at 83% meant that ‘all sorts of benefits were agreed’38 as 
cash incentives were seen to be prohibitively expensive. The most common 
benefit for executives was the company car. Other perquisites included gold bars, 
fine wine, platinum sponge, and access to luxury properties. Remuneration advice 
for the executives of British companies was principally concerned with reducing 
the tax burden: ‘It’s slightly shameful that we were giving advice on 
fundamentally how to get around pay controls’39 This was particularly the case for 
the executives of British companies, and was not seen to be the most desirable 
advisory work for those offering remuneration advice: 
 
‘The very interesting thing, in a sense, about remuneration consulting in 
those days, is that the big pay, the interesting, exciting pay was among 
American companies, because if you go to the late 70's, big British 
companies, ICI40, Shell, BP… they didn't pay bonuses, they didn't have long 
term incentives. They were losing executives to American companies, which 
not only paid better base salaries, but actually paid in different forms.’41                                                          37 Interview with Vicky Wright, former President of the CIPD and former Worldwide 
Head of Hay’s Reward Consulting 
38 Ibid 
39 Interview with former Partner at what is now Willis Towers Watson (formerly Towers 
Perrin, then Towers Watson) 
40 Imperial Chemical Industries was the largest UK manufacturer & exporter in the 1970s. 
41 Interview with former partner 
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The pay packages offered to executives in the US and for subsidiaries of US firms 
were seen to be interesting because stock options and bonus schemes were already 
commonplace. Consultants at Towers Perrin 42  and Hay Associates were 
acquainted with the three prong pay packages on offer to American executives. 
Establishing UK offices enabled these American consultancies to serve their US 
clients with European subsidiaries. In spite of the seemingly limited scope of pay 
advice beyond their US client base, there was a strong desire by Towers’ 
actuarial, benefits, communications and direct pay43 (ABCD) business to provide 
services to large, reputable British companies. This would come in the form of 
pay survey data services.  
 
3.1.1 Towers’ first mover advantage 
 
Executive pay surveys44 were not pervasive practice in Britain in the 1970s. While 
the British Management Institute (BMI) archives list records of remuneration 
surveys as early as 1961, Britain’s largest companies relied upon a pay club 
known as the Chairman’s Group45 to discuss and swap information on the pay 
package of senior executives. The Chairman’s Group comprised around 20 
chairmen from Britain’s largest listed companies, and pay information was often 
swapped on a ‘rather ad hoc basis’ and for specific cases. It was described as 
operating with ‘no notes, or very few notes.’4647 This ad hoc swap presented an 
opportunity for Towers to offer British Chairmen a more systematic approach to 
the collection and circulation of (anonymised) pay data. However, Towers first                                                         
42  According to Crystal (1991), executive compensation consulting, as an organized 
profession, did not get started in any meaningful way in the United States until the 1950s. 
This rise was linked to two occurrences; the introduction of executive compensation 
surveys, first introduced by McKinsey Director Arch Patton in the late 1950s. Second, 
Crystal (1991) noted that the practice grew steadily due to the popularization of stock 
options in the 1950s and a strong stock market. This is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
43 Base pay, annual bonus, long term incentive 
44 The first executive pay survey was designed by consulting firm McKinsey Director 
Arch Patton in the 1950s. 
45 Young and Scott (2004) described the Chairman’s Group as “shadowy’ and ‘a sort of 
pay club for the great and good, which enabled the chairpersons of selected large 
companies to meet and discreetly and compare detailed notes on each other’s 
compensation arrangements.  
46 Although initial meetings were amongst Chairmen, it was later delegated to company 
secretaries.  
47 Interview with former managing partner 
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had to establish a reputation in the UK with regard to pay surveys. And they did 
so by managing the surveys for American companies with European subsidiaries.  
These early surveys tended to be industry specific. One of the first industry 
specific surveys focused on the hi-tech sector, and for which Towers managed the 
database from the 1970s to the 1980s. A second survey, which was critical in 
establishing Towers’ reputation in the UK, was the Parker Pen Compensation 
Survey. The survey was managed and analysed by Towers Perrin, and importantly 
promoted by the head of HR at Parker Pen. The compensation data in this survey 
included around 70 American companies, including the likes of Kodak and IBM, 
which were pre-eminent organizations during this time. Although Towers growth 
and data services were ‘very, very oriented to US subsidiaries,’ the influx of US 
banks into Europe spurred Towers’ UK client base.   
 
Few US banks had European branches in the 1960s; however, the 1970s 
witnessed the rapid growth in foreign operations for US banks of all sizes48 
(Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1999). Like Towers’ other US clients, the banks had 
the same need for data, and ‘through good luck, and good fortune’; Towers also 
penetrated this market, growing their databases to incorporate banking sector data. 
More critically, the increased presence of the banks and subsidiaries had 
implications for the demand of highly skilled labour. As British companies started 
losing senior executives to American companies ‘that not only paid better salaries, 
but actually paid in different forms,’ there was growing interest amongst UK 
executives in accessing competitive pay information. With Towers’ reputation as 
the market leader in compensation surveys, they were the first ‘port of call’ when 
British companies turned their attention to the increasing retention risk posed by 
American companies.  
 
Towers Perrin’ first break in providing pay surveys to British companies came in 
the late 1970s, when then Group Personnel Director of Cadbury Schweppes, 
Major Frank Hamer commissioned the firm to conduct a survey of executive 
director pay in other factory companies. While the first survey comprised only six 
anonymised companies, they were some of the biggest companies in Britain.                                                         
48 Most of these banks were later absorbed or ‘went belly up’  
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Towers Perrin conducted the survey again the following year, increasing their 
participation twofold. It was this survey that became Tower’s ‘Top Executive Pay 
Survey’ – the market leader in executive pay data - comprising 80 of the top 100 
UK companies within a few years of its establishment.  
 
Yet, executive pay remained fairly undiversified throughout the 1970s. As 
Tower’s former managing partner remembered of their 1979 market trends 
analysis, ‘nobody had share options’ in the Towers’ database, and ‘only 10% 
actually had annual bonuses.’ The firm’s pay advice centred on tax efficient 
remuneration for executives, facilitating pay surveys, and producing market trends 
analyses based on the survey data. The firm ‘really got into executive 
compensation consulting in Britain by providing competitive information’49.  This 
fundamentally changed with the coming to power of Margaret Thatcher, the 
subsequent reduction in top earners’ tax rates and the introduction of executive 
stock options. The following section describes the changes income and tax 
policies, which transformed executive pay.  
 
 
3.2 The birth of ‘executive pay’ in Britain  
 
3.2.1 Share scheme legislation 
 
The first profit sharing schemes introduced in the UK were at the behest of the 
Liberal party in 1977.  Liberal party leader, David Steel, put forth the idea of 
legislating profit sharing schemes during the renegotiation of the Lib-Lab Pact50. 
The eventual All Employee Profit Sharing Schemes (1978) focused on launching 
employee share ownership in private sector businesses. Prior to the change in 
legislation, profit sharing schemes, whether settled in cash or shares, attracted the 
recipient’s highest marginal tax rate. The 1978 legislation sought to make profit 
                                                        
49 Interview with  former managing partner 
50 Following their 1974 defeat in the by-elections, the Labour government was left with 
no overall majority, and facing a vote of no confidence, Prime Minister Callaghan 
acquiesced to a bi-party agreement with the Liberal Party. The Lib-Lab Pact ran from 
March 1977 to September 1978.   
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sharing in shares more attractive51, and was built on the premise that employees 
should be made to feel like part owners in the companies in which they were 
employed. This scheme was the bedrock upon which the Conservative 
government later added profit-related pay policies. Law and accounting firms 
were in a strong position to respond to the change in legislation; their tax 
professionals in particular well poised to supply advice to companies interested in 
establishing share schemes.  
3.2.2 Thatcher’s Enterprise Culture 
 
Following the labour government’s defeat in the 1979 general election, Margaret 
Thatcher and her conservative government came to power. Almost immediately, 
Thatcher set in motion agendas, which wrought significant cultural change in 
Britain. In the first budget after the election, Chancellor Sir Geoffrey Howe cut 
the top rate of income tax from 83 per cent to 60 per cent on earned income and 
the basic rate from 33 per cent to 30 per cent. The government also suspended pay 
controls in favour of interest rate manipulations and monetary policy.  
In order to improve labour productivity and to encourage the ‘rise of the 
entrepreneurial self’, the government went about re-imagining the association 
between labour, performance, and profit. The ‘entrepreneurial self’ is a key pillar 
of Thatcher’s enterprise culture. In the 1980s, governmental policies sought to 
shift the state and labour away from the Keynesian welfare model and a ‘culture 
of dependency’ to the entrepreneurial self which embodied ‘self-reliance’ (Peters, 
2001). In the government’s ‘rethink’ of British labour, the emphasis was shifted 
from relatively inflexible salary structures to the use of performance-related 
reward systems (Armstrong and Murlis, 1988). Thus, the government introduced 
wider share ownership for employees, profit related pay and performance related 
pay via schemes introduced in the Finance Acts. As Smith (1993) noted, ‘the 
conservative government has worked at placing micro-level decisions about 
remuneration and macro-level aspirations and intentions for improved national 
economic performance within the same political web’ (p. 2).                                                          
51 The 1978 Act made income tax concessions for employees participating in schemes 
approved by the Board of Inland Revenue (Breakwell, 1983).  
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The introduction of the Savings Related Share Option Scheme in 1980, for 
example, encouraged employee share ownership and triggered companies to 
reform pay, benefit and share structures. The 1980 to 1982 recession similarly 
prompted companies to review pay systems, but more so in response to large 
layoffs triggered by the recession.  Thus, the enterprise culture was first and 
foremost a workforce wide, nationwide shift, of which executive incentive 
systems was one facet.  
It was the 1984 Finance Act, which revolutionised executive pay. The Act 
allowed executives to hold options with a face value of up to four-times 
emoluments, and have any consequent gains on exercise taxed at the capital gains 
rate of 30%, as opposed to personal income tax rate of 60%. Executive stock 
option schemes essentially ‘offered tax savings of 30%’ (Director, 1995, p.66).  
Apart from the incredible and immediate tax benefits for executives, the tone 
around pay was shifting. The TUC had called increased wages and lower taxes. 
The Institute of Directors’ Director General made a statement in 1984 with regard 
to pay: 
‘The solution to the problem of the low paid is not Wage Councils and 
statutory minimum wage levels. And it is certainly not centralised 
bargaining. The levels of pay much be decided in the marketplace – they 
should be linked to increased productivity and not artificially distorted by 
outside manipulation.’ 
The sentiment that the market should be taking responsibility for rewarding 
productivity was gaining traction on many fronts. The power of incentives, which 
was already firmly established in the United States, was taking root in Britain for 
a host of reasons: 
 ‘There was a genuine belief in the value of incentive contracts, alignment 
with shareholder interests and ‘the naïve notion that share options don’t 
cost anything.’52 
 
The corporate response to the Finance Acts was immense, illustrated in the 
growth in the number of share schemes between 1986 and 1989:                                                         
52 Interview with Former managing partner  
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Table 3.1: Share scheme growth (1986-1989) 
Type of Schemes 1986 1989 
All Employee Profit Sharing Schemes (1978) 622 853 
Savings Related Share Option Scheme (1980) 611 838 
Discretionary (Executive) Options Scheme (1984) 2080 4069 
Source: Institute for Public Policy, Economic Study No.3, 1990 
Companies ‘piled on (executive) share options’. 53  The IoD’s ‘Director’ 
publication quoted a Hewitt Associates consultant as stating that ‘companies 
typically used the ceiling as the upper level for directors, with multiples of two or 
three times salary for those just below board level and one times salary for 
divisional managers’ (Director, 1995, p.66).  The ‘gold rush’ in stock option use 
was partly because some were ‘fearful’ that the tax benefits would not last long54; 
which was linked to the belief that Thatcher would only last one term.  
 
The upsurge was also prompted by a concern that the types of managers of state-
owned enterprises lacked the right mind-set to succeed in the private sector. State-
owned enterprises, such as BT and the utilities, ‘were unionised, right the way up 
to senior management’55, and steps had to be taken to get these newly minted 
executives ‘thinking in business terms and to get the senior management group 
acting like managers and leaders.’ 56  Incentive schemes were seen to align 
managers with stock performance, thereby overriding the union mind-set.57  
 
Third, there was also a growing preoccupation with attracting and retaining talent 
from the global talent market. The deregulation of London’s financial markets led 
to the ‘frantic efforts of financial institutions to attract and lock in talent’ (Saffin,                                                         
53 Interview with Former managing partner 
54 Prior to 1984, companies could award discretionary executive share options, but these 
plans had to be approved by shareholders. 
55 Interview with Vicky Wright 
56 Ibid. 57 The issuing of stock options in advance of and subsequent to the initial public offering 
of state enterprises would later prove controversial as ‘mediocre middle managers’ were 
seen to benefit from windfall gains.  
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2004) as the City sought to establish itself as a global financial centre. The 
financial sector, mimicking practice in the US market, firmly believed the talent 
could be attracted and retained by getting pay packages ‘right’ for executives and 
City bankers. The pay comparison between British firms and American firms 
domiciled in Britain bolstered the rationale for increasing pay packages. The 
‘Director’ also published research in 1984 detailing statistics that British directors 
were underpaid vis-a-vis their European counterparts with the exception of Spain 
and Portugal. Seemingly absent from this period was any opposition to the ideals 
espoused in introducing stock options as a means of reward. Institutional investor 
representative bodies (notably the ABI) were concerned with ‘the prospect of 
equity dilution through over-zealous use’ (Main, 2006), but overall agreed that 
options would serve in aligning executive and shareholder interests.  
 
3.2.3 ‘Now Cash is Clean Again’58 
By the late 1980s, stock options were institutionalised across large public 
companies, and the financial press had taken an interest in the topic of executive 
pay. The Financial Times stated that 63 per cent of large UK companies had 
incentive schemes by 1987, compared to 24 per cent in 198159.  Consultants also 
reported to the Financial Times that the average payment in executive incentive 
schemes had risen to 25 per cent of base salary, up from 11 per cent for the same 
period (Skapinker, 1987). The press also sought to capture sentiment surrounding 
executive pay, quoting a consultant’s statement that “when it comes to rewarding 
senior management, cash is now clean" (Skapinker, 1987).  The sea change in 
remuneration observed in the private sector was also observed into public sector 
pay. The Top Salaries Review Body’s Chairman, Lord Plowden stated in 1985, 
'we are left in no doubt that, in the present climate, pay and morale are 
inextricably linked'.  
 
Executive pay had risen to cultural and social significance for the British 
workforce and the public at large. With these shifts, the first pockets of disquiet                                                         
58 Title of Financial Times article, published January 20, 1987 
59 Piggy backing on the media attention, some advisors actively sought to promote their 
market knowledge. This 1987 article drew on data provided by Hay Management 
Consultants. 
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began to surface. Government resistance to workforce-wide wage increases 
contrasted with the millions of pounds being realised via top executive option 
schemes. As one Hay Management Consultant stated at a London conference, 
1987 may be remembered “as the year that finally killed off the myth that the UK 
is one labour market.” Criticism of Sir Ralph Halpern’s pay package (Chairman of 
the Burton Group) captured growing concerns. In 1987, the Financial Times 
provocatively stated: 
 
“(A)ren’t annual payments of 1 m pds a little excessive?”  
“Aren't institutional shareholders and the public at large inevitably going to 
assume that schemes …are motivated by little more than managerial 
greed?” 
 
Halpern held the title of Britain’s highest paid executive and he fiercely defended 
performance related pay, which he believed helped to create a culture of 
enterprise and was, therefore, crucial to the success of the British economy 
(Skapinker, 1987). In further defence of directors pay, research by the IoD and 
Reward Regional Surveys argued that spectacular pay packages were reserved for 
a few celebrated cases, and that the overall increase for British directors was much 
more modest. However, fractures in performance related pay was increasingly 
vocalised in the public domain by Labour politicians. The disquiet surrounding 
high pay gained further momentum in 1989 when Lord King, Chairman of British 
Airways received a 116% pay increase. Thatcher herself was reported as being 
“appalled” at the salary increases for Britain’s top businessmen (Saffin, 2004).  
By October 1987, the Financial Times noted ‘the huge transformation, which has 
occurred in the pattern of UK remuneration over the past few years. Employers 
had to find their way around such concepts as performance- and profit-related 
pay, cash bonuses and a range of share option schemes,’ for which there has been 
‘no shortage of consultants willing to help them’ (Skapinker, 1987).  
Prior to their coverage in the press, pension and benefits and remuneration 
advisers attracted almost no attention. The term ‘remuneration adviser’ did not 
 73 
appear in leading British newspapers before 1987 60 . Yet, as directors’ 
remuneration gained increased attention from politicians and investors, those 
advising on remuneration emerged as an object of interest.  
The Financial Times identified the prominent players in the supply of 
remuneration advice as Hay Associates, Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby 
(Towers Perrin), and Inbucon. In addition to the traditional practitioners, there 
were now many more players in the field. This included one-person operations, 
catering to a specific industry (Skapinker, 1987). The Financial Press placed 
disproportionate emphasis on consultancies that actively provided journalists with 
sound bites of data to populate press articles. The field of remuneration advice 
was concurrently undergoing remarkable change in the 1980s in the UK, of which 
the media captured little to none. Drawing on interviews with former leading 
partners providing advice during the 1980s, the following section describes the 
rise of remuneration advisory services within specific firm settings. As described 
in Chapter 2, the interviews were biographical in nature and spanned the career of 
the consultants interviewed.  
 
3.3 Practice formation 
The formation and formalisation of executive pay advisory practices was 
occurring in a few key ways. For Towers Perrin, executive pay advice occurred on 
the back of their executive pay surveys. As Tower’s former managing partner 
recollected: 
 
‘There was this fascination with the three61 prong executive pay. British 
companies wanted to know more about what other big rich companies were 
doing. We capitalized on that through developing these survey databases. It 
just really grew from there.’  
 
For the big accounting and law firms in Britain, executive pay advice was an 
outcropping from three different points of origination. The large accounting firms                                                         
60 A search for ‘remuneration consultant’ was conducted across title and content within 
the leading newspapers publications, which included the Guardian, Financial Times, The 
Economist, Sunday Times , Telegraph 
61 Base salary, short term (annual bonus) and long term (stock options) 
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were already well established as professional service firms by the 1980s, with 
specialisms in legal and tax advice and ‘operating in the margins of the 
management consulting field from the outset, providing ‘advice’ on 
administrative and financial matters as an occasional and ad hoc service 
(McDougald and Greenwood, 2012). As one of the more established psfs, 
Coopers and Lybrand had a management consulting practice and general HR 
consulting practice. However this was not the space from which executive 
remuneration advice grew.  
 
3.3.1 Accounting firms 
 
In the early 1980s, Coopers and Lybrand launched their Compensation Benefits 
and Incentives group within the tax practice. The team mainly comprised non-
practising barristers and accountants working on the implementation of share 
option schemes; work which mainly focused on legal and accounting issues. The 
various statutory changes and Finance Acts (notably in 1978, 1980, 1984 and 
1987) gave rise to large swaths of work in relation to profit related pay schemes 
and employee share schemes.  Similarly, Arthur Andersen recognised new work 
opportunities from the government’s favourable tax changes for employee share 
ownership. As one partner recalled, Andersen ‘developed a whole practice, about 
helping companies to persuade their employees, to make part of their pay variable 
instead of fixed, so that they could benefit from tax advantages.’62  
 
In addition to the growth in share schemes, the multi-faceted work required for the 
privatisations of state-owned enterprises also presented new work opportunities for 
the accounting firms. Coopers and Lybrand gained prominence for their work in 
the privatisation of British Telecommunications (BT). As noted earlier, 
incentivising executive directors was an important concern during the 
privatisation. Vicky Wright recalled the need for ‘hard edge’ human resources 
skills to tackle the ‘union mind-set’ and create incentive structures that were 
‘going to get them (the executives) to cut costs and everything else.’ Wright 
stated:  
                                                         
62 Interview with former Andersen partner 
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A lot of accounting firms that were doing a lot of restructuring of all the 
telecommunications, electricity, and water, were all in the same game of 
how do we correct the senior management group. The way it was done was 
overwhelmingly whack them a bonus fee, it might not have been very much, 
and give them share options. 
 
The stature of human resource management benefitted from the involvement of 
human resource professionals in the incentive design work for the newly privatised 
companies. However, for Coopers and Lybrand, there was a greater interest in 
developing share scheme implementation work, over incentive design work.  The 
firm focused their attention toward increasing their market presence in share 
scheme implementation, which was more so an encroachment on the work 
domains of law firms than actuarial and benefit firms. As will be described in 
Section 3.4.3 below, the benefits firms maintained their focus on pay data and 
incentive design work.  
 
3.3.2 Law firms 
 
One of the few law firms, which actively engaged in remuneration advisory work 
during this period, was Clifford Turner63. Law firms were well placed to provide 
tax and share scheme implementation advice due to their legal knowledge; 
however, incentive design was not actively pursued. In 1984, Clifford Turner 
‘thought it would be quite nice to dip their toe in the water of a multi-disciplinary 
practice’ 64  and established New Bridge Street. New Bridge Street, under the 
auspices of tax partner David Reed and partly qualified actuary Laurie Brennan, 
would house a practice that integrated share implementation work with all 
employee share scheme design work. New Bridge Street ‘was not an exec 
comp(ensation) practice at all’ recalled one of the firm’s former partners. Rather it 
was doing employee buy-out 65  type work during the wave of government 
privatisations. Although the practice initially focused on all-employee share 
schemes, there was ‘increasingly bits of executive stuff because people would say, 
                                                        
63 Clifford Turner merged with Coward Chance in 1987, and was henceforth known as 
Clifford Chance   
64 Interview with former partner 
65 A proportion of the equity was made available on an all-employee basis 
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"well can you just advise us on this and what do you think of that"’.66  For New 
Bridge Street, providing executive pay advice ‘morphed over time’, it was ‘never 
a conscious decision’.67 
 
3.3.3 ‘All about data’68  
 
The accounting and law firms possessed the legal and tax knowledge necessary 
for employee and executive share scheme implementation work. Incentive design 
work, however, required pay data knowledge. And pay data knowledge required 
surveys, which had been monopolised by Towers Perrin, and data services houses 
such as Inbucon and Data Income Services. Directors’ remuneration disclosure 
was insufficient for evaluating executive pay market trends and since Towers 
Perrin had a stranglehold on the market trends data and analysis, potential entrants 
in incentive design work would need to overcome the data barrier. Tower’s 
former managing partner remembered the survey revenue as ‘quite a small 
percentage of total fees’, but importantly giving the firm access to clients, for 
whom they then proffered incentive design services. By 1987, the Financial Times 
reported that Towers Perrin had experienced 40% growth in its remuneration 
consulting practice in each of the three previous years (Skapinker, 1987). 
However, the tide was turning on executive pay sentiment. The 1990s represented 
a wave of corporate governance codes, including the Cadbury and Greenbury 
reports as well as institutional investor governance guidelines. These proved 
highly influential in shaping remuneration governance and remuneration 
consulting work.  
 
 
3.4 Key shifts in pay governance 
 
While the emergent field of remuneration governance is described in Chapter 4, it 
is important to note that it was the recommendations of the Cadbury Report 
(1992) which institutionalized remuneration committees as a feature of                                                         
66 Interview with former partner 
67 Interview with former managing partner 
68 In an Interview with the Lead partner of a consulting firm, he described this earlier era 
in remuneration advice as ‘all about data’ and the latter era as ‘all about corporate 
governance’ 
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boardrooms and pay oversight in British public companies. The Cadbury 
committee was concerned about the informational disadvantage of the non-
executive directors populating remuneration committees. It was believed that the 
remuneration committee could access the external comparison data from the 
personnel department. Cadbury, hesitant to provide further guidance on 
remuneration, deferred to the ‘Promotion of NEDs’69 (hereafter, PRO NED).  
 
PRO NED went on to describe the three main sources of industry pay 
comparisons as the consultants’ survey, consultants’ advice on an ad hoc basis, 
and salary clubs. It described salary clubs as existing in ‘many industries to 
provide pooled information often against agreed disciplines of benchmark posts’ 
(PRO NED, 1992).  Companies in pay clubs exchanged detailed and confidential 
information regarding pay. It is not clear whether the responsibility for pooling 
the data was rotated amongst the members of the club, however, its data was 
meant to be anonymised.  
 
Remuneration consulting work was given an important boost, for although it was 
still an emergent and fledgling field of practice, the PRO NED guidelines made 
reference to the consultants’ survey and consultants’ advice with a self-evidence 
that suggested a stable field of practice. Main (1993) describes how almost 
universally, remuneration consultants supplied survey data to personnel 
departments. The personnel department in turn supplied the information to the 
remuneration committee. However, it was still the case that the consultants’ 
information was ‘supplemented or even displaced by salary clubs’.  
 
Remuneration consultants were also starting to appear in corporate boardrooms to 
explain their proposed remuneration packages. As Main (1993) stated, that ‘in 
terms of bonus formulae, companies are generally guided by consultants, who 
may attend remuneration committee meetings in person to explain their 
proposals’. The relevance of remuneration consulting work was being realized at 
the highest echelons of British corporations. The professional service firms were                                                         
69 PRO NED, an initiative first recommended in the 1970s, was established in the early 
1980s and funded by the Bank Of England. Its remit was to source viable Non-executive 
directors, and compile a list, which corporate boards could refer to when appointing 
NEDs to their boards. 
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undoubtedly taking notice of this. Where accounting and legal psfs had previously 
specialized in the implementation of schemes, the professionals within these firms 
started envisioning an expansion of their work domains. The section, which 
follows, describes how accounting psfs – in particular Coopers and Lybrand - 
sought to capture new work domains, and the challenges with which they were 
faced in doing so. This section highlights that the economic and social dominance 
of the professions’ label can be stymied by demands for technical know-how, 
which reinforces the claim that knowledge and expertise must be externally 
validated (Power, 1992).  
 
 
3.5 Emergent occupation 
‘By the mid-1990s, remuneration consulting had, in the UK, become a 
specialist activity in its own right, and people were specialist remuneration 
consultants.’70 
 
3.5.1 New Bridge Street 
 
In the mid-1990s, under Carol Arrowsmith’s leadership, New Bridge Street 
crafted a strategy focused on supplying executive remuneration advice to top 
British companies. Arrowsmith recalled that their strategy was achieved by 
investing in both people and resources.  Yet, in spite of their marked success, 
Clifford Chance decided to redirect its efforts to establishing an international law 
firm rather than a multidisciplinary practice. In 1997, New Bridge Street was fully 
spun off from the law firm, marking the start of its operations as a boutique 
practice. During the ensuing decade, it grew to become the leading executive 
remuneration boutique practice, achieving its dominance by catering to FTSE 250 
companies.  New Bridge was particularly successful in serving the FTSE 250 
companies as it ‘was a relatively untapped market, partly because Towers wasn't 
interested in that market at the time’71 and partly because a number of FTSE 250 
companies hadn’t yet hired remuneration committee advisers.  
 
                                                        
70 Interview with principal 
71 Interview with partner 
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3.5.2 Coopers and Lybrand  
 
In the early 1990s, Coopers and Lybrand were being approached by consultancies 
perceived as unable to fulfil the legal and accounting requirements for the 
implementation of share schemes:  
 
‘Around 1992, 1993, we realized that a lot of the work we were doing was 
the implementation of pay schemes for senior executives designed by other 
people, like Mercer, and Hay, and Towers…. 
 
Well actually, we can do that (design work)…there's no reason why we have 
to just come in at the end. We could go up the value chain.’ 
 
Coopers and Lybrand’s Human Resources Services (HRS) division was born out 
of the desire to vertically integrate and provide incentive design work. As Daly 
and Schuler (1998) have observed, accounting PSFs were seen to be 
entrepreneurial in nature and constantly able to re-invent themselves. 
Interestingly, because executive remuneration advisory work originally centred on 
the tax implications of legislative change, the HRS unit at Coopers and Lybrand 
was established within the Tax division, although tax implications had ceased to 
be the most critical concern in executive remuneration design. HRS became the 
umbrella under which the Compensation, Benefits and Incentives (pay consulting) 
group operated, enabling tax experts specialising in executive share plan 
implementation to work with human resource specialists competent in pay design. 
Although the accounting firms were labelling the new business lines as human 
resources, one partner recalled that the firms were not seen to have ‘enough 
people to understand the HR.’72 At Coopers and Lybrand, there were two people 
with HR backgrounds working in the management consulting practice who were 
pay specialist people, and ‘more interested in (pay) policies and benchmarking.’ 
These HR specialists were eventually brought in under the HRS umbrella so that 
the fledgling pay design team could draw upon the HR specialist knowledge as 
needed.  
 
                                                         
72 Interview with Vicky Wright 
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3.5.3 Still ‘all about the data’ 
 
Both the HR specialists and the newly established pay consulting group faced a 
similar challenge. They ‘had no direct source of data, and…didn't quite know 
what to do about that.’73  Coopers and Lybrand didn’t have the infrastructure 
required to collect data for large swathes of British industry. The compensation 
group was either conducting bespoke pay surveys for client companies, or 
purchasing data from the actuarial and benefits PSFs, namely Towers Perrin. It 
was well known that Towers held the monopoly on pay survey data for FTSE 100 
companies. From Coopers and Lybrand’s perspective, Towers ‘didn't necessarily 
see us at the time as their competitors…they wouldn't necessarily have seen the 
big 4 accounting firms as competing. They saw us as coming in and doing work at 
the point that they'd sort of done their part, so initially, they were happy to sell us 
the data.’ Yet, for the Coopers and Lybrand team, they ‘agonised over this’, partly 
because they ‘were sort of aware it wasn't an entirely satisfactory situation.’ They 
tried different strategies, including experimenting with collecting the data 
themselves from the annual reports.  
 
The group eventually resolved their data issue by first collaborating with, and 
later acquiring, Monks Partnership; an executive and management pay data 
specialist. By the mid-1990s, the Coopers and Lybrand group had grown to 
around 25 people, four of whom were partners. The group was structurally the 
same as the rest of Coopers and Lybrand, with multiple layers comprising 
partners, senior managers, managers, supervisors and students. The hierarchy, 
however, was considered top heavy: 
 
‘For an accounting firm, that's not a great model, because the mantra in 
accounting firms is all about leverage, the bigger the base of the triangle, the 
more money, the more profit is made. We were encouraged to take on more 
junior staff to try to move away from what was a sort of diamond 
structure…to something that was more like a pyramid.’  
 
This suggests that already well-established norms on optimal leverage and 
hierarchical structures could be transposed on to the remuneration consulting                                                         
73 Interview with former partner, Coopers and Lybrand, PwC  
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team. The imposition of pre-existing hierarchical structures on nascent 
occupational groupings has also been observed in management consulting (Muzio 
et al., 2011). While these structures may appear  ‘natural’ in the context of 
Coopers and Lybrand and therefore imposed on the many work domains which 
operated within the psf setting, it remains an empirical question as to how these 
structure shapes work and vice versa. The interaction between psf structures and 
the work tasks of consultants is not within the scope of this chapter. Chapter 5 
examines the work tasks, which typically occur at the varying levels of the 
organisational hierarchy, and the implications for the social construction of 
expertise.   
 
3.5.4 Coopers and Lybrand to PwC 
 
In 1998, Coopers and Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse to form 
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers (PwC). Price Waterhouse lawyers and accountants had 
been doing similar work to the Coopers and Lybrand team, albeit with a smaller 
team and ‘about 5 or 6 years behind.’ 74  Price Waterhouse was traditionally 
focused on audit and had only diversified into management consulting in the 
1980s in the face of intense price competition in the audit market.75 Following the 
merger, a former Coopers and Lybrand partner described their ‘big group’ as 
‘very multi-disciplinary’ in composition. PwC was a recognized player in 
executive remuneration consulting at the end of the 1990s, even if they were not 
yet advising Britain’s largest companies.  
 
 
3.6 Expanding work domains 
 
The prominence of remuneration consulting work was bolstered in response to the 
Cadbury Report, PRO NED and institutional investor guidelines. Their combined 
advocacy for remuneration committees to possess the appropriate information 
enabled a role for remuneration advice in the boardroom. The ‘qualified’ 
professionals who worked within the law and accounting psfs seized upon the                                                         
74 Interview with former partner, Coopers and Lybrand, PwC 
75 This was gleaned from a review of PwC archives housed by Columbia University 
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broadening work of remuneration consulting, seeking to advance their 
prominence in incentive design work. This entailed rivaling the dominant 
consulting houses, and in particular Towers Perrin.76 The law and accounting psfs 
sought to expand into ‘consulting’ work to complement their share scheme 
implementation work. Towers’ competitors sought to diminish the data collection 
and analytics tasks by positioning themselves as consulting houses, stocked with 
professionals who were both well-suited and better-suited to the boardroom. As 
one partner recalled: 
 
‘Towers was better known as a data house, and less as a consulting house, 
and we plugged that gap…I don't know if that's objective or not, but that's 
certainly my perception of it.’ 
 
It’s not that ‘a gap’ existed, but rather that Towers’ competitors sought to create a 
chasm between data and consulting. Access to pay design work hinged on the 
databases and data analytics prowess of the consultancies. Nevertheless, 
accounting and law psfs could not shake the central and imperative role of data in 
remuneration consulting work. In spite of any efforts to make distinctions 
between data collection and incentive system design, the former was seen to 
enable the latter. Only consultants who ‘knew the market’ could reasonably 
design incentive systems. Thus, competing firms invested heavily in building in-
house databases or acquiring data. It would be upon a foundation in data analytics 
that remuneration consultants would expand into additional work domains. These 
new domains were enabled by key shifts taking place in the field of pay 
governance.  
 
While Cadbury and PRO NED took high-level positions on governance, the 
institutional investor representative groups operated in the details. Seeking to 
maximise the returns of their investments, these groups were organised around a 
pay-for-performance logic. Their guidelines importantly reflected this, as layer by 
layer, the institutions sought to bolster performance conditions for executive                                                         
76 While the majority of the consultancies operated within the ‘walls’ of psfs, this did not 
preclude boutique firms from gaining a foothold in the market In 1994, Strategic 
Compensation Associate (SCA) Consulting was established, and in 1997, prominent data 
supplier Inbucon and sister firm Meis established a trading company (TBP2 Limited) 
under which their data analysis and advisory services could operate separately but 
collaboratively. 
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incentive systems. The added layers of detail brought with it added layers of 
complexity. The guidelines and the complexity associated with it fed into the 
specialism of remuneration consulting work, as consultants distilled the demands 
of the institutions in their design work. The following section presents an 
overview of the governance initiatives pursed by the institutions and the ways in 
which remuneration consultants reacted and absorbed these governance shifts into 
their work.  
 
3.6.1 Institutional investors shape consulting work 
Institutional investor representative bodies emerged as influential players during 
the 1980s; their emergence is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4. The key 
players included the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), which engaged in the formulation of 
remuneration guidelines on specific issues. From the early to mid-1990s, the ABI 
– sometimes jointly with the NAPF - released the governance guidelines: 
Table 3.2: Key Steps in Executive Pay Governance: Early-Mid 1990s 
 
Date: Event: 
Aug 1991 ABI: ‘Second Addendum to Share Option and Profit Sharing Incentive 
Scheme Guidelines’ 
Dec 1992 Cadbury Committee Report 
July 1993 Joint NAPF-ABI statement on Share Schemes 
May 1994 ABI: ‘LT Remuneration for Senior Executives’ 
Feb 1995 ABI: ‘Share Option and Profit Sharing Incentive Schemes’ 
 
Source: Manifest 
 
 
The upshot in option related ‘windfall’ gains during the privatisations, in 
particular, prompted institutional investor representative bodies to release 
numerous guidelines related to share schemes. These guidelines, importantly 
added layers of complexity to executive remuneration design. The ABI’s 1991 
guidelines, for example, recommended that companies establish performance 
conditions on share option vesting. Furthermore, they provided guidance on the 
appropriate measures. These appropriate measures were shaped by what 
institutional investors assessed as the best-in-class incentive practices. Thus, 
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institutions and remuneration consultants created a feedback loop. The consultants 
created the frontiers of possibility by designing innovative incentive systems, 
which the institutions would then subsequently accept or reject.  
In one example, consultants were popularising earnings per share growth hurdle 
as the preferred performance measure. It measured relative to the growth in the 
relative price index (RPI), therefore absorbing the institutions’ preference for 
relative measures. The ABI in turn, included in their governance guidelines, citing 
it as best practice. As one partner recalled:  
‘When a company did something they (the ABI) didn't like, there was 
another bit that went into the guidelines that said, "You can't do that. And 
you can't do that thing we don't like and you can't do that thing we don't 
like." They built up layer by layer. Actually investors were very good at 
controlling some of the structural elements.’ 
Although the ABI and NAPF had a fairly stable and publicly communicated 
mandate, it was not always the case that consultants could predict the institutions 
opinions. As such, it was not unusual for companies using a particular incentive 
plan or performance criteria to suddenly fall into disfavour with the institutions. 
This is in part because, even among the institutional investor representative 
groups, there was divergence in opinion. When the ABI supported relative total 
shareholder return in the performance criteria of choice, the NAPF advocated 
EPS, which prompted one managing partner to comment: 
‘Standard Life hated relative TSR. Andy Banks who used to be at Legal and 
General hated earnings per share, which is why an awful lot of companies 
have got half and half. Both and everybody's equally unhappy.  
 
Given the clout, which the institutions wielded, consultants were often subject to 
new guidelines that they might fundamentally disagree with. One of the more 
significant changes to the ABI guidelines was the recommendation that 
companies use relative total shareholder return as their performance measure for 
long term incentives. Around 1993, Reuters introduced, upon the advice of the 
Boston Consulting Group, relative total shareholder return as a performance 
measure for their performance share plans. The term ‘relative’ meant that the 
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company’s performance would be contrasted to a group of comparator firms, 
rather than allowing the payment of the reward to be triggered solely on firm 
performance. As stock options had lost favour with the institutions, and 
performance share plans were gaining prominence, performance criteria were a 
central concern for institutional investors. It was argued that relative TSR, vis-a-
vis absolute TSR, represented a levelling of the playing field as overall market 
movements and industry economics were removed from the evaluation of 
executive performance. As one principal at a boutique consultancy recalled of the 
ABI’S strong preference for performance share plans and relative total 
shareholder return: 
‘They were the ones that caused a lot of problems. They're the ones - they 
would deny it now - who introduced relative total shareholder return’ 
The principal believed the institutions didn't understand that share options were 
fundamentally different from performance share plans. Rather, fund managers, 
drawing on the internal incentive structures used in fund management, 
erroneously applied relative performance to long-term incentive schemes. Others 
shared this view in the industry.  
The ABI guidelines came to function as ‘law’ for boards and remuneration 
committees (Main, 1994, 1999, 2006). Through their continued governance 
guidelines, the ABI and NAPF ‘assumed a more far-ranging prominence’ (Main, 
2006).  In one example, Main (2006) noted, ABI guidelines with respect to 
executive stock options were  ‘almost universally adopted, to the extent that it 
seemed to become a rule or an entitlement that all executives at board room level 
would be issued with options to the value of four times emoluments.’ Directors, 
especially those serving companies whose institutional shareholders included 
insurance and pension funds, were particularly sensitive to the governance 
guidelines put forth by the ABI and NAPF.  
The consultants thus became a buffer between the institutional investor bodies and 
remuneration committees. The ABI in particular had become a force to be 
reckoned with. Although Main (2006) described the institutions’ influence as 
‘dented’ by the Greenbury Report, it was arguably the case that Greenbury served 
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to further entrench ABI and NAPF guidelines. As will be described in the 
following section, Greenbury centred on issues, which the institutions had been 
engaging with for several years. By the time Greenbury was convened, stock 
options were already in decline and performance share plans were on the rise. 
Greenbury was triggered to demonstrate political will in tackling ever-growing 
executive pay packages. The implications of the report, however, were far 
reaching. In the following section, the social and political climate surrounding 
Greenbury and the eventual recommendations are described, as well as the 
implications for remuneration consulting work.  
 
3.7. Moral panic deepens: The Greenbury Report 
 
In November 1994, British Gas union members brought a pig to the company’s 
annual general meeting along with a feed bucket labelled ‘the trough of 
privatisation.’ It was a demonstration of their disgust with the pay packages being 
received by executives in the newly privatised utility companies and in protest of 
chief executive Cedric Brown’s 75% pay rise. Arguably Cedric Brown was the 
straw that broke the camel’s back, for executive stock options more broadly had 
become a symbol of the vast gulf between all-employee plan pay-outs and 
executive stock option vesting. In the two years prior – 1992 to 1993 – 1.3 million 
employees were granted shares or options worth a total £2.19 billion, which 
compared with 80,000 executives receiving shares or options worth £1.6 billion. 
These figured returned a staff benefit of £1,671 and an executive pay-out of 
£20,000. The public outcry triggered at the British Gas AGM and captured in 
several newspapers articles77 spurred Prime Minister John Major to establish a 
special cabinet committee to examine shareholders’ powers to control boardroom 
excesses (Saffin, 2004). Although the committee considered amendments to 
legislation, the government once again deferred to self-regulatory codes of 
governance.  
                                                        
77 Newspaper article titles included: 'Derailing the Gravy Train,' 'Executive Gluttony 
under Attack,' and 'Fat Cats in the Dock' 
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In 1995, the Confederation of British Industry convened the Greenbury Study 
Group under the auspices of Sir Richard Greenbury (Chairman and CEO of Marks 
& Spencer).78  
 
As noted earlier, stock options, with which Greenbury himself found particular 
issue, was already on ‘its way out’ by the time the Group was convened. The ABI 
and NAPF had released guidance in 1993 and 1994 on the issue of performance 
conditions for the exercise of executive stock options. Thus, by October 1994, 
New Bridge Street data found that 76 of the top 350 companies had already 
introduced alternatives to stock options.  There was a sentiment amongst the 
consultants that Greenbury ‘was solving a problem that had already waltzed 
through,’ and furthermore was seeking to do so rather prescriptively. Greenbury 
himself sought to limit long term incentives schemes to only one plan, however, 
there were several amongst the Study Group who were in strong opposition. 
Ultimately, those in favour of a single LTIP were unable to advance its inclusion 
in the final report.  
3.7.1 Greenbury’s Recommendations 
The Greenbury Report identified accountability, transparency and performance 
linkages as central to pay governance. As PRO NED had recommended in 1992, 
Greenbury similarly recommended that remuneration committees wholly consist 
of non-executive directors. These NEDs should have relevant experience and a 
‘good understanding, enhanced as necessary by appropriate training, or access to 
expert advice, of the areas of remuneration committee business.’ Whether already 
occurring, or creating a new opportunity for work, this ‘appropriate training’ of 
NEDs was also assumed by the remuneration consultants.                                                          
78 The committee included Sir Michael Angus, Chairman of Whitbread PLC and the 
Boots Company PLC; Sir Denys Henderson, Chairman of Rank Organisation Plc; Sir 
David Rees, Chairman of GKN plc (nominated by the Stock Exchange); George 
Metcalfe, Chairman and CEO of UMECO plc; Sir David Simon, Chairman of The British 
Petroleum Company plc; Sir Iain Vallance, Chairman of British Telecommunications plc; 
Robert Walther, Group chief executive of Clerical Medical Investment Group (nominated 
by the ABI), and Geoff Lindey, Head of UK Institutional Investment J.P. Morgan 
Investment Management Inc. (nominated by the NAPF).  The diversity and prominence 
of their backgrounds indicates that the Study Group was intended to be a collaborative 
effort across the industry’s key players. However, by the publication of the report, there 
was evidence of a process fraught with tension. 
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The remuneration committee would report to the shareholders on behalf of the 
board, thus achieving transparency and accountability in pay determination. The 
report would form part of or be annexed to the annual report, and was to include 
‘full details of all elements in the remuneration package of each individual 
director by name, such as basic salary, benefits in kind, annual bonuses, and long 
term incentive schemes including share options’ (Greenbury, 1995). Prior to 
Greenbury, disclosure requirements were based on the Companies Act 1985, 
which only required disclosure of the aggregate emoluments for all directors, and 
emoluments79 disclosure for the Chairman and/or highest paid director (if the 
Chairman was not the highest paid). 
 
The Study Group also acknowledged that remuneration committees were ‘often 
influenced by consultant surveys or information exchanges with other 
companies.’ In recognising that this left much scope for different interpretations 
and applications, the Group believed decisions on pay required ‘knowledge and 
judgement.’ In the references in which Greenbury makes of committee knowledge 
and judgement, it is tethered to the pay and market trends data seen to be coming 
from ‘the market’ for executive talent. This ‘market for talent’ is problematised in 
chapter 6. It is worth noting that the Greenbury Report assumed the market for 
talent to exist ‘out there’, and although the Group acknowledged that the market 
was imperfect, it was unquestioned.  
 
The Group was more concerned with the effects of selecting ‘skewed’ comparator 
firms from this market. Thereby enabling an upward ratchet of executive pay. Yet, 
neither directors nor consultants are implicated in selecting ‘skewed’ comparators. 
This may seem surprising given that comparator firm selection largely sat within 
the consultant’s remit. Also, compensation consultants had emerged as the object 
of concern in the US context in the early 1990s, in part due to an auto-
ethnography by former Towers Perrin managing partner, Bud Crystal. In his 
account, Crystal described the ‘capture’ of consultants by rent extracting 
executives. In the UK setting, in contrast, remuneration consultants were held in 
                                                        
79 The Cadbury Report recommended that salary and performance elements be disclosed 
separately.  
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high esteem, so much that Towers Perrin’s John Carney was invited to advise the 
Greenbury Study Group.  
Ultimately, the Study Group strengthened the links between committee decisions 
and consultants’ knowledge. It also placed consultants more closely within the 
realm of governance-related work due to increased disclosure recommended by 
the Group. Third, the report ‘pushed remuneration committees harder towards 
other schemes’ (The Director, 1995). While options had not been explicitly 
banned, the report recommended longer-term, performance-based share 
arrangements, phased awards and some sort of shareholding handcuff (ibid). The 
frontiers for incentive design work expanded as a result.  
Overall, remuneration consulting work thrived. The performance share plans 
which Greenbury’s intended to replace stock option schemes was work, which the 
consulting firms were already carrying out. As one partner recalled of the 1990s: 
‘Then it was simpler, right? The three consulting firms80 effectively just went 
around with their data…having conversations and trying to develop, design ... 
There was much more design work then… on the back of the data. That was a 
lot more fun. We didn't have long engagement letters. We didn't have huge 
contracts with the clients or anything like that. It was simpler.’81  
 
The consultants during this period were benefitting immensely from advising an 
elite and prominent client, unencumbered by lengthy engagement contracts. 
Although concerned that his view sounded ‘like some old fogey looking through 
rose tinted glasses’82, senior consultants remembered this period for the relative 
ease with which they secured incentive design work. Remuneration consulting 
practices flourished throughout the 1990s. The most critical episodes in pay 
governance had yet to emerge. The following section describes the pre-conditions 
that led to the statutory regulation of executive remuneration.  
 
 
 
                                                         
80 The three consulting firms refer here to Towers Perrin, Hay and Mercer.  
81 Interview with former lead partner 
82 Interview with former lead partner 
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3.8 Proactive governance, reactive legislation 
In 1997, the Labour party was elected to power. The British economy had 
returned to consecutive years of growth from 1992, and there was optimism for 
sustained economic stability. Britain’s competitiveness was at the forefront of the 
government’s agenda, alongside proving that the party could modernise its 
economic policy.  
In 1999, the government capped 83  pay deals for public sector workers, and 
advised that other employees be similarly capped so as not to fuel a wage spiral 
(BBC, 1999). The wage caps for general workers cast attention to executive pay 
packages, which continued to rise, seemingly unchecked. Public policy interest 
gained momentum once more on the issue of  ‘fat cat’ pay.  
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) commissioned PwC to evaluate 
FTSE company compliance with the existing corporate governance codes. The 
government maintained that self-regulation was still preferred to state intervention 
and new laws would remain a last resort (BBC, 1999). The DTI’s consultative 
document - published in July 1999 - centred on the shareholders’ rights to 
accountability and transparency in executive pay decisions. The proposed 
mechanism by which remuneration committees could be held to account was an 
advisory non-binding vote on the remuneration report at the company’s annual 
general meeting. Where Greenbury had recommended a voluntary vote, PwC 
found that less than 3% of the 270 firms sampled had put the remuneration report 
to a shareholder vote. In light of this, the DTI set their sights on introducing a 
mandatory advisory vote on the remuneration report. Institutional investor 
representative bodies, including the ABI and NAPF, were strong and vocal 
advocates for these enhanced shareholders powers.  
In August 2002, the UK parliament brought into force new regulations requiring 
quoted companies to publish a Directors’ Remuneration Report. In addition to 
remuneration related disclosures, the DRRR (2002) required that the report ‘name 
any person who provided to the (remuneration) committee advice, or services, that 
materially assisted the committee’ in determining pay policy and implementation.                                                          
83 Pay was capped at the level of inflation. 
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During the DTI’s consultative process and the Higgs committee’s deliberations, 
remuneration consultants had emerged as an object of concern. Their 
independence was questioned within the lenses of a managerial capture 
hypothesis. The critics - whether politicians or institutions - believed that 
management-appointed consultants were subject to conflicts of interest and 
therefore the remuneration committee, relying on the consultant’s advice, would 
be unable to fulfil their task objectively and independently. In response to the new 
regulation and the best practice guidance from Higgs, companies were faced with 
the decision as to how remuneration advisers could or should be appointed. One 
FTSE 100 Head of Reward during this period recalled:  
 
‘What they (FTSE 100 company) decided was that they wanted to appoint an 
independent advisor, because that was being advised, that was best 
practice… 
 
It was around that time that we ran a recruitment ... a process to appoint 
independent advisors to the Rem Co and New Bridge Street was selected as 
part of that process. My job as an in-house Head of Reward therefore was to 
try to balance off the fact that we've now got two sets of advisors, because in 
theory, the company still had Towers Perrin…I, at that point, really didn't 
want to have two sets of advisors giving conflicting advice. That was kind of 
the concern that I think many companies were working with: do we want one 
adviser? Is that going to be sufficiently insightful? Will they know the 
business well enough? Will they position things appropriately so that they get 
the executive input into the process?’ 
 
Many FTSE 100 companies went through a period of transition in which one set 
of advisers was appointed by management, another set by the remuneration 
committee. For those FTSE 350 companies without advisers, many companies 
decided to appoint one. For those hiring multiple consultants, Bender (2004) 
suggests that this was meant to bolster the independence of the pay setting 
process; where one consultant’s advice would appear to act as a check on the 
other’s advice. Yet, in a review of the remuneration reports published in 2002, 
only one company cited two advisors according to this particular rationale84: 
                                                         
84 With the exception of Legal and General, no other FTSE 100 firm indicated that the 
duplication of services was either provided or desirable in bolstering the perception of 
independence. 
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Remuneration reflects individual experience and responsibility. It is based 
on relevant individual market comparators, related to job size, function and 
sector, and individual and company performance. Judgments are based on 
a range of external information, mainly from major remuneration 
consultants (including Towers Perrin; Watson Wyatt; New Bridge Street; 
Monks and MacLagans). The practice is to use at least two independent 
sources of information for each individual decision.85 
 
The leading providers of executive remuneration consulting services to FTSE 350 
companies included Deloitte, PwC, EY, and KPMG, and the boutique firms New 
Bridge Street, Kepler Associates and MM&K. Some FTSE companies did not 
appoint any advisor to the remuneration committee, and some appointed sole 
practitioners as opposed to a firm. A summary list of remuneration committee 
advisers as disclosed in the Directors’ Remuneration Reports for FTSE 350 firms 
(2015) in presented Table 3. The term ‘boutique’ is used to represent 
consultancies, which do not operate within the walls of professional service firms. 
The law firms overwhelmingly provided share scheme implementation advice or 
other legal advice.86  In the first full year in which the regulation took effect, 94 
per cent of FTSE 10087 companies disclosed external advisors (Deloitte, 2004). 
The majority of this external advice was supplied by executive remuneration 
consulting teams, often situated within professional service firms.  
 
Table 3.3: Remuneration Advice to FTSE 350 Remuneration Committee (2002) 
Professional service firms Boutique  
Consulting 
tradition Big4 ‘Independent’ Sole Law firms 
Hay Group 
Pearl Meyer and 
Partners 
Towers Perrin 
Deloitte 
EY 
PwC 
KPMG 
New Bridge Street  
MM&K 
Kepler Associates 
 
Gerrick Aronson  
Alan Judes  
Alithos 
Allen Overy 
Clifford Chance 
Eversheds 
Freshfields 
Herbert Smith Freehill 
Linklaters 
Pinsent Masons 
Slaughter and May                                                         
85 Legal and General Remuneration Report (2002) 
86  Unlike the accounting psfs, the law firms did not seek to control remuneration 
consulting work domains. The reasons for this are not fully known, and has been added to 
the list of puzzles to be resolved in future research. 
87 87% of FTSE 250 companies disclosed external advisors (Deloitte, 2004).  
 93 
It was also the case in the wake of the DRRR (2002) that demand for 
remuneration consultants surged. In response to this, remuneration consultancies 
sought to carve out their unique selling points. As one partner described of PwC 
in the early 2000s: 
 
‘Go back to 2000 or so, and we had, I don't know, whatever it was, four 
clients or something. You're going up in a pitch against people who've got 25 
clients, that's pretty tough. We had to create a brand that was linked to this 
idea of actually, we're not just going to tell you what everybody else does. 
We're going to be more thoughtful about it.’88 
 
The core of the PwC executive remuneration consulting strategy centred on 
‘linking pay to strategy.’ In addition to this, the practice, via its partners, sought to 
‘make contributions to public debates’, engage with political and social 
institutions. The PwC practice became much more consulting oriented, more 
academic in style and concerned with providing a balanced rhetoric around what 
was increasingly a politically vitriolic issue.  
 
The politicisation of executive pay posed a firm-level reputational risk, especially 
in light of the demise of Enron and the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX 2002). For PwC (and accounting firms generally), the regulatory changes in 
the early 2000s raised questions about a place for remuneration advice within 
accounting professional service firms.  Given that SOX applied to US public 
companies as well as their global subsidiaries, and the high degree of uncertainty 
on the issue of prohibited other services, executive remuneration consulting was 
by no means secure. Both PwC and Deloitte’s89 remuneration consulting teams 
carved niches within their respective psfs; careful not to create overlap with audit 
or tax services.    
 
Given the dominance of the psfs in the field of remuneration consulting, there 
appeared to be little room for new entrants given the rising barriers to entry.                                                         
88 Interview with lead partner 
89  Deloitte acquired the Arthur Andersen remuneration consulting team (with the 
exception of two members) in the fallout of Enron. Arthur Andersen, prior to its demise 
was one of the leading remuneration consultancies. Deloitte absorbed almost the entire 
25-person Andersen team, elevating its market share and status in the industry almost 
overnight. 
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Against these odds, former SCA Consultants Gordon Clark, Jenny Martin and 
Peter Smith successfully established Kepler Associates in 2000, based on a 
philosophy of linking executive pay to creating stakeholder value. Unlike the 
professional service firms, with teams often comprising accountants, lawyers and 
actuaries, Kepler built their team by hiring recent university graduates – often 
from elite universities - and training these new starters almost entirely in-house. 
Mimicking the hierarchical structure used in psfs, Kepler added layer-by-layer to 
their practice; promoting entry level associates to senior associates, managers, 
principals and partners. Kepler built a reputation in the field based on their 
sophisticated data models and analytics. In the following section, the new work 
domains made possible by the DRRR (2002) are examined, as well as the 
implications for remuneration consulting work. 
 
 
3.9 ‘All about corporate governance’ 
 
There didn’t appear to be any doubt that independent advice to remuneration 
committees would be supplied by the executive remuneration consulting practices 
which had formed and stabilised in the 1990s to early 2000s. In a review of the 
2002 Directors’ Remuneration Reports (for FTSE 100 companies), the 
‘independence’ of the remuneration consultant was represented in a plethora of 
ways. These variations will be described in Chapter 4, when analysing the role of 
independence in shaping the co-emergence of remuneration committees and 
remuneration consultants.  
 
The work domains for remuneration consultancies expanded significantly with the 
enactment of the DRRR (2002).  The layout and content of the remuneration 
report represented new tasks for the consultant. Similarly, the shareholder vote 
necessitated engagement (or increased engagement) with institutional investors 
and investor representative groups.  
 
The new disclosure requirements also meant that the proprietary databases 
containing executive director pay data were no longer a competitive advantage. 
Thus, the emphasis on proprietary data was thrown into sharp relief for the 
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consultancies. The human resource consultancies, which had operated broader 
workforce pay databases, had an advantage over the accounting and law firms, the 
latter of which had focused on the FTSE company executive pay data. New work 
asks included broadening the database catchment to encompass data for one to 
two levels below the board. 
 
3.9.1 Shareholder engagement 
 
 
Another integral channel of governance work stemmed from the introduction of a 
mandatory non-binding vote on the remuneration report at the company’s AGM. 
Following the legislation, all FTSE 350 companies had put their remuneration 
report to a shareholder vote in the year following the DRRR’s enactment.  
 
The Remuneration committee’s engagement with the largest and most influential 
institutional investors in their respective companies also increased markedly, and 
remuneration consultants either accompanied the remuneration committee chair or 
prepared them in advance of these meetings. Davis (2007)90 conducted interviews 
and roundtable events, specifically with AFSCME, Association of British 
Insurers, Financial Reporting Council, Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators, Institute of Directors; International Corporate Governance 
Network, Manifest, PIRC, Research, Recommendations and Electronic Voting91 
(RREV), Shareholder Forum, and the Working Group on Advisory Votes. Davis 
found that subsequent to the establishment of the shareholder vote, pay panels 
meet more frequently; engaged in design-stage consultation with key investors, 
investor trade organizations and/or proxy service advisors; utilized more 
information; and hired more independent outside advice. According to corporate 
secretaries at the roundtable in London, directors “demonstrated more awareness 
that their work will be subject to broad scrutiny” and were “more diligent” about 
crafting policies that allow them ‘to defend decisions taken’ (Davis, 2007).   
 
                                                        
90 Davis (2007) is a policy briefing funded by Yale University’s Millstein Centre that 
drew on the UK experience in order to make proposals for a US advisory shareholder 
vote. 
91 RREV is the proxy advisory division of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).   
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ABI and RREV both observed the increased communication between boards and 
investors. According to ABI, company initiated contact prior to finalising plans 
tripled, while RREV recorded 150 and 130 instances of dialogue in 2005 and 
2006, respectively. This contrasts to an average of 20 such outreach efforts by 
companies in the years prior to the establishment of the advisory vote. 
 
In 2004, Deloitte was commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) to conduct an evaluation on the impact of the DRRR (2002). In the report, 
Deloitte illustrated the post-DRRR (2002) inter-relationships between institutional 
investors and companies with the following diagram: 
 
Figure 3.1: Inter-relationship between institutional investors and companies 
Source: Deloitte (2004) 
 
Visually absent from Figure 3.1 is the interpenetration of the remuneration 
consultants in pay governance work. Yet, the remuneration consultants were 
present in the engagement between the remuneration committee chair and key 
institutional investors, in crafting the report, and in liaising with shareholders in 
anticipation of remuneration report vote the annual general meeting. The 
remuneration consultant had a ‘pulse’ on the key facets of pay governance. The 
following section argues that these work activities emplaced the consultants as 
central actors in pay governance because they were perceivably fulfilling a 
gatekeeping role; a role that they did not oppose, but rather actively enabled.  
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3.10 The core logics of remuneration consulting work 
 
Prior to the upshot in governance guidelines in the 1990s and the 
recommendations of the DRRR (2002), the remuneration consultant had operated 
in the background – with little visibility to politicians or the public. What little 
visibility they pursued via the provision of pay data to journalists, was premised 
on increasing their marketability to potential clients in order to boost their 
economic growth, economic prominence, profitability and market share. 
Remuneration consulting work was premised on a market logic. The field of 
remuneration consulting is a near personification of the decline in traditional 
professionalism, from the disinterested expert driven by a “service ideal” to the 
knowledge worker producing services within a ‘managerial professional business’ 
(Abbott, 1988; Dirsmith et al., 2015). 
 
In its earliest iteration, remuneration consulting work included supplying pay 
information to the remuneration committee and personnel departments, or 
advising management on the accounting and legal implications of share scheme 
implementation. Initially, survey data analysis and implementation work, were 
carried out by different firms. It was only later that both work tasks were offered 
within the same consulting team. Accounting and law psfs, in particular, seeking 
to expand into new work domains, were integral in combining pay survey work, 
share scheme implementation work and incentive design work. These 
professionals within psfs were seeking interesting work activities, which 
increased firm profitability, and social and economic prominence. As one former 
managing partner recalled, ‘if it were just remuneration, you’d have died of 
boredom years ago. It's actually extracting good business decisions out of a lot of 
heat and drama. Just trying to get a lot of very powerful people to do what it is 
you think they ought to be doing is quite addictive really.’ Remuneration 
consulting work enabled qualified professionals to engage in enterprising work 
domains.  
 
The shifts into remuneration governance work that followed, were opportunistic, 
in that governance guidelines that shaped incentive design ultimately shaped and 
constrained remuneration consulting work. In what was largely unintentional on 
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the part of consultants, a gatekeeping role (Coffee, 2006) emerged as a result of 
the burgeoning governance codes and legislation surrounding executive pay. The 
consultants hadn’t actively sought such a role. Nevertheless, the consultants were 
not ones to look a gift horse in the mouth, especially when the governance-related 
work complemented their already established work processes.  
 
The gatekeeping role, which consultants fulfilled, is not quite the same as the 
external auditors’ gatekeeping role. Prior to analysing the complementarity of the 
market and gatekeeping logics, which shape consulting work, the consultants’ 
gatekeeping role must first be explicated.  
 
The remuneration consultant as gatekeeper 
 
Coffee (2006) described the term ‘gatekeepers’ as ‘some form of outside or 
independent watchdog or monitor – someone who screens out flaws or defects or 
who verifies compliance with standards or procedures’ (p. 1-2). Coffee further 
detailed two distinct roles of the gatekeepers. The first is a ‘private policemen 
who has been structured into the process to prevent wrongdoing’ (p. 2). However, 
unlike the auditor, the remuneration consultant is not a gatekeeper in the sense of 
withholding consent. While the consultant can withhold cooperation, their 
signature is neither required by governance codes nor regulation. Prior to the 
DRRR (2002), there was neither ‘rhyme nor reason’ for the consultant to assume 
a policing role. While they had emerged as an intermediary between the 
committee and institutional investor governance guidelines, this was more so 
premised on their need to reflect the institutions’ recommendations within 
incentive design.  
 
Prior to 2002, remuneration consultants were almost universally appointed by 
management teams, if one can even use the term ‘appointed’, as this term has 
come to hold particular meaning within the field of remuneration governance.92 In 
response to the DRRR (2002) and the regulatory concerns with respect to board 
independence, a clear articulation of the ‘remuneration committee appointed                                                         
92 Consultants interviewed overwhelmingly stressed that they were ‘appointed’ by the 
remuneration committee, in that sense that this in and of itself, reified their independence.  
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advisor’ emerged as a role, which the remuneration consultant could fulfil. In 
what Coffee describes as the most distinctive part of the gatekeeper, the 
gatekeeper acts as a reputational intermediary to assure investors as to the quality 
of the signal’ (p. 3).   
 
Even then, there was no impetus for remuneration consultants to fundamentally 
alter the ways in which they engaged with the remuneration committee. A 
preventative or policing role would not emerge as a feature of the client-
consulting relationship until the consultants’ independence was called into 
question. Allegations of the consultants’ loss of independence only reached 
critical mass in the wake of the global financial crisis. The perceived loss of 
independence will be analysed in depth in the following chapter, which studies the 
co-emergence of the consultant and committee; challenges to the consultants’ 
legitimacy, and the way in which the consultants reproduced their legitimacy. 
 
Not a professionalisation project 
 
Perhaps it is the consultants’ quasi-gatekeeping role, which has been conflated 
with the emergence of a profession, or an occupational grouping seeking to 
professionalise. However, the genealogy of executive remuneration consulting up 
to 2002, suggests more than the stabilisation of a field of collective practice, but 
less than a profession. By the mid-2000s, executive remuneration consulting has 
emerged as a distinct occupation, enabled by a complex of macro level conditions, 
organization-level transformations and micro-level work tasks; and importantly 
shaped by a dominant market logic. 
 
There is little to no evidence of remuneration consultants seeking to 
professionalise. The professionalisation project, as Larson (1977) describes, 
occurs where professions are motivated by a drive for status as opposed to earlier 
economic motivations. As Schudson (1980) summarises: professionalisation is not 
a process of upgrading the essential character of a kind of work but a political 
process of gaining greater control over work.’ Therefore, the outcome of the 
professionalisation project is the attainment of credibility and control.   
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In the years in which remuneration consulting was emerging as a distinct field of 
practice, the senior consultants shifting into remuneration consulting work already 
possessed professional accreditation. Qualified as accountants, lawyers and 
actuaries, the senior members of remuneration consulting work possessed a first-
order professional claim. These individuals possessed a source of identity, which 
had already achieved status in society. Professionals in the accounting and law 
psfs initially expected to gain market share because of the social capital derived 
from their professional qualifications. The accountants and lawyers attempted to 
tout their professional status vis-à-vis the ‘data guys’ as a means of overcoming 
the barriers to entry in remuneration consulting work. Yet, this social capital did 
not naturally transfer to securing advisory appointments during the 1990s.  
 
Prior to the governance guidelines, it was ‘knowledge’ of the executive pay 
market, which imbued remuneration consultants with their value. As Morris and 
Empson (1998) noted in their study of professional service firms, knowledge is 
particularly affected by beliefs about what is useful or will add value.93 Possessing 
executive pay data represented special and proprietary knowledge, which 
differentiated the consulting houses from the accounting firms. When unable to 
upend the central and elevated role of data in remuneration consulting work, 
accounting psfs built or acquired survey data houses. The belief that their status 
would overflow into gaining market share in remuneration consulting work did 
not initially come to fruition.  
 
The psf effect 
 
Also tempering the pursuit of accreditation processes of self-regulatory bodies 
was the growing importance of the organization’s reputation. The emergence of 
management consulting and professional service firms as a dominant form of 
organization superseded the consultants concerns with social closure. The 
embedding of remuneration consulting work within psf tempered the need to 
pursue a professionalisation project. By the 1990s, the big accounting firms were 
no longer referring to themselves as accountants (Greenwood et al., 1998). These 
psfs had ‘championed the concept of 'multidisciplinary practices' (Greenwood et                                                         
93 Emphasis added by the original authors.  
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al., 1998), and remuneration consulting was seen to fit as one such 
multidisciplinary practice. It was also typical for psfs to target a broad range of 
related professional jurisdictions for future colonization. The pensions and 
benefits-focused psfs re-imagined the scope of the business as human resource or 
human talent organisations; similarly, the accounting psfs, namely PwC and 
Deloitte, were advancing Human Capital business segments. Executive 
remuneration consulting would come to be situated within these business streams.  
 
Remuneration consulting teams drew on the resources, reputation and structural 
norms of their professional service firms, which largely mimicked the structural 
form of the ‘classic’ accounting professions. Chapter 5 discusses in detail the 
apprenticeship model and hierarchical structure, which an executive remuneration 
consultancy drew upon for the purposes of constructing knowledge and expertise.    
Overall, the ‘hodgepodge’ of professional actors, over a period of several decades, 
opportunistically absorbed or captured executive remuneration-related work areas. 
Not unlike the inter-professional jurisdictional claims described by Abbott (1988), 
or the colonization of work described by Suddaby and Greenwood (2001), 
remuneration consultants were claiming new domains of remuneration 
governance work emerging from the regulatory space. These work domains were 
made even more attractive to the psfs when consultants started advising the 
remuneration committee directly.  
 
The client effect 
 
As noted earlier, the remuneration consultant had limited public visibility prior to 
the DRRR (2002). However, the disclosure of the remuneration committee 
advisor enabled a visibility of the consultants. The remuneration consultants’ 
status was also substantially enhanced in light of the stature of their board-client. 
Retaining and promoting their relevance in executive pay design (and later pay 
governance) was targeted to this client.  It has been observed, that the social 
credibility that enables an occupation to be seen as the legitimate supplier (Cooper 
and Robson, 2006), is premised on the client acceptance of the adviser’s expert 
claims. Yet, the client-consultant relationship is mutually beneficial; both their 
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claims to independence is inextricably linked. Remuneration committees have 
time and again found their governance position tenuous in the face of political 
censure due to high profile failings in board oversight. Thus, it is not only the 
remuneration consultant who reproduced their legitimate claim to pay 
governance, but also the remuneration committee. This is explored in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 
The co-emergence of remuneration consultants and remuneration committees  
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter studies the co-emergence of executive remuneration consultants and 
remuneration committees as central actors in the governance of executive pay. As 
described in Chapter 3, remuneration consultants expanded their work domains in 
response to the enactment of the DRRR (2002) in order to retain their relevance to 
the remuneration committee. It will be argued in this chapter, that following the 
DRRR (2002), the independence of the remuneration committee and the expert 
claims and independence of the remuneration consultant became importantly 
interlinked. From this point onward, their work in the field of remuneration 
governance 94  became mutually dependent. As such, neither actor can be 
adequately understood nor analysed without reference to the other. 
 
Prior to analysing the interlinkages and interdependencies between the consultant 
and committee, the chapter first describes the rise of the non-executive 
‘independent’ director (or NED), and subsequently the remuneration committee. 
As was the case in chapter 3, a genealogical approach is drawn upon in studying 
the historical emergence of NEDs and remuneration committees. Genealogy sheds 
light on counterintuitive, surprising, and disruptive shifts between consecutive and 
non-consecutive governance episodes, enabling more critical assessment of the 
choices being made by consultants and committee members, but also regulators 
and investors.   
 
Section 4.1 describes demands for non-executive directors and attempts at 
formalising the requirements of ‘independent’ non-executive directors throughout 
the 1970s. Section 4.2 describes the Bank of England’s attention to board                                                         
94  Remuneration governance refers to any state, institution, industry, or investor led 
regulatory or governance initiative covering ‘quoted’ or publicly listed companies in the 
UK. In this study, the focus is FTSE 350 companies. While disclosure regulation has 
largely focused on executive directors (i.e. those with a position on the Board of 
Directors), remuneration governance often extends to the remuneration of senior 
executives in FTSE companies, for example, the Executive Committee (i.e. one level 
below the board) and ExCo-1 (two levels below the board).  
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governance in the 1980s. Section 4.3 details the rise of institutional investors, and 
Section 4.4 the emergence of remuneration governance as a distinct institutional 
field. Section 4.5 describes the DRRR (2002) as well as the Higgs Review (2003). 
Section 4.6 examines the ways in which remuneration consultants and 
remuneration committees documented independence in executive pay practices. 
Section 4.7 describes the impact of the global financial crisis on pay governance 
and the challenges to the consultants’ independence. This section also describes 
how the consultants’ reproduced their legitimacy in remuneration governance. 
Section 4.8 discusses key themes presented in the chapter, and Section 4.9 
presents links to Chapter 5.  
 
 
4.1 The rise of non-executive directors 
 
This section describes early concerns with board oversight from the 1970s in the 
UK public company setting. While corporate governance, as a term, was not 
widely used until the 1980s, these are important early efforts at delineating 
executive and non-executive directors (NEDs), and in particular, the role, 
character and independence of the NED.  This section demonstrates efforts by the 
Bank of England to collect and analyse data on board composition, track the 
growth of non-executive directors, and in so doing, distinguish independent NEDs 
within the board. It is in seeking to distinguish the independent NED that this 
section highlights the ways in which actors socially constructed independence in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
4.1.1 Demands for greater board oversight 
 
In the pre-Cadbury era of board oversight, British boardrooms were often likened 
to an “old boys’ club” (Howe and McRae, 1991), their members supine in their 
rubber- stamping (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998) of management decisions. The 
criticisms of board structure, processes and responsibilities, which largely fell on 
deaf ears during the early half of the twentieth century, started gaining traction in 
the 1970s.   
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There was a perception that the workforce of British companies was being 
marginalised, and the concept of the stakeholder had to be broadened to 
incorporate workers. The re-imagined stakeholder, coupled with corporate 
scandals occurring at the time, lead to the emergence of a public policy concern 
on the issue of board independence. The idea that non-executive directors should 
perform an explicit monitoring role and that a proportion of them should be 
independent of management entered public debate (Parkinson et al., 2000). In a 
1970 survey, the largest group of NEDs were made up of bankers, lawyers, 
accountants and other technical specialists, followed by retired executive directors 
of the company (BIM, 1970).  
 
Neither the specialist group nor the former directors were considered independent 
and were seen as unlikely to lead to effective internal scrutiny of management. 
Demands were made for a legally defined role for NEDs as well as minimum 
NED quotas on large boards (BIM, 1970). Institutions, such as the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI) and the Institute of Directors (IoD), were in opposition 
to statutory intervention, citing the ‘unique circumstances of individual 
companies, the need for flexibility, and the dangers of prescription’ as their key 
arguments (Parkinson, 1993). The Conservative party had always been a staunch 
defender of the corporate economy, refraining from state intervention. The Labour 
government was also unwilling to seek a legislative solution to concerns regarding 
board oversight. As such, the 1971 Parliamentary bill (which sought three 
mandatory NED postings) was supplanted in favour of industry and institutional 
self-regulation. This initiative, commissioned by the Confederation of British 
Insurers (CBI), the City, and other institutions culminated in the establishment of 
the Watkinson Committee.  
 
The Watkinson Committee was tasked with investigating possible solutions for 
improving corporate accountability, especially with regard to workers. 
Accountability was a central concern as the separation of ownership and control 
was seen to allow managers to go unsupervised by those whom they had a duty to 
serve (Watkinson, 1973). In the socio-political climate of 1972, workers felt their 
concerns were not being taken into consideration by management, which was 
reflected in the seven-week miner’s strike. At the regional level, responsibility to 
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the workforce was the focal concern of the EU Fifth Company Law Directive. 
The Directive proposed the two-tier board structure with the intention of including 
worker representation (Davies, 1978; Spira and Slinn, 2013). The Watkinson 
Committee’s 1973 report, entitled The Responsibilities of the British Public 
Company, advocated the use of NEDs and the need for disclosure of their 
qualifications and interests in the company’s annual report.95 The Committee also 
recommended that institutions take an active role in identifying viable non-
executive directors. It was this recommendation, which would later prompt the 
committee sponsors, mainly the Bank of England, to establish and fund The 
Promotion of NEDs (hereafter, PRO NED). None of the report’s other 
recommendations were wholly accepted at the time of its publication (Spira and 
Slinn, 2013).  
Yet, board oversight did not slip from policy makers’ attention, and in 1977, the 
Labour government again attempted to put forth an active monitoring role for 
NEDs in their White Paper entitled The Conduct of Company Directors. The 
Paper argued for the codification of directors’ fiduciary duty, and called for NEDs 
to provide independent supervision of the company’s management. Legislation 
was once again stymied, with the government preferring to ‘leave the issue to the 
business and investment communities to sort out’ (Parkinson et al., 2000). A 1977 
Conservative Private members’ bill, sponsored by Sir Brandon Rhys-William, 
called for companies above a certain size to have no less than three NEDs. This 
bill was also defeated.  
Overall, there were several attempts made in the 1970s by politicians and 
institutions seeking to formalise the boundaries of the outside directors’ role as 
well as define directors’ independence. However, for a host of reasons, this was 
not achieved. Obstacles to regulation included the TUC’s resistance to 
relinquishing power to worker representatives 96 , political ambivalence with 
respect to statutory intervention, and a lack of will amongst business and 
institutions to actively self-regulate board oversight. Ultimately, the emphasis on                                                         
95 The committee also recommended that a code of corporate conduct be established, and 
the role of chairman and chief executive be separated. 
96 The relinquishing of control would be in the form of worker representative on the 
board.  
 107 
protecting workers and establishing a more broadly defined group of stakeholders 
- particularly employee participation - ‘withered away with the election of 
Margaret Thatcher’ in 1979 (Adelopo, 2012). Thus, director independence and 
oversight was left largely unresolved in the 1970s, and from the 1980s, board 
oversight was motivated on new grounds. These new grounds would only become 
apparent as Thatcher’s enterprise culture took root in Britain. 
 
4.2 Board Oversight in the 1980s 
Constructing a definition of independence 
As described in Chapter 3, Thatcher’s enterprise culture relied on employee share 
schemes and profit related pay to inspire neoliberal ideals of self-reliance within 
the British workforce. The emphasis on market fundamentals was coupled with a 
decline in state interventionist policies. Thus, corporate oversight was vested in 
the board of directors and a role was increasingly being envisioned for 
institutional investors. In the absence of corporate failings, and due to the 
government’s pre-occupation with the privatisation agenda, board oversight and 
governance did not feature as prominently as it had in the 1970s, and would in the 
1990s. In its stead, the Bank of England collected and published data on board 
composition. The topic featured repeatedly in both the Institute of Directors (IoD) 
Director publication and the Bank of England’s (or Bank) Bulletins. On the issue 
of non-executive directors, the Bank frequently published data either collected by 
the Bank or PRO NED.97 
Based on a review of Bank of England Bulletins, the Bank was deeply interested 
in board composition from the late 1970s. In the Bank’s 1983 Bulletin, 
comparisons were made across the years 1976, 1979, and 1982. Although there 
was a positive trend toward appointing more NEDs on corporate boards, and an 
indication that there were fewer companies within the sample that included zero 
NEDs, the 1976 statistics were seen to be problematic.  This is because the 1976 
Bullock Survey had assumed that NEDs could be identified based on the reported 
salary in the annual report. Thus, a director was deemed to be non-executive                                                         
97 As the Bank sponsored PRO NED, there may be little distinction between the two.  
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where the salary reported was less that £7500. This was later seen to be an 
unacceptable means of delineating non-executive directors from executive 
directors, and the Bank subsequently improved the rigour of the survey.  
The 1988 survey also presented comparative statistics across the years 1983, 1985 
and 1988. In this edition of the Bank’s Bulletin, in addition to the data on board 
composition and board member credentials, board member independence was also 
featured. The timing of its appearance is not surprising given that PRO NED had 
published a code in 1987 which detailed recommended practice for non-executive 
directors.  
PRO NED had also set about surveying companies on the progress being made 
with respect to introducing NEDs, and furthermore, ensuring that NEDs were 
independent. Independence, in the PRO NED surveys, was defined mainly with 
reference to financial links to the company or to previous service as an executive. 
With respect to the latter, companies were asked to indicate how many of their 
non-executive directors were serving or had served the company in a professional 
capacity and how many were former executives of the company or its 
subsidiaries. 
Although the Bulletin’s survey comparisons indicated increased NED 
appointments, progress remained slow. In terms of clarifying the boundaries of 
the NED role, the Bank stated: 
 
A suitable non-executive director will generally be able to offer detached and 
independent advice that full-time executive directors may be less well placed 
to give, and he may also be able to provide additional expertise in specific 
areas, such as finance. 
 
Thus, the definition of the non-executive centered on directors’ qualifications and 
ability to monitor effectively, while PRO NED’s definition of ‘independence’ was 
based upon the NED’s distance from the business. The Bank of England and PRO 
NED were central in analyzing and documenting board composition and board 
independence throughout the 1980s. While the decade drew to a close with little 
formal public policy discourse on the issue of board oversight, the 1980s were 
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also marked by the rise of two critically important actors in the field of 
governance – the ABI and the NAPF. The following section describes the rise of 
institutional investor representative bodies and the role, which they assumed in 
remuneration governance.  
 
 
4.3 The rise of institutional investors  
 
Throughout the 1980s, institutional investors (for example, pension funds) 
supplanted the influence of industrial relations groups 98  in matters of board 
oversight, and emerged as the stakeholder of central concern for companies. In the 
March 1984 Bulletin, the Bank of England described the change in institutional 
shareholdings: 
 
Two decades ago the life assurance companies, pension funds, 
investment and unit trusts together held about a quarter of the equity 
of companies listed on the Stock Exchange. The proportion has more 
than doubled since then. In contrast, and over a slightly longer period, 
investment in listed equity by individuals fell from about two-thirds of 
the total in the late 1950s to about one-third now. 
 
The two key voices, which emerged in the 1980s, were the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI), and the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). The ABI 
was established in 1985 through the convening of several specialised insurance 
industry trade associations, including the British Insurance Association, the Life 
Offices’ Association, the Fire Offices Committee, the Accident Offices 
Association, the Industrial Life Offices Association and the Accident Offices 
Association (Overseas). These associations joined together to form one trade 
association for the insurance industry. The NAPF, formed in 1923, was a non-for-
profit that served as the ‘voice for workplace pensions’ in Britain.  
 
Banks did not believe that institutional investors of this size were seen to be 
unlikely to buy or sell blocks of shares in retaliation to poor governance. Yet, 
there was also little expectation that institutional investors would take an active 
role in corporate governance. Rather, their ‘most important element in the                                                         98 See Spira and Slinn (2013) for further evidence of the shift from industrial relations 
groups to institutional investors. 
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husbandry of this investment (was) assurance that the board has the right mix of 
abilities and experience to provide good direction (Bulletin, 1984, p. 76). 
However, if there were perceivable board failings, there was little guidance given 
by the state or self-regulatory mechanisms on what the institutional investor could 
do to rectify the problem.  
 
The institutions did not deviate from the Bank’s expectations. Their governance 
role remained largely muted.  With respect to remuneration, the investor 
representative bodies assumed a governance role as their concerns grew regarding 
potential equity dilution (Main, 1993, 1999, 2006). As described in chapter 3, the 
1984 Finance Act precipitated an explosion in executive stock option plans for 
which the ABI and NAPF were concerned with ‘the prospect of equity dilution 
through over-zealous use’ (Main, 2006).  
 
The investor concern principally arose because the vast majority of executive 
stock options were serviced through the new issuance of shares (i.e. subscription) 
as opposed to the company acquiring shares on the open market (Main, 2006). 
Furthermore, executive stock option pay-outs were making investor groups 
increasingly uneasy. Options, previously extolled as ‘at risk’, were allowing for 
windfall gains and ‘jackpot’ remuneration during the privatisations. While 
institutional investors supported the use of share schemes, questions were arising 
as to whether incentive pay-outs reflected the executive’s or firm’s performance. 
Thus, institutional investor representative bodies issued governance guidelines.  
 
Table 4.1: Key Governance Guidelines (1980s) 
 
Date: Event: 
Nov 1984 NAPF: ‘Share Scheme Guidelines’ 
April 1985 BIA Investment Protection Committee 
July 1987 ABI: ‘Share Option and Profit Sharing Incentive Scheme’ 
March 1988 NAPF: ‘Share Schemes’ 
May 1988 ABI: ‘Addendum to Share Option and Profit Sharing Incentive 
Scheme Guidelines’ 
Source: Manifest 
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The attentiveness to shareholder value and the alignment of shareholders and 
management was revolutionising the institutional field of corporate governance in 
the United States (Fligstein & Shin, 2007) during the 1980s. Fligstein and Shin 
(2007) identified a logic of shareholder value as core to the field, describing it as 
one which was ideologically rooted in agency theory and which promoted the 
maximisation of shareholder value. This logic was similarly taking root in the UK, 
importantly captured in the Cadbury Committee deliberations described in the next 
section. As noted earlier, institutional investors critically shaped the tone of the 
Cadbury Report, and the conditions of possibility for UK corporate governance. 
The following section also describes the conditions, which led to the emplacement 
of executive remuneration within the Cadbury Committee’s remit.  
 
 
4.4 The field of remuneration governance 
 
Britain entered the 1990s in severe recession. The UK economy was suffering 
from high unemployment, the government was proceeding with its privatisation 
of British Coal, Powergen, National Power, and British Rail and companies were 
undergoing staff reductions. These difficult economic times and the fall-out from 
the BCCI scandal and other corporate failings appeared in stark contrast to rising 
CEO pay (Delman, 2010). The argument that British executives were paid far less 
that their American counterparts was less palatable. Furthermore, the justification 
that high pay was the result of superior firm performance was losing ground as 
evidence was published on the growing disconnect between directors’ pay and 
company performance. It was for these reasons that executive remuneration 
entered Cadbury’s deliberations, despite Sir Cadbury’s efforts to contain the scope 
of his committee’s remit.  
 
4.4.1 Cadbury Report 
‘Sunlight is the best disinfectant’ (Brandeis, 1934) 
In May 1991, the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and 
the accountancy profession convened a committee under the auspices of Sir 
Adrian Cadbury (Retired Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes and at the time, 
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Chairman of PRO NED) to address financial aspects of corporate governance. 
The board’s monitoring role was seen as central in governance, and the 
Committee’s work importantly focused on the NED’s ability to challenge 
executives. The Report opined on the main functions and responsibilities of the 
NED, stating that they should bring an independent judgement to bear on issues of 
strategy, performance and resources including key appointments and standards of 
conduct (Cadbury Report, 1992). There was to be no legal distinction between the 
executive and non-executive director, however, non-executive directors were at an 
informational disadvantage vis-a-vis internal directors. The focus on internal 
control and the NEDs’ role in governance led to further emphasis on board 
subcommittees. Cadbury was resistant to broadening the scope of the committee’s 
remit, however the Maxwell scandal which occurred during the committee’s 
deliberations created further momentum for executive pay oversight.  
4.4.2 Cadbury deliberates on pay governance 
The Cadbury Archives include the meeting notes between Cadbury and Jonathan 
Charkham. Charkham, then governor at the Bank of England, a prominent 
corporate governance pundit and member of the PRO NED initiative saw 
remuneration as being set within ‘cabals of pay’ and believed that a fair pay 
system was ‘extremely difficult to devise. He believed this was due to the 
drawbacks of stock options and earnings per share, as well as the problem of time 
lags where payment of bonuses did not necessarily align with sustained profit 
levels. Charkham highlighted two different concerns, the transparency of 
executive pay setting and the problematic nature of the pay components. The 
Committee’s deliberations on the structure and responsibilities for remuneration 
committees were further shaped by the following; the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee (ISC) (Main, 1992), PRO NED, and prevailing practice in the US.  
The Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) - whose membership in 1991 
included the Association of British Insurers, the Association of Investment Trust 
Companies, the British Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association, the 
National Association of Pension Funds, and the Unit Trust Association - was also 
concerned with the independent setting of directors’ remuneration. The ISC 
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insisted that executives should play no part in deciding their own packages and 
further called for remuneration committee composition to be disclosed in the 
annual report. 
PRO NED Guidelines, published almost simultaneously with the Cadbury Report, 
emphasised that getting the right information to NEDs was at the ‘heart of the 
matter.’ It was their view that populating the committees with independent NEDs 
was an initial step, but ‘if the committee is to have a real role it must satisfy itself 
that it had all the information it needed about both internal relativities and external 
comparisons on executive pay (PRO NED, 1992). 
 
Following the publication of the Cadbury Report, PRO NED released guidelines 
stating that the remuneration committee should (i) ensure that the company's 
directors and senior executives are fairly rewarded for their individual 
contributions to the company's overall performance and  (ii) demonstrate to all the 
stakeholders in the business that the remuneration of the senior executive 
members of the company is set by a committee of board members who have no 
personal interest in the outcome of their decisions and who will give due regard to 
the interests of the shareholders and to the financial and commercial health of the 
company. Where Cadbury had suggested committees be wholly or mainly 
populated with NEDs, PRO NED went further in recommending that 
remuneration committee members be wholly comprised of independent non-
executive directors. 
Cadbury’s recommendations were also influenced by the SEC’s 1978 regulations 
pertaining to Compensation Committees (Main, 1992). Charkham suggested that 
‘one possibility worth considering was ‘whether shareholders should be asked to 
approve in advance either the method or amount of remuneration.’99 Charkham 
noted that the SEC had previously refrained from regulating shareholder 
engagement on directors’ remuneration as pay setting was seen to sit within the 
remit of the board. However, the US was ‘now understood to be changing its 
mind.’100 The UK’s corporate governance pundits were particularly interested in                                                         
99 CAD-02153: Cadbury meeting with Charkham. 19 June 1991 
100 Ibid 
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American policies as there was ‘a growing suspicion that (Britain’s) main 
competitors' systems of corporate governance might be one of the factors giving 
them a competitive edge’ (Charkham, 1993). Compensation Committees were 
already institutional practice in US boardrooms by the 1980s (Main, 1992).    
Despite the interest in introducing a role for shareholder engagement, disclosure 
emerged as the cornerstone of Cadbury’s regulatory efforts. The Report described 
governance’s overriding principle as one of openness (ICAEW, 1992), whereby 
shareholders were entitled to a full and clear statement of directors’ present and 
future benefits. In addition, separate figures should be given for salary and 
performance-related elements; the criteria on which performance is measured 
should be explained; and the relevant information about stock options, stock 
appreciation rights, and pension contributions (ICAEW, 1992). The report also 
recommended the establishment of remuneration committees consisting wholly or 
mainly of non-executive directors. 
4.4.3 Impact of the Cadbury Report 
Remuneration committees existed in many British companies prior to the 
publication of the Cadbury Report. Research conducted in 1990 found that 30 per 
cent of a sample of 220 companies reported the existence and composition of a 
remuneration committee in their annual report. 101  Of these committees, 
approximately 70 per cent solely comprised NEDs (Main and Johnston, 1992). 
Yet, while these subcommittees indeed existed, their role in remuneration 
governance was made a central imperative of the Cadbury Report and later the 
Greenbury Report. As Main et al (2006) stated:  
‘Before 1992, few people knew or cared whether a company determined 
the pay of its top executives by making use of a board sub-committee 
known as the remuneration committee. Starting with the Cadbury 
Committee, however, the subsequent decade saw this organisational 
arrangement move centre stage in what has become an increasingly 
heated debate regarding executive pay. 
                                                         101  The actual number of committees was also assumed to be higher since many 
companies did not disclose the existence of their remuneration committee. 
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Brian Main was also conducting research on remuneration committee work at the 
time of the Cadbury Committee deliberations. He found, in his 1992-1993 study 
that the pay setting process had ‘gained a significant amount of inertia’ as 
remuneration committees had come to rely on pay data from remuneration 
consultants. Main (1993) further noted that committees were caught between 
senior management to whom the NEDs were beholden, and the shareholders who 
scrutinised pay, resulting in the committee ‘paying the "going rate" as revealed in 
remuneration surveys.’ The consequence of this was that by establishing 
remuneration committees and by relying on pay data from remuneration 
consultants, the pay setting process ‘gained a significant amount of inertia’ (Main, 
1993).  
The Cadbury Report played a central role in institutionalising remuneration 
committees by identifying them as best practice. PRO NED’s guidelines bolstered 
the informational needs of the director. The remuneration consultants continued 
supplying data to personnel departments. Their status had been elevated, as a 
board sub-committee was now a recognised recipient of their pay data and pay 
analytics. What is perhaps surprising in that while Main raised concerns with 
respect to the isomorphic tendencies emerging from the use of data and the 
RemCo’s risk aversion, this was not evident in the policy documents published 
during the period.  
As described in Chapter 3, remuneration consulting work was shaped by the 
governance guidelines issued by institutional investor representative groups, 
which inevitably filtered through to the design and structure of executive pay 
packages. As Cadbury had conceded that the governance of executive pay was an 
incomplete project, further governance efforts would fall within the purview of a 
later committee. However, the public angst over pay largely dissipated following 
Cadbury’s publication. Executive pay packages were brought to the fore once 
more as windfall gains for executives of newly privatised companies triggered 
political censure and increasing resentment, particularly amongst the unions. 
Given the government’s preference for non-statutory governance solutions, 
further governance for executive pay was entrusted to the Greenbury Study 
Group.  The eventual Greenbury Report focused much of its attention on 
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disclosure and pay for performance linkages, and little on the independence of 
either consultants or remuneration committees. Independence in executive pay 
determination emerged as an object of concern in the early 2000s with the DTI’s 
consultation processes and the Higgs Review.  
 
4.5 Statutory intervention in remuneration governance 
 
In 1999, in response to government’s decision to cap pay deals for public sector 
workers, executive pay was once more emplaced as a policy concern. The DTI 
maintained that self-regulation was still preferred to state intervention and new 
laws would remain a last resort (BBC, 1999). Released in July 1999, the DTI’s 
consultative document largely centred on the shareholders’ rights to 
accountability and transparency. The mechanism by which remuneration 
committees could be held to account was via an advisory vote on the 
remuneration report at a company’s annual general meeting. Where Greenbury 
had suggested a voluntary vote on remuneration, the DTI set their sights on 
making the vote mandatory.    
 
There was growing interest once more in defining more stringently, the 
characteristics and indicators of independence for NEDs. The 1999 consultative 
document emphasised the potential for conflict of interest in the setting of pay: 
 
There are, for example, many instances where the company’s non-
executive chairman is a member of the remuneration committee in 
circumstances where it is far from clear whether that person is (to quote 
from the Combined Code) “independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the 
exercise of their independent judgement.  
However, momentum for regulatory change fizzled in the ensuing three years 
despite a second consultative document being published in 2001. It took pay 
furores at companies Prudential and Vodaphone and the collapse of Enron in the 
US for the government to commit to new governance mechanisms and 
importantly, legislative change. Drawing from the consultative documents 
published in 1999 and 2001, the DTI drafted their final report and on June 25, 
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2002, submitted it for Parliamentary approval. It proposed disclosure of the 
company’s policy on directors’ remuneration for the coming year102; details on 
share options or other long term incentive plans (LTIPs); the reasoning behind the 
performance criteria introduced where significant changes in policy occurred; and 
whether and why any share options or LTIPs are not performance related. The 
DTI also proposed that the remuneration report contain a graph illustrating the 
change in the company’s shareholder return and full details on any director 
service contracts. A representative of the committee or the company secretary 
would be required to sign the report on behalf of the committee. Failure to do so 
constituted an offense for which the committee would be liable to a fine.  
As substantial as these disclosure and accountability mechanisms were, the most 
significant change was the introduction of the mandatory (non-binding) 
shareholder vote on the remuneration report. Failure to put the report to a vote at 
the AGM also constituted an offence for which the directors’ would be liable to a 
fine. The report also recommended that the report disclose the name of the 
remuneration adviser, alongside a list of other services provided by the consultant 
to the company and a statement as to whether it was a committee appointment.  
The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations was approved in July 2002, 
enacted in August 2002, and took effect for quoted companies with year-ends on 
or after December 31, 2002. 
4.5.1 Higgs Review: Defining independence 
Overlapping the deliberation on remuneration governance was the commissioning 
of a review on the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. The 
committee, led by Sir Derek Higgs, sought to define and bolster the independence 
of non-executive directors. In January 2003, the Higgs Report was published, 
defining independence as independent in mind, and in character and judgement. 
The report stated that all non-executive directors should be independent of mind 
and willing and able to challenge, question and speak up. The expert ‘outside’ 
adviser also emerged as an important concern in remuneration committee work. 
Higgs stated:                                                         
102 This would compliment disclosure of remuneration agreed for the preceding year.  
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Research confirmed the worries of many directors that compensation 
consultants were often perceived to be too close to executive management 
and too ready to encourage companies to position their remuneration policy 
in the “upper quartile” of their peer group comparators. Such a policy can 
have a one way ratchet effect which is undesirable for individual companies 
and inflationary and self-defeating in the market place. 
 
Higgs summarised the principal duties of the remuneration committee, of which 
only one referred to the consultant. It recommended that the committee ‘be 
exclusively responsible for establishing the selection criteria, selecting, appointing 
and setting the terms of reference for any remuneration consultants who advise 
the committee.’ The Higgs Review and its summary of principal duties were 
subsequently included in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003). 
Also included in the summary was the recommendation that the committee ‘make 
available its terms of reference, explaining its role and the authority delegated to it 
by the board.’ However, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) delayed the 
implementation of Higgs’ proposal, instead establishing a working group to 
consider the report further. The approved Higgs’ recommendations were not 
implemented until 2008. Its influence, however, was felt well ahead of this 
official implementation.  
 
 
4.6 Documenting Independence   
 
In the wake of the newly implemented statutory regulations, committees and 
consultants had choices to make around the articulation of their relationship in the 
newly required Directors Remuneration Report. Bender (2004) suggested that the 
practice of hiring multiple consultants was being used to bolster the independence 
of the pay setting process. In this way, one consultant’s advice would appear to 
act as a check on the other’s advice. However, in a review of the remuneration 
reports published in 2002, only one company appears to draw on such a practice. 
The Legal and General remuneration report stated: 
 
Remuneration reflects individual experience and responsibility. It is based 
on relevant individual market comparators, related to job size, function and 
sector, and individual and company performance. Judgments are based on 
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a range of external information, mainly from major remuneration 
consultants (including Towers Perrin; Watson Wyatt; New Bridge Street; 
Monks and MacLagans). The practice is to use at least two independent 
sources of information for each individual decision. 
 
Across the FTSE 100 firms, consultant’s independence was being articulated in a 
number of ways. It was common for committees appointing boutique firms (e.g. 
New Bridge Street and Kepler) to identify the advisers as the ‘independent 
remuneration consultant’ based on the absence of other services. In this vein, if a 
multi-service firm provided only remuneration services to the committee, they 
could equally be described as independent. For example, Pearson’s remuneration 
report stated: 
 
To ensure that it received independent advice, the committee appointed 
Towers Perrin who supplied survey data and advised on market trends, 
long-term incentives and other general remuneration matters. They did not 
provide other services to the company. 
 
However, Exel’s use of the term independent would then require a different 
interpretation. The Exel remuneration report states: 
 
During 2002 the committee formally appointed as advisors and received 
guidance in relation to executive reward and share schemes from Towers 
Perrin, NBS and PWC. Towers Perrin also provided Exel with independent 
actuarial, benefits and risk management services. 
 
Diageo’s report on the other hand states that ‘the company, with the agreement of 
the remuneration committee, appointed the following independent and expert 
consultants…’ (Diageo Annual Report, 2002). Given that criticism rested on 
management’s involvement in remuneration consultant selection, it is unclear how 
the company defines independence, as it is does not avoid the perceived conflicts 
of interest.  
 
Remuneration committees needed to project objectivity, neutrality and 
importantly, independence in pay setting processes. The committee, in tandem 
with their chosen advisor, achieved this through the use of rhetorical strategies 
centred on independence. As Power (1997) noted, the way of talking about a 
practice is an important feature of the practice itself. The regulation importantly 
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enabled the linking of remuneration committees and remuneration advisers by 
linking the notion of independent pay setting to the committee’s ability to appoint 
its own advisors. Bender (2012) and Gallani (2015) support the view that 
remuneration consultants were appointed in order to signal rigour and 
independence in the pay setting process. However, given that remuneration 
consultants were themselves the subject of some criticism, rhetorical strategies to 
bolster their independence were also necessary. These rhetorical strategies were 
articulated through the remuneration report, and the terms of reference, which 
Higgs had recommended. The terms of reference103 used by British companies are 
almost verbatim the summary of principal duties outlined by Higgs.  
 
4.6.1 No marked advantage for boutique firms 
 
In the American market for pay advice, boutique firms marketed successfully that 
the absence of other services and cross selling reduced their conflicts of interest, 
and thereby signalled their independence. The boutique firms in the UK market 
did not transform the market for remuneration advice in the same way. Although 
the new regulations called for disclosure of the adviser along with other services, 
the UK’s remuneration consultancies had not been deeply implicated in the 
shortcomings of remuneration governance. As one managing partner described 
how the separation of advisers didn’t take root in the UK: 
 
‘It's an interesting sort of philosophical approach, and different markets 
have gone different ways, because of course that model is complete 
separation of advisors. It's absolutely the norm in the US, and to some 
degree in Australia. It's never really caught on here. I think the issue is that 
while having an adviser who advises the remuneration committee and does 
nothing else…although that seems to be more independent, the risk is that 
they just become detached from the realities of the business.’ 
 
The remuneration consultancies sitting within psfs were quick to challenge this 
enhanced ‘independence’ of a boutique firm, arguing that a single client for a 
boutique firm could represent 20 per cent of their revenue, as opposed to 2 per 
cent, for example, for a psf consulting team.                                                         
103 It is common for these to be found on a company’s website, under the corporate 
governance section.   
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It is then unsurprising that in the decade since the DRRR (2002) was enacted, 
boutique or stand-alone consultancies almost entirely disappeared from the field 
of remuneration consulting. This is not because they failed, but rather because 
professional service firms acquired a number of boutiques. It was also not 
uncommon for psfs to retain the name of prominent boutiques possessing strong 
reputational brands.104  
 
 
4.7 Continuous intervention in remuneration governance 
 
Throughout 2007, the sub prime mortgage crisis, which had gripped US banks, 
was rapidly spreading through the highly interconnected global financial 
institutions. By October 2008, panic had set in and the government announced 
rescue plans for the banking system, notably bailouts totalling £37bn for RBS, 
Lloyds TSB, and HBOS. By the end of 2008, the FTSE 100 closed 31.3% lower 
from the beginning of the year, and the UK had officially entered recession.  
 
Table 4.2: Executive Pay Governance (2009-2010) 
 
Date: Event: 
2009 Walker Review 
2009 
Institutional Shareholders' Committee releases the Code on the 
Responsibilities of Institutional Investors 
2010 Remuneration Consultants’ Professional Code of Conduct established 
2010 Remuneration Consultants Group established 
 
By February 2009, the government mobilised a regulatory initiative to strengthen 
systemic failings in the banking sector. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, the 
Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the 
Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury announced a review to recommend 
measures to improve the corporate governance of UK banks, particularly with 
regard to risk management. There was a strong and growing sense that the bonus 
culture in banks had not only precipitated the crisis but also deepened it. As such, 
both committee oversight and remuneration policy were investigated.  
                                                         104 New Bridge Street still retains it name almost a decade after its acquisition by 
Hewitt Associates, for example.  
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The Walker Review was concerned with NED independence, stating that board 
oversight required ‘a materially increased time commitment from non-executive 
directors (NEDs), from whom a combination of financial industry experience and 
independence of mind will be much more relevant than a combination of lesser 
experience and formal independence.’ Furthermore, the Walker Review was 
deeply concerned with the overarching remuneration framework, of which the 
remuneration consultant’s work was a critical feature.  
 
The Review sought to extend the work of the remuneration committee to cover 
the whole firm as well as being directly responsible for employees who perform a 
significant influence function or whose activities have or could have a material 
impact on the risk profile of the entity. The report recommended deferments for 
cash bonuses, and lengthier vesting periods for LTIPs. It was also proposed that 
the committee chair face re-election if the remuneration report received less than 
75% approval at the AGM.  
Walker also recommended that institutional investors play a more active role, 
especially in situations where they suspected weakness in governance. Whether or 
not Walker and FRC recommendations catalysed them into action, institutional 
investors were boisterous and vociferous during the 2012 AGM Season, 
prompting the media to dub that year the Shareholder Spring. In 2012, more FTSE 
all share companies received no votes than in the preceding nine years 
combined.105 The dynamics of institutional investor engagement is an important 
dimension of pay governance, which is not adequately covered within the scope 
of the thesis.  
The following section described how the Walker Review challenged the 
legitimacy of the remuneration consultants and the steps taken by the industry to 
demonstrate their independence, professionalism and claim to the gatekeeping 
role which they had, to date, only partially fulfilled.  
 
 
                                                         
105 High shareholder dissent occurred at Barclays, UBS and Reckitt Benckiser. 
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4.7.1 Crisis, Collaboration and the Professional Code of Conduct  
 
Through Walker’s consultation, consultants were described as ‘self-interestedly’ 
responsible for some part in the escalation of banks and other financial 
institutions’ remuneration packages. During the consultation period, comments 
were voiced with regard to the ‘undue focus on median or inter-quartile ranges of 
external comparatives’ rather than broader focus on the spread of underlying data 
and the different characteristics of companies and incumbents in the sample; the 
lack of clarity in some cases as to whether the client is the remuneration 
committee or the executive; and possible conflicts of interest and concerns as to 
independence where the consultant is part of a group that has other fee-paying 
relationships with the entity to which remuneration advice is being provided.  
 
The draft proposal of the Walker Review stated: 
 
‘One ingredient in the urgent and much-needed restoration of confidence 
in remuneration processes will be greater confidence in the integrity and 
professionalism of external consultants. Principal issues to be addressed 
are the integrity of the advisory process; the professional capability and 
competence of the adviser; and total clarity as to the nature of the remit to 
the adviser and the identity of the client within the firm.’ 
 
Both Walker’s recommendation and a proposed solution were presented in the 
same draft document. The comments captured during the consultative period were 
enough to launch the remuneration consulting industry into action. Cognisant that 
a failure to create an internal oversight function could trigger statutory regulation 
of remuneration consulting services, managing partners at three of the leading 
consultancies - John Carney (Towers Perrin), Carol Arrowsmith (Deloitte) and 
John Lee (New Bridge Street) - discussed the formation of a Professional Code of 
Conduct. In collaboration with the other leading providers of remuneration 
consulting services for FTSE 350 companies, the content of the Code was decided 
upon and included in the draft proposal of the Walker Review. The formation of 
the Code was overwhelmingly described as a defensive strategy by senior 
consultants.  The subsequent formation of the Remuneration Consulting Group 
(RCG) was motivated with the principal focus of overseeing and updating the 
code. Neither the formation of the code nor the Group were the beginning of a 
professionalisation project (Larson, 1977). Both initiatives were in response to the 
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challenges to the consultants’ independence. As one lead partner recalled of a 
meeting between David Walker and representatives from the industry, Walker’s 
message to the consultants was paraphrased as follows: 
 
‘You lot as a profession need to stand up for yourselves more, and you 
need to be stronger as a profession so that you're not the whipping boys 
anymore’ 
 
Although ‘everybody hoped it would not be necessary’, remuneration consultants 
were ‘under a lot of fire’ and the choice was either to pursue self-regulation or be 
regulated by the state. 
 
Remuneration consultants did not promote self-regulation through the 
professional body. The leading partners across the industry debated fiercely to 
ensure that the RCG operated conservatively in a stewardship role, encouraging 
‘good practice’ and updating the Code. Furthermore, the RCG only accepted 
organizational members, and not sole practitioners. The main industry players 
were ensuring that psfs retained their role as the main vehicles for professional 
control and standard setting (Muzio et al., 2011; Cooper & Robson, 2006).  
 
Despite the consultants’ efforts at signalling their independence and objectivity 
through the code and by the formation of a professional body, political and media 
criticism continued to plague the field. As politicians and the public grappled with 
the extent of the financial crisis, and the role of incentives in prompting excessive 
risk taking, the penchant for increased accountability surged once more.   
 
The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) launched two 
consultations in 2012. The proposed regulation sought to significantly increase 
disclosure of incentive structures and details of external pay advisers, as well as 
strengthen shareholder say in pay design.  
 
In a June 2012 article by the Telegraph, the consultants were likened to ‘arms 
dealers. In the article, Russell (2012) stated: 
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Lurking in the background of the corporate landscape they peddle the 
ammunition, in the form of executive pay “reviews”, which have been used 
to such deadly effect against company boards. They operate with little 
accountability, less responsibility and almost no transparency. 
 
Also in June 2012, an article published by Goodley (2012) in the Guardian 
described consultants’ conflicts of interest. The article stated: 
 
An analysis by the Guardian shows that almost 70%106 of pay consultants 
sold supplementary services to companies whose remuneration 
committees they had guided. The figures emerged following critical 
comments about the sector from former City minister Lord Myners and 
from the High Pay Commission, which in November highlighted concerns 
that consultants "ratchet up" executive pay. 
 
In an interview around this time, RCG Chairman Martin Read stated that the 
industry was viewed as having ‘horns growing out of their heads... the devil 
incarnate’ (Russell, 2012).  
 
As one Head of Reward at a FTSE 100 company surmised of the institutional 
investor reaction to the allegations made of consultants’ independence: 
 
They are concerned ... they've kind of bought the story…- the Vince Cable107 
story - that there's a kind of ratcheting up and that ... the remuneration 
consultants are kind of paid by the chief executive to prove that he or she is 
underpaid… 
 
Across the large FTSE companies, institutional investors and representative 
bodies insisted upon liaising with the remuneration committee chair directly. 
Some remuneration committee chairs responded to these demands by 
accompanying the remuneration consultant. Increasingly for the larger FTSE 
companies, the head of reward would facilitate the dialogue between key 
investors and the remuneration committee chair. Where a company’s executive 
team was committed to using executive pay as a strategic tool, there tended to be 
a stronger representation by the head of reward in the incentive design process                                                         
106  The Guardian noted that this was based on ‘the 50 most valuable UK public 
companies’ (Goodley, 2012)  
107 Lib-Dem Vince Cable was Business Secretary under the coalition government.  
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and investor relations. The rising prominence of the head of reward, or global 
reward roles was to the detriment of the remuneration consultant’s relevance in 
incentive design work. The following chapter analyses, in further detail, the 
consultants’ work in buttressing their hold on the market.  
 
The changes would require lengthier and more detailed reporting. Demands for a 
binding vote also introduced uncertainty for companies and boards. The proposed 
mandatory binding shareholder vote created uncertainty in the industry given its 
limited precedence. Some pundits even argued a binding vote would be 
unconstitutional and impossible to enforce. Despite the avalanche of criticism, 
which the consultants had weathered, the remuneration committee had similarly 
and for a much longer period of time also been subject to media scrutiny and 
criticism. Thus despite the consultants seeming fall from grace, the remuneration 
committees were the client-audience who continued to validate their claim to pay-
governance expertise. Further regulation, if anything, presented increased work 
opportunities for the consultant.  
 
4.7.2 Consultants’ ‘policing’ role emerges  
 
The Enterprise Reform Bill (2013), which took effect on September 30, 2013, 
entailed a host of legislative changes, of which remuneration constituted a 
subsection. The bill introduced substantial changes to reporting and represented 
the biggest change in the field since the DRRR (2002) came in to effect (IAS, 
2013). The objectives of the bill included ‘boosting transparency so that what 
people are paid is clear and easily understood and giving shareholders more 
power through binding votes so that they can hold companies and directors to 
account (Deloitte, 2013).  The disclosure requirements with respect to providers 
of advice would now include details on (1) who appointed the adviser, whether or 
not it was the committee and how they were selected; (2) whether and how the 
remuneration committee has satisfied itself that advice received was objective and 
independent; and (3) the amount of fee or other charges paid by the company for 
the provision of the advice or services received by the company and the basis on 
which they were charges.  
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These disclosure mechanisms were then coupled with the consultants playing a 
policing role in the boardroom. As one remuneration committee chair of a FTSE 
100 firm recalled:  
 
‘The consultants are often the people who are saying, "I wouldn't do that if I 
were you. Really, you've got to get this passed”…They've been urging caution’ 
 
Similarly, a senior governance analyst at one of the leading institutional investor 
representative bodies described what she perceived as changing practice between 
consultants and clients: 
 
‘I've been to seminars run by Deloitte for example, where the consultants 
were quite aggressive towards what their clients could and couldn't do. In fact 
I've heard one of them say, "You get paid enough, do you really need to have a 
pension equivalent that is paid in cash?" ‘ 
 
It was the case that consultants had urged caution or challenged pay choices prior 
to the allegations made in the media and governance discourse. However, it was 
the heightened awareness amongst the key actors, which prompted investors and 
boards to see the consultants’ challenges in new ways.   
 
 
4.8 Discussion 
 
In this chapter, the emergence of the non-executive director is described. With the 
rise of NEDs in British boardrooms, a role was created for a NED-led 
remuneration committee to oversee executive pay determination. The perceived 
shortcomings of the NED identified in the Cadbury Report were seen to be the 
likely shortcomings of the remuneration committee. As the NED’s information 
needs were a central concern, pay information - the core of remuneration 
consulting work - would become the firm ground upon which remuneration 
committees could exercise their pay oversight role. When the independence of 
remuneration committees was challenged in the early 2000s, the objectivity of the 
pay advice was questioned. To resolve this, the committee would appoint their 
adviser independent of management. The remuneration consultant, already the 
well-established provider of information ascended to committee-appointed 
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adviser. The remuneration consultant provided much needed pay data and the 
appearance of an external adviser, and the RemCo’s status of corporate guardian 
elevated the status of the consultant. As described in chapter 3, in the wake of the 
2002 regulation, the consultants assumed a quasi-gatekeeping role to further 
bolster the remuneration committee’s claims to independence in executive pay 
determination. As long as the remuneration consultant were seen to advise the 
board of Britain’s largest companies, they were perceivably operating at the same 
level as professions similarly enlisted in governance work, such as external 
auditors, actuaries, and lawyers.  
 
It is on this basis that the committee and consultants’ governance roles were 
mutually dependent. Later, as the financial crisis unfurled, both remuneration 
committees and remuneration consultants were implicated in promoting, allowing, 
or at the very least, not deterring incentive systems, which encouraged executives 
to take actions that deepened the crisis. At risk of statutory regulation of their 
occupation, remuneration consultants begrudgingly created a code of conduct and 
a professional body. 
 
The professional body would assume a passive, almost supine role, focusing 
principally on stewardship for the professional code. What is perhaps surprising is 
that the senior members of the remuneration consulting teams were 
overwhelmingly members of professions themselves. Yet, remuneration 
consultants, rather than adopting a professions logic, sought to bolster their 
gatekeeping logic, even though it was their gatekeeping role which had been 
‘dealt a blow’ with the onset of the crisis.   
 
This raises questions about the nature of the consultants’ independence. More 
broadly it raises questions about the nature of corporate gatekeepers’ 
independence. In the allegations, which arose about the consultants’ loss of 
independence, the emphasis on the consultants’ conflicts of interest would have 
struck corporate governance pundits as familiar given the near perfect overlap 
with allegations which have been made of the external auditor for decades.  
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In appealing to a gatekeeping role, the consultants, whether unwittingly or not, 
had exposed their independence claims to the same yardstick by which other 
gatekeepers’ objectivity and independence had previously been measured. In 
particular, the calls for independence for remuneration consultants had mimicked 
the demands made of auditors.  
 
An auditor independence logic had been transposed into the field of remuneration 
governance. Within the audit literature, the academic discourse on auditor 
independence is often traced to the seminal work of Mautz and Sharaf (1961). In 
their view, the only way for auditors to maintain an appearance of independence 
was to engage in auditing without providing any non-audit work.  Otherwise, 
conflicts of interests may be seen to arise when an audit firm provides auxiliary or 
additional services alongside the audit. DeAngelo (1981) reinforced this by stating 
that economic dependence damages auditor independence perceptions. These key 
contributions to the academic literature shaped the defining characteristic of 
independence as potentially jeopardised by the provision of non-audit services to 
the client.  
 
In the context of the corporate gatekeeper, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004), 
develop on a theory of managerial capture, which has its roots in the auditor 
independence logic. The authors propose that the consultant has strong incentives 
to please the CEO (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The consultants’ loss of 
independence as a function of conflicts of interest or managerial capture was then 
drawn into the academic discourse on remuneration governance in seemingly 
unproblematic ways, and without pause. Murphy and Sandino (2010) state:  
 
‘The provision of these other services also creates a conflict of interest, 
because the decisions to engage the consulting firm in these more-lucrative 
corporate-wide consulting areas are often made or influenced by the same 
top executives who are benefited or harmed by the consultant’s executive 
pay recommendations.’ 
 
In drawing on the managerial capture perspective, Conyon et al. (2011) state: 
 
A complexity that arises is that in addition to their role of market expert 
and arbiter, consultants may have another role in their provision of other 
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services to the firm. This suggests the potential to frame compensation 
recommendations in favour of the CEO—in whose gift repeated business 
may be dependent—rather than provide arms-length advice (Conyon et al., 
2011) 
 
The notions of independence drawn upon for analysing remuneration consultants 
are neither challenged above, nor are its roots in auditor governance explored. The 
conflicts of interest and managerial capture perspectives have been 
unquestioningly supplanted into remuneration governance research. This is 
arguably not least because independence is ‘not readily observable’ (Toh, 2016, 
p.146), prompting academics to draw upon conventional wisdom in opining on 
issues of independence and objectivity. However, the disproportionate reliance on 
proxies in the academic study of auditor independence and quality, and the 
concerns and criticisms, which this has garnered, should give pause to corporate 
governance researchers.  
 
Auditors as gatekeepers are markedly different from remuneration consultants, 
most notably for their certification role. In spite of the absence of a certification 
role, remuneration consultants have become subject to a similar expectations 
gap 108  as the auditor. The consultant’s emplacement within the field of 
remuneration governance was entirely premised on an information role for the 
remuneration committee, and not a policing of executive largesse. Yet, in 
ascending to the remuneration committee-appointed adviser and seeking to retain 
their relevance in remuneration governance work, remuneration consultants 
sought independence (in appearance) so that regulators and investors might 
observe it. In so doing, they are now subject to the same public scrutiny as the 
auditor and the similar allegations of conflict of interest and managerial capture. 
Researchers have gone no further in establishing whether these analytical 
constructs are best suited to evaluating the consultants’ independence.  
 
Arguably, the remuneration consultants’ independence has more to do with their 
knowledge of the market, their ability to contextualise pay packages, design                                                         
108 The ICAEW describes the expectations gap as the difference between what some 
stakeholders believe to be the nature of assurance that results from the audit and the 
actual purpose of the audit 
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suitable incentive schemes, and steer remuneration committees through ‘choppy 
waters’ and uncertain economic times. As Power (2011, p.325) noted: 
 
‘Independence and expertise are deeply intertwined qualities, qualities 
which are iteratively revealed and validated in markets over successive 
transactions which generate trust in a service. In Jamal and Sunder’s 
analysis, independence is not reducible to a set of regulatory prohibitions or 
anything in the mind of the individual which exists before or outside of the 
market.’ 
 
We return once more to the client’s role in validating the consultants’ claim to 
expertise. Sikka and Wilmott (1995) describe the potential for loss of 
independence to devalue the material and symbolic value of the auditors’ core 
area of expertise. Yet, the remuneration consultants have overwhelmingly retained 
their claims to expertise in the eyes of the remuneration committee- as client, and 
largely reproduced their relevance to the institutional investors-as consumer.  The 
policing role, which the consultants’ have since absorbed, is premised on 
reproducing their claims to independence in the eyes of politicians, regulators and 
institutional investors.  
 
Is it not the case that the ‘litmus test’ for executive pay packages is the 
shareholder vote at the annual general meeting?  
 
 
4.9 Future work on gatekeepers’ independence 
 
There are many more puzzles to the remuneration consultants’ independence and 
expertise. In a statement, which captures several puzzles, a principal at one of the 
leading consultancies stated the following: 
 
‘Being an actuary is fairly serious because you determine how much money goes 
into the pension scheme and if you advise too much, you bankrupt the 
employer, and if you advise too little then the pensions won't be payable. Being 
an accountant, again, you start with audit and it's important that auditing is 
done properly. It's important that law is done properly or your client is sued and 
loses money. You're in an environment where your advice matters… 
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Rem consulting doesn't matter in the same way…. There isn't the objective 
reliance on advice that extends beyond the company. If we give bad advice and 
the CEO gets paid a bit too much money, who loses? Some shareholders? So it's 
a matter that relatively rich people lose half a percent on the dollar. It's neither 
here nor there. Whereas if you screw up an audit, that matters. If you screw up 
an actuarial pension scheme valuation, that matters. If you screw up legally, it 
matters.’ 
 
And yet, with the exception of audit failures, no other issue garners as much 
public and political attention. Executive pay, especially when considered in 
contrast to workforce pay, is the most emotive issue currently facing corporate 
Britain. Undoubtedly, remuneration consultants will continue to the object of 
media consternation. In which case, it is surprising that remuneration consultant 
have not actively pursued the social closure afforded to the professions. Is appears 
instead, that they have relied on their expert status. Yet, it remains to be seen 
whether this is a sustainable strategy.  
 
In the following chapter, the consultants’ expertise, the means by which it is 
produced and validated is explored in the context of a field-based study within an 
executive remuneration consultancy. It is in studying their day to day work 
activities, the  
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Chapter 5 
Remuneration consulting work 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Drawing on a participant observation in a leading consultancy and 20 interviews 
with their remuneration consultants, this chapter presents an analysis of executive 
remuneration consulting work. There is consensus amongst scholars that 
remuneration consultants are pay experts (Murphy and Sandino, 2010; Conyon et 
al., 2011; Bender, 2012; Gallani, 2015), yet little is known about the work that 
constitutes their expertise, or the ways in which consultants continually reproduce 
their expertise. Studying the norms, practices and beliefs of executive 
remuneration consultants is an important area of research, as these actors are 
central in executive pay design and governance. Focusing on the ‘micro-practices’ 
(Hall, 2010) of remuneration consulting work elucidates the day-to-day 
complexities in not only designing executive pay packages, but also negotiating 
the acceptance of those packages by other key actors.  
 
The chapter contributes to our understanding of structures, norms and practices 
within professional service firms. In recent decades, there has been a growing 
interest in knowledge-intensive firms, organizations and work 109  (KIFOWs) 
(Alvesson, 1993) and well as the knowledge worker. Yet, there is a ‘considerable 
gap in our knowledge and understanding of the internal workings of contemporary 
professional service firms’ (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2008). Responding to the 
social and economic dominance of psfs in society, academic interest has turned to 
the internal workings of these organizations, with particular interest in knowledge 
creation and inter-professional competition.  
 
This study is also an opportunity to empirically distinguish between terms such as 
routine and expert, and its related and joint role in reifying the ‘knowledge 
worker.’ Social constructivist researchers have importantly challenged the 
functionalist view of expertise as the technical and objective core of occupational 
work. Power (1992) noted that expertise was only in part knowledge based, that                                                         
109 Used interchangeably with professional service firm, human asset firm, knowledge 
based organization (Alvesson, 1993; Morris and Empson, 1998). 
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‘claims to knowledge (internal validity) can only be mobilised and secured by 
establishing the social credibility of such claims (external validity).’ This is not 
suggesting that routine and expert can be conflated, yet, in remuneration 
consulting, seemingly routine work achieves expert status. At the risk of 
describing knowledge as ‘everything and nothing’ Alvesson (1994), remuneration 
consulting work is a rich empirical setting in which to further investigate an 
occupation’s body of knowledge and the ways in which its collective practices 
produce and reproduce the consultants’ relevance. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 briefly reviews the methods 
employed in this chapter.110 Section 5.2 described the field site, and the consulting 
team structure. Sections 5.3 through to 5.6 describe executive remuneration 
consulting work. Section 5.7 presents the discussion and conclusion, and Section 
5.8 establishes the link to Chapter 6.  
 
 
5.1 Methods 
 
From March to June 2016, the researcher worked as an analyst in a leading 
London-based executive remuneration consultancy. The consultancy is situated 
within a prominent professional service firm. As the researcher sought to 
experience executive remuneration consulting work as both analyst and academic, 
the psf and remuneration consulting partners agreed to a participant observation. 
The participant observation was further informed by semi-structured interviews 
with 20 members of the consulting team.  
 
The interview protocol entailed four questions, the first of which was simply 
formulated and asked consultants: ‘what do you do?’ The three additional 
questions probed consultants’ skillset, training, and the tasks they personally 
found most rewarding and challenging. The interview transcripts, the researcher’s 
fieldnotes, and the data analysis and interpretation are the empirical foundation 
                                                        110 The in-depth and expanded methodological approach and research design is described 
in Chapter 2 
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upon which the chapter is constructed. The entire corpus of data collected and 
analysed for the thesis informs this chapter’s conclusions.  
 
 
5.2 The field site: ExComp 
 
In the interest of preserving the anonymity of the consultancy, the pseudonym 
ExComp111 is used throughout the chapter. Not dissimilar from several of the UK-
based executive remuneration consulting practices, ExComp was initially a 
standalone practice, which was subsequently acquired by a large professional 
service firm. Thus the team comprises consultants from the original practice as 
well as consultant’s from the psf’s executive reward practice.   ExComp adhered 
to a partnership model, and a simplified illustration of the organizational 
hierarchy is as follows: 
 
Figure 5.1: Organizational hierarchy at ExComp 
 
 
 
Source: Researcher’s interpretation 
 
In the chapter, the term consultant is used ubiquitously when describing any 
member of the executive remuneration consulting team. Where further 
classification of the consultant’s position within the organizational hierarchy is 
needed, the terms analyst, senior analyst, associate, principal, partner or managing 
partner is used.   
                                                         
111 Given the relatively small size of the industry, no details are given in terms of the 
genesis of ExComp, as it would be immediately recognizable to those in the field.  
Managing PartnerPartner
Principal
Associate
Senior Analyst
Analyst
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The field based experience and the subsequent fieldnotes benefitted immensely 
from participation in weekly staffing meetings, data collection, background pack 
compilation, pitch pack editing, thought leadership publications, ancillary 
projects, and importantly an open plan office which meant sitting in proximity to 
consultants working at various levels and on a multitude of tasks.  
 
Due to the researcher’s work restrictions in the United Kingdom, the weekly 
employment was capped at 20 hours, and as such, strategic choices were made as 
to the optimal dates and times at the field site. See Appendix B for a calendar of 
dates and hours spent at ExComp, and Appendix C for the list of interviews with 
ExComp consultants.112 Appendix D presents a list of internal documents used as 
primary data sources in this research. These documents include training and 
induction materials, client background packs, tender proposals, pay benchmarking 
decks and market trends updates.  
 
In the subsections, which follow, the descriptive account unfolds in parallel with 
the organisation’s hierarchical levels, in that Section 5.3 describes the analysts’ 
work, Section 5.4 the senior analyst, Section 5.5, the associate, and so forth. 
While this layout can give the appearance of clear lines of labour division 
between the hierarchical levels, this is neither the case, nor the intention. There is 
overlap in tasks between adjacent hierarchical levels. Thus, the tasks described in 
each subsection are largely carried out by a particular level, but not exclusively.  
 
 
5.3 Analyst work 
 
5.3.1. Analyst recruitment 
 
As established in Chapter 3, there was no academic knowledge, which preceded 
entry into the field of remuneration consulting and no accreditation programmes 
once a consultant embarked upon their career. While ExComp valued 
quantitative, analytical and reasoning skills in candidates; there was no single 
degree path, which was explicitly ‘required’ although arguably some paths were                                                         112  These interviews are a subset of the 45 interviews conducted across executive 
remuneration consultants, and these 45 interviews are furthermore a subset of the 60 
interviews conducted for the thesis. 
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valued over others. At ExComp, recent university graduates typically staffed the 
entry-level position. ExComp’s founding partners had backgrounds in strategy 
consulting, and were graduates of elite universities. As one analyst recalled, 
ExComp ‘tended to aim their recruitment efforts at Oxford and Cambridge as a 
whole.’ Their recruitment process targeted graduates from these and similar 
institutions, as well as candidates who demonstrated strong numerical and 
analytical skills.  
 
Prior to acquisition, the process of finding suitable candidates relied on recruiters 
and job adverts with university career services. For analyst positions, recruiters 
targeted both final year university students and recent university graduates. 
Reflecting on the interview process, the consultants often described themselves as 
interested in strategic or management consulting, but also recalled never having 
heard of executive remuneration consulting prior to a recruiter’s call or the career 
service job posting. Two recollections capture this: 
 
I was applying for all types of consultancy; boutique, management 
consultancies… I found (ExComp) through a recruiter and they 
recommended me for the role based on my mathematical background. I'll 
be honest, I'd never heard of remuneration consultancy before I started. I 
just knew of the concept of consultancy.’ (Analyst) 
 
 ‘I got a phone call from a recruiter who had me on their books from when 
I was applying for internships at University. And they specialized in 
broader consultancy and banking and all that kind of stuff. And they said, 
you know, there's this company… they do executive compensation 
consultancy. You will have never heard of that before. No one's ever 
heard of that before. If we sent you some materials, would you be 
interested in applying? They sent me a brochure and I thought it sounded 
really interesting. It was a lot like my microeconomics module at Uni.’ 
(Associate) 
  
As this associate further described, her microeconomics course included topics on 
imperfect information and how to motivate people in principal-agent problems. 
For another consultant, his interest was piqued while reviewing newspaper articles 
in preparation for the first round telephone interview. The articles covered the 
2012 AGM season, which was a particularly active shareholding season. Those 
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graduates with political and economics backgrounds were often attracted to 
executive remuneration consulting because of the public policy interest, or the 
incentive dynamics which arose from the agency problem. Some candidates were 
also drawn to ExComp because it was seen to be niche, enabling recruits to build 
specialist knowledge. It was appealing to recruits who ‘didn't just want to start (a) 
rotation scheme where you become number X out of 1,000 graduates.’ 
 
Hiring typically occurred at ExComp on an as needed basis rather than as part of 
an annual cycle.  Following the initial phone interview, candidates underwent 
several rounds of in person interviews with the principals and partners of the 
practice. This was an opportunity to gauge the candidate’s fit with all the senior 
members of the consultancy, which in a boutique firm setting, was seen to be 
critically important.  Following their acquisition by the psf, ExComp sought to 
maintain their recruitment process. 
 
For the psf, the hiring process for new starters in the various business lines was 
mostly formalised. Due to the prominence and status of professional service firms 
as one of the most desirable graduate job destinations, it was incumbent on an 
applicant to visit the firm’s website, and apply for their preferred position; in this 
case remuneration or reward consulting. Once applicants had completed the 
online application form, the firm contacted a subset of the applicants for an 
interview. If the candidate was successful at the interview stage, they were then 
invited to an ‘assessment day’ at the firm, which comprised the verbal and 
numerical tests, partner interview, a group exercise, and a case study for which 
the candidate was asked to present their thought process for resolving the issues in 
the case. If a candidate was successful in the assessment centre, an offer was made 
for the position of analyst.113  
 
ExComp resisted transitioning to the psf hiring model. The first analyst hired onto 
the team after ExComp’s acquisition underwent several rounds of interviews, was 
hired off the annual cycle unlike analysts hired through the established psf 
graduate hiring process. As the newest team member recalled:                                                         
113 Some firms used the title Associate in place of Analyst for the same entry-level 
position. 
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‘It was quite hard in the beginning, because I wasn't sure… "Am I joining 
(the psf), am I joining (ExComp)?" When I started, I felt like I was joining 
(ExComp), and then when I came into the office and all the HR kind of 
admin stuff was (the psf), I was like "Oh." A little bit of an identity crisis, I 
think.’ 
 
From recruitment, the ‘identity crisis’ deepened as the analyst was introduced to 
the difference between executive remuneration consulting and broad-based 
remuneration consulting. This chasm between executive remuneration and broad-
based remuneration would deepen the further the consultants progressed in their 
career.   
 
5.3.2 Analyst Training 
 
Analyst work centred on data collection, data analysis and data manipulation. The 
analyst was ‘working with Excel every day’, as well as Microsoft’s Power Point, 
Word, Access, Thompson Reuters EIKON (formerly Datastream), and 
Bloomberg.114 It was expected that the analyst would develop a ‘fundamental 
understanding’ of how pay was structured in the United Kingdom and typically, 
within British public companies. As one analyst explained, he needed ‘to 
understand the salary, bonus, LTIP model and how that works and what the 
different elements are designed to do’. Furthermore, he was expected to 
understand ‘market practice in each of those areas’ with particular attention to 
‘quantum115, performance measures116, and time horizons.’117   
 
The consultants often described their training as ‘an apprenticeship model’, 
‘learning by doing’ and ‘ad hoc training’. As one analyst commented, ‘I feel we 
are calling it training…it's more a process of asking questions.’ The                                                         
114  The latter two external databases were typically used in market trends and 
benchmarking work, where historical performance data was required for a client’s 
comparator firms. 
115 The quantum referred to the total pound value received by the executive 
116 This will be described in detail later in the chapter. Examples include total shareholder 
performance as the metric by which the individual’s performance is assessed, and then 
measured against a target level in order to determine to incentive payout.  
117 Time horizons has multiple meanings; it can mean the period over which performance 
is measured, or the period until the payment of the incentive occurs.  
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apprenticeship model was also well suited to the senior members of the team who 
identified strongly with the apprenticeship models which they had been subject to 
in their accountancy, legal and actuarial pasts. However, formal training was 
beginning to take root, especially as the hiring cycle synchronised with the psf 
annual intake cycle.118 As ExComp sat within the broader human resources (or 
Talent) group, their analysts were subject to companywide training. 
 
The ExComp training comprised a two-week induction of scheduled task-based 
sessions. Senior analysts mostly facilitated the sessions, with the odd session 
facilitated by an associate or principal. During their first few weeks of work, 
analysts scheduled to meet the senior members of the team in 15-30 minute time 
slots; a practice common within psf consulting teams.  
 
It was the case that in some situations, a ‘new-starter’ may not be inducted via the 
formal training. This occurred when an analyst started during a particularly busy 
time in the annual cycle. In situations such as this, the new-starter’s introductory 
training is entirely ad hoc in style, relied substantially on observing other analysts 
at work and asking questions. Once another official induction is scheduled for 
new starters, the analyst is invited to join in for a refresher. 
 
5.3.3 Analyst induction 
 
The Induction focused on building ‘foundational’ knowledge for the analysts. The 
introductory session was itemised as follows: Elements of Remuneration, 
Overview of incentives and Introduction to DRRs (Induction Schedule, April 
2016). The Elements of Remuneration session described base salary, short-term 
incentives and long-term incentives, and definitions and distinctions between 
terms such as total cash, total direct and total remuneration, to name a few. The 
overview of incentives introduced the new starters to the consultancy’s 
philosophy underlying incentives. Incentives fell into two main categories, short-
                                                        
118 This push toward a formal induction schedule was also due to the wave of governance 
and regulatory changes over the previous decade, which led to an increase in regulatory 
and governance requirements and more complex incentive structures.   
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term incentives (1 year or less) and long-term incentives (3 years or more). The 
consultancy’s incentive philosophy was importantly shaped by the principles of 
the Managing Partner. At ExComp, the Managing Partner steadfastly believed in 
maximising shareholder value as this was seen to maximise stakeholder value. In 
his understanding of value-based incentives, ‘there is no conflict between 
shareholder value and stake holder value’. He stated: 
 
‘…in the long run shareholder value is maximized by doing all the things that 
maximize value or create value…for all stake holders. In order for a company to 
be successful in the very long term, it needs to be attractive to potential 
employees, it needs to be attractive to potential customers, it needs to retain 
employees and customers… 
 
I believe that value based incentives are a very powerful form of competitive 
advantage for companies. I think very, very few companies treat their 
remunerations in that way.’ 
 
The philosophy to which a team adhered shaped both the number and type of 
performance measures selected, and the targets applied to the executive. At 
ExComp, their philosophy found a natural fit with the balanced scorecard and 
more robust stretch targets. Target setting work is described in further detail later 
in the chapter.  
 
The final segment of the introductory session shed light on the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report (Report). The Report was the central platform of 
communication with the client’s shareholding community, the media and the 
public. Companies and their advisors largely met the Report’s regulatory 
requirements. Since the DRRR’s inception, the Report had become much more 
than a disclosure mechanism and/or compliance task. It had emerged as a 
marketing tool, through which advisors could demonstrate innovativeness in 
incentive design and clarity in communicating critical information to 
shareholders. The Report was a symbol of effective remuneration design and 
governance, so much so that PwC had established an annual industry level award 
recognising leading remuneration reports. During the field study, the researcher 
was tasked with identifying outstanding examples of disclosure from FTSE 
Company DRRs. Using PwC’s best practice in reporting criteria, helped narrow 
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down examples, which were then compiled into a PowerPoint deck and circulated 
to the entire team.  
 
The Induction also included a Jargon buster session, which introduced analysts to 
common language and terms used in the field. Remuneration consulting, like 
many occupational fields, is littered with acronyms and abbreviations, which are 
used by consultants in their day-to-day work.  
 
Table 5.1: Common terms used in remuneration consulting work 
 
RemCo Remuneration Committee 
EPS Earnings per share 
TSR Total Shareholder Return 
PSP Performance Share Plan 
L-Tip Long term incentive plan   
TCC Total cash compensation. If past looking, then salary plus annual 
bonus, since the bonus is now known.  
 
When calculating the total cash compensation is salary plus 
“target” annual bonus (where “target” is disclosed) or 
otherwise salary plus half the maximum bonus opportunity 
(where maximum is disclosed), or salary plus the average bonus 
as a % of salary paid over the last 3 years).  
 
TDC Total direct compensation is total cash plus the fair value of 
long-term incentive, or TCC plus executive share option and 
performance share plans.  
 
Fair value is based on the ‘normal’ maximum annual grant, 
discounted for performance conditions and forfeiture risk. 
Options are valued using an adjusted Black Scholes model.  
 
 
The second part of the table above, detailing the definition of total cash 
compensation and total direct compensation would give the analyst early insight 
into the informational-dependency of their work, in the sense that only where 
information was available, were certain calculations possible. As scientific as pay 
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calculations are assumed to be, there was judgment required in constructing the 
formulae. This judgment is described in detail in Chapter 6, when studying pay 
benchmarking practices.  
 
Following this introductory session, the Induction focused on building key 
technical skills, principally teaching analysts to extract the necessary data points 
from the remuneration reports and inputting into ExComp’s in-house database, or 
similarly extracting data from licensed databases (such as EIKON). Data 
extraction was the critical first step for the trends analysis, target setting and 
benchmarking work, which would follow.  
 
5.3.4 Data Collection 
 
The task of locating executive pay data, extracting the data and inputting it into 
the in-house database started with analysts opening PDFs of company annual 
reports, locating the DRR, and then scrolling through the disclosures in order to 
identify and extract the key data points. The fiscal year-end of FTSE 350 
companies substantially affected the timing and pace of data collection. The 
majority of these fiscal year-ends occurred on 31 December 2015, and the 
companies’ annual reports were subsequently released in the first quarter of 2016, 
resulting in April and May being crucial data collection months for the analysts. 
During this period, analysts developed a strong understanding of the layout of 
company’s annual reports and the directors’ remuneration report. 
 
The key quantified data points included salary, annual bonus, LTIP, pension and 
benefits. The process of data collection had been substantially simplified by the 
consolidation of pay data in the Single Figure Table.119 The single figure table 
(See example below of HSBC’s 2015 Single Figure Table) considerably reduced 
the time analysts spent extracting pay numbers from the DRR.  
 
 
 
                                                         
119 In 2013, BIS regulatory changes required that public companies publish a single figure 
of remuneration for executive directors. 
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Figure 5.2: The Single Figure Table 
 
Source: HSBC Annual Report 2015 
 
Beyond the data summarised in the Single Figure Table, the analysts also had to 
collect information on the performance measures and targets, information which 
was typically presented in narrative form. It was the pay figures in tandem with 
the details justifying or explaining incentive choices which gave the consultants a 
sense of ‘what’s normal, what looks different, what’s interesting over a number of 
years’ in executive pay levels and incentive design.  
 
The data collection tasks although mundane and repetitive, remained central to the 
analyst’s appreciation of the various incentive structures used across FTSE 
companies. As one analyst recalled, the data collection task meant ‘I really 
understood what was going on.’ The exposure to the data created a sense of what 
was normal, and also enabled analysts to identify ‘if there’s an error somewhere,’ 
or whether there was something interesting or unusual.  
 
The Single Figure Table and the disclosed performance measures and targets 
concealed the highly negotiated process of setting pay and more contentiously, the 
awarding of incentive pay. These processes within executive pay design and 
determination were revealed in the other work activities in which the consultants 
engaged, starting with the proprietary databases and data analysis. Whereas the 
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DRR largely concealed the negotiated processes, in-house proprietary databases 
shed light on them.   
 
Data accuracy 
 
Data accuracy was seen as critical.  In order to ensure the accuracy of data entries 
in the in-house database, a peer review system was established. A second 
verification process was also in place where senior analysts and the database 
manager carried out a final check of the data entries.  Entering the pay details 
accurately was seen to be imperative as it was the cornerstone of market trends 
analysis, benchmarking exercises, target setting work and ultimately pay level 
recommendations. It was detrimental to the credibility of the team if a client 
identified an error in the data or the analysis.  
 
Data collection was also the first step for tasks yet to come. The numbers inputted 
and extracted from the database were rarely presented ‘just cold.’ The data points 
were essential for compiling into market trends analysis, in pay benchmarking and 
target setting tasks. As the client’s pay strategy is both a function of the specific 
business context and the broader patterns in pay design, analyst training centres 
on knowing the broader patterns in pay for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms. 
Concurrently, the analysts are being trained to analyse subsets of the market, 
namely sectors, as it is often these sectors, which are used in the peer or 
comparator firm group.  
 
Proprietary databases 
 
While data for executive directors’ remuneration for public companies was 
publicly available, data for private company executives and below board 
executives of all companies was less easily accessible. Furthermore, executive 
directorships often only extended to a handful of executive roles, namely the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and depending 
on the size and complexity of the company and sector in which it operated, may 
also include the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or the Chief Operating Officer 
(COO). The Executive Committee (or ExCo) which strategically steered the 
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company operated ‘one level below’ the board. The pay data for these executives 
as well as executives ‘two levels below’ were typically stored in the human 
resource data files of the companies. It was this data, which was considered 
proprietary to the remuneration consultancies that collected it. ExComp and their 
competitors could either build proprietary databases with below board data, or 
purchase below board data from a competing firm.  
 
The broader Talent Group of the psf maintained an in-house database, which 
stored global pay data. The data collection and management was ‘off-shored’ to 
teams in Poland and India. This database served all of the psf’s global offices. 
However, it did not store below board executive pay data for British public 
companies at the level of detail, which was needed for the survey product that 
ExComp needed to generate, or the follow-on benchmarking analysis and 
incentive design work requested by clients.  
 
Below board executive incentive design had grown substantially since the early 
2000s, in line with the increased interest from British companies in reward 
management. Incentive design work for below board executives was both an 
interesting area of work for consultants, and more lucrative that the governance 
work for board level executives.  
 
The task of populating the database required that consultants search client folders 
for current pay data for below board executives in British companies. In need of 
additional staffing, populating this database was a key task of the researcher’s 
internship.  
 
The client folders were the first ‘port of call’ as these were meant to include the 
company’s payroll files. Wading through client pay data spreadsheets, a similar 
trend emerged; client data was often dated, messy, and incongruent. The data 
should, in theory, reflect the most recent payroll in order to be deemed ‘current’. 
However, with few files reflecting 2016 pay data, the database manager was 
approached to offer further guidance. Initially, the decision was made to include 
data ‘no more than 18 months old’ as ‘current.’ Yet, he later reconsidered and 
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determined that no data prior to January 2015 should be included in the database.  
The time window for ‘current’ was established as January 2015 to April 2016.   
 
Where the client’s pay data was older than January 2015, the ExComp’s lead 
partner or principal for the client engagement was asked to approach the client – 
typically the HRD - to request ‘current’ data. The principal or partner was often 
hesitant to make this request especially if benchmarking and incentive design 
work was not being carried out. This was despite the fact that the terms and 
conditions of the client engagement included a clause allowing the consultancy to 
use anonymised client data in their survey results.   
 
Another impediment to collecting the relevant data was that pay data for senior 
levels - especially levels equal to or more senior to the HRD - were unlikely to be 
included in the HRD’s payroll, which was often the source of data in ExComp’s 
client folders. Where senior level pay data was available in the client data, then it 
was often unclear whether the long term incentives were at fair value, policy, or 
actual. In this instance as well, the data manager decided it was materially 
inconsequential to separate the varying LTIP valuations.  
 
ExComp’s senior consultants, cognizant of the choices made in populating the 
proprietary database, remained committed to maintaining the in-house database 
rather than purchasing survey data from competitor firms. At least with the in-
house database, the rigour of the discretionary choices would be known.  
 
5.3.5 Data Analysis 
 
Data is the foundation for everything we do. You can't just go to a client, and 
we have this on a regular basis. You will talk to someone and you will say, 
"Well, from our experience and what we've seen we can tell you that this is 
more prevalent." They will go, "Great. Give me a number to that." Everything 
always goes back to numbers. They want to know how many companies do it, 
how often they do it…’ 
 
The central data analysis tasks upon which consultants relied on the in-house 
databases were market trends analysis, target setting and pay benchmarking.  
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Market Trends Analysis 
 
It was common for ExComp and their competitors to produce annual, periodical 
or bespoke pay trends analyses for clients and potential clients. ExComp’s annual 
Board Remuneration Handbook’ summarised the trends in the various pay 
elements, which included Salaries, Bonuses, LTIs, Clawback, Pensions, 
Ownership and NED fees.  
 
The Handbook featured summary statistics for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 firms. It 
gave the reader ‘at a glance’, a sense of key shifts and features of CEO and CFO 
pay. For example, the salaries section detailed the percentage increase in CEO pay 
for upper quartile, median and lower quartile pay, while the bonus section detailed 
the average number of performance measures used by sector (See Figure 5.3 
below).  
 
Figure 5.3: Example of Market Trends Analysis  
 
 
 
Pay Benchmarking 
 
Executive pay benchmarking occurs when the client asks the remuneration 
consultant to position executive or non-executive directors’ pay against a group of 
peers. Pay benchmarking is typically performed annually, enabling the client to 
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ascertain whether their pay levels and pay elements are competitive with ‘market 
practice’ and also fit for purpose with respect to the company’s pay philosophy.  
 
The peer group against which the client’s roles are compared is selected based on 
its similarity in size and complexity to the client firm. Thus size and sector data 
are needed for the determination of the peer group. Following the selection of the 
peer group, data is extracted from the database on the various elements of the 
remuneration package for the comparator roles to which the client is being 
benchmarked. The client has a pay philosophy as to whether it pays its executives 
at the median or upper quartile. If the pay falls below the desired quartile, the 
consultant will consider a host of factors before suggesting an increase in pay. 
This is because benchmarking is seen as a guide in pay setting and consultants 
would not use it as the sole basis by which the pay package is increased. 
Furthermore, institutional investors had no appetite for pay benchmark results 
justifying executive pay increases.  
 
Pay benchmarking practices have become implicated in the upward ratchet of pay, 
and is investigated in depth in Chapter 6.  
 
Target Setting  
 
Target setting was described in the internal training documents as the process by 
which consultants select appropriate performance measures and targets for either 
short term incentive schemes (annual bonus), long term incentive schemes 
(typically performance share plans, stock option plans, deferred annual bonus 
with performance based company matching), or both. Target setting work 
operated at the intersection of three areas of concerns; institutional investor 
demands for pay linked to performance, strategic remuneration goals, and the 
individual corporate executive’s risk-reward tolerance.   
 
From the early 1990s, institutional investor representative bodies raised concerns 
with respect to windfall gains from stock option vesting; at which point they 
released guidance on the need for companies to introduce challenging 
performance conditions.  The introduction of performance share plans in response 
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to investor concerns subsequently led to a proliferation of ‘total shareholder 
return’ (TSR) and ‘earnings per share’ (EPS) as the most commonly used 
performance metrics in long term incentive systems for British quoted companies. 
While LTIPs were initially of central focus for institutional investors, short-term 
incentives have also been the subject of public and political ire.  
 
While the DRRR (2002) provided guidance on LTIP performance measure 
disclosure, the disclosure of performance measures and targets for short-term 
incentives were unregulated. Annual bonus disclosures had not been included in 
the 2002 regulations, but included from 2013. The issue, which continued to 
plague investors, was the use of discretion by the RemCo in awarding incentive 
payouts.  
 
In those companies, which deemed incentive systems as a strategic tool, 
remuneration was given far greater attention. Such attention manifested in a few 
ways; for example, the HRD may sit on the Executive Committee, the HRD is 
also more likely to be involved in the selection of the external advisor. The 
intricacies of incentive design are unlikely to be outsourced to consultants and 
rather rest with the internal HR function. The HRD or HoR facilitate 
communications with large institutional investors, and accompanies the 
remuneration committee chair to meetings with key investors. The third area of 
concern when setting targets is the executive’s acceptance or resistance of the 
target.  
 
Target setting training 
 
The ‘Target-setting’ session addressed the theory behind target setting, and then 
demonstrated the ‘pulling’ of data from the database for target setting analysis. 
The task of selecting performance measures and determining the minimum, 
maximum and threshold target relied upon familiarity with the data, and what was 
considered ‘normal.’ The training session directed analysts to look within the 
sector first, as sector-appropriate targets were already institutionalised in practice.  
During an observed induction session, three junior analysts sat in on select 
sections for a refresher, and to provide support to the session’s facilitator. All 
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attended with laptops in hand. The facilitator projected his desktop screen onto the 
conference room screen in order to walk his audience through the task. The task 
was to retrieve comparator firm data from Datastream, Bloomberg and the in-
house database in order to compare a client’s pay data relative to 5 year TSR with 
comparator firms’ pay data relative to the comparator firms 5 year TSR. The 
‘quirks’ of the different databases were described to the new-starter, including 
actions that might cause a database to ‘break’, the optimal number of peer firms 
for which to retrieve data at a given time, or the typical length of time taken for 
data to be retrieved from the database.  
 
Methodological questions were answered with ease by the facilitator or junior 
analysts. For example, the new-starter questioned why 5 years of TSR data was 
used. One of the analysts quickly commented that 5 years vis-à-vis 3 years 
reduced volatility. However, when questions were raised as to specific coding 
language used in the data retrieval formulae; these were often met with a shrug or 
dismissal. The technical architecture of the databases was trusted implicitly, and 
these coding questions often remained unanswered. Thus, the Excel formulae 
described during the training (for example, =getsinglefigure(FC, 
“TE”,0,3,”SF”,”GBP”,2,FALSE)) was not unpacked, rather presented as formulae 
to be learnt by rote. The analysts’ skills needed for their work extended to the data 
input, extraction and analysis; but not the underlying mechanics by which the 
database retrieved the data.  
 
Data collection played a key role in the performance measures selected. From 
reading annual reports, and collecting the data that was used daily, the analyst 
started to ‘slowly see patterns emerging.’ For example, it became common 
knowledge to the analyst that the ‘media industry typically used revenue, mining 
used total shareholder return, retail used profit’.   
 
 
5.3.6 Communication skills 
 
Although the final sessions of the induction training focused on incentive plan 
implementation and communication with shareholders and clients, the analysts 
 152 
would not be engaged in these tasks during the first year on the job, often longer. 
Given the central role of the client, and the importance of managing the client’s 
impression of the team’s competence and credibility, junior team members did not 
attend client meetings until they had progressed to either senior analyst or 
associate. As one senior analyst recounted ‘it usually takes a while for junior 
people to start going to client meetings. It's usually a matter of at least three 
years.’ When junior members of the team were taken to client meetings, they 
initially attended ‘just to take notes’. The rationale being that the senior analyst 
would gain ‘an understanding of how the client meeting works’ and become 
‘familiar with that set up so that when it actually comes to them presenting on 
something, that's one less unknown for them to overcome.’ This type of client 
prep was also achieved by allowing junior and senior analysts to sit in on client 
calls to experience the types of questions asked and the responses given by the 
team. Associates, principals or partners facilitated liaising with key institutional 
investors.  
 
5.3.7 Establishing Norms 
 
Elite Identity 
 
There were two key ways in which ExComp’s consultants differentiated 
themselves. First, the executive remuneration consultants perceived themselves 
differently from the broad-based remuneration, or broader talent/human resources 
consultants. The ExComp junior team members (analysts and senior analysts) 
often ‘lunched’ together in their office building’s cafeteria. It was during one of 
the lunches that ExComp’s analysts described their practice as more so strategy 
consulting as opposed to human resources consulting. Part of the distinction 
stemmed from advising the board, the publicity surrounding executive pay, and 
the complexity of executive pay, which in turn required technical training.  
 
ExComp consultants also distinguished themselves from consultants in competing 
consultancies. There was a commonly held belief within the team that ExComp 
analysts with 12 months on the job experience were equivalent to 18 months’ 
training at a competing firm. This belief was reinforced when analysts ‘jumped 
ship’ for a competing firm.  Prior to ExComp’s acquisition, analysts seldom left 
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for competitors, however, when they did, it was often in search of more diverse 
work experiences. As one former ExComp analyst described:  
 
‘(ExComp) has 25 consultants. It's an extremely small practice, which is what I 
wanted when I first looked to find somewhere to start my career. I went to 
Oxford, collegiate culture and my school was small so I wanted to continue 
that theme of somewhere small where you can establish yourself.  
 
I think when I decided to move, I wanted to find somewhere with maybe just a 
bit more opportunity. (The psf), as you know, it's first and foremost an 
accountancy firm. It has hundreds of different areas that it works in. There's a 
lot of cross service line collaboration. There's just enormous scope for 
opportunity. That was my main rationale. 
 
The other one was that I, for some reason, thought it would be a good idea to 
do some sort of professional qualification. I'm currently doing the ACA. 
 
This analyst was atypical in that consultants at ExComp seldom expressed interest 
in pursuing professional qualifications. Executive remuneration consulting, 
although narrow in scope, was seen to operate within the scope of management 
consulting or strategy consulting. ExComp’s junior consultants were more likely 
to express interest in Masters in Business Administration (MBA) programmes, 
than professional qualifications.  
 
Apprenticeship 
 
While analyst-level data collection tasks were repetitive and mundane work, the 
analysts understood their work activities within the broader collective practice of 
remuneration consulting. Analysts were staffed on client engagement teams 
shortly after starting with the firm. They were thus exposed to the anecdotes, 
experience and outcomes of senior level work tasks. As an analyst recalled, 
‘there's all these different layers that make it a bit more interesting’, such that 
even though they were not directly carrying out what might be considered more 
interesting work, it importantly lay in their future.  
 
Learning-by-doing or this apprenticeship model was the centre of the analysts’ 
indoctrination into remuneration consulting work. As one analyst described, ‘no 
matter how extensive you try to train someone, and however much effort you put 
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into it, you will never cover all the scenarios that you might encounter.’ Asking 
questions, observing work and practice-by-doing were the essential skills, which 
aided in analyst progression.  
 
 
5.4 Progression to senior analyst 
 
It was typical for analysts to move into a senior analyst position after 
approximately eighteen to twenty four months. Moving into a senior analyst role 
meant that the task distribution changed, with more data analysis work vis-a-vis 
data collection and data extraction from the database. It is worth noting that the 
dichotomy between data collection and data analysis was not always clear. As a 
senior analyst recalled: 
 
‘The biggest part of my time is spent analysing the data. I think it's probably 
equally split between various pieces of analysis. Number one would be the 
benchmarking, so that involves collecting data for a list of companies, putting 
it into the database, getting it out, processing it, checking it, doing some 
quick quartile analysis, and then putting it into a pack.’  
 
In this instance, the work of data collection was subsumed in data analysis work. 
Yet, in other situations, it was common for senior analysts to delegate data 
collection tasks to junior analysts. Delegating data collection tasks to junior 
analysts depended on the size of the engagement team, which depended on the 
size of the client (e.g. FTSE 100 teams demanded more resources) or the demands 
of the engagement (e.g. incentive design work was far more resource intensive 
than benchmarking work). Where data collection and extraction from the database 
was delegated, the senior analyst typically verified parts of the data. This check 
occurred either before or after the data analysis work. At times, it was through the 
process of analysis, when the statistical outputs were unexpected by the senior 
analyst, that they were prompted to return to the data, the assumptions, or both.  
 
Consultants’ branching out into more complicated things like IFRS2 valuations 
and TSR reports’; tasks which one senior analyst described as requiring a ‘certain 
amount of knowledge’ also marked the level of senior analyst. IFRS2 valuations 
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were considered complex, technical work given that no two share-based 
arrangements were exactly the same.  
 
While IFRS2 valuations and TSR reports was seen to rely on technical 
knowledge, senior analysts also needed to build client-specific knowledge. Within 
the category of ‘client specific knowledge’, there were elements, which were 
considered to be both technical and non-technical. Non-technical knowledge 
might entail the analysts’ ability to use client specific language or jargon. As one 
senior analyst stated, there are ‘no specific qualifications for this job, but you have 
to understand companies, company accounts, economics, the way the city works, 
capitalizations… you can't be a consultant and not know what an IPO is, or a 
NOMAD 120 .’ Conversing competently with clients was seen to be critically 
important for future client interactions.  
 
In preparation for serving niche clients, there were opportunities to enrol in 
training programmes. One senior analyst described cherry picking from external 
training courses, attending a Financial Reporting Council (FRC) training 
programme in preparation for serving a financial services client. The senior 
analyst described the sessions as teaching them ‘how to read financial accounts 
and things like that…and also told you a bit about the kind of regulation around 
reporting.’  
 
In tandem with this, senior analysts were writing papers either internally for 
clients on specific topics, or for publication in their consultancy’s periodicals. As 
one senior consultant recalled: 
 
‘You can almost time it to the day when you're going to get requests in. 
They're very much just repeats of the previous years. There's a couple of 
clients where you know in June you're going to get your benchmarking paper 
to write. Then August, there'll be a market update on the AGM season and all 
of that. Those are a bit more routine.’  
 
While some writing projects were routine, others were opportunities for creativity, 
either in the content or in the presentation of data analysis.                                                          
120 A company that has been approved as a nominated advisor for the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM), by the London Stock Exchange. 
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5.4.1 Background packs 
 
In line with new remuneration governance best practice, it was increasingly 
common for FTSE 350 remuneration committees to retender remuneration 
advisory appointments every three to four years. Request for proposals were 
typically sent to the leading consultancies. Once received by ExComp, an 
engagement team was convened during the weekly team meeting, based on the 
availability of the team members, and sector expertise of the leading principal or 
partner. The potential client’s request for proposals varied, for example, some 
were highly detailed, leaving the consulting team little room for new incentive 
design, or alternatively, an RfP might indicate that the company was revamping 
its incentive structures, and seeking innovative ideas. As incentive design was 
overwhelmingly cited as one of the more interesting work activities, the latter 
scenario was much preferred.  
 
The background pack typically included the ‘key figures’ detailed in the annual 
report, the three financial statements, recent news articles (typically less than 3 
months), analyst reports, proxy advisor reports (if available) and information 
garnered from trolling the company website.  It was the compilation of these 
details, which enabled the team to construct an image of the client’s strategic 
direction and current pay strategy.  
 
It was also at the level of senior analyst that the client’s business context became 
central to their work. One senior analyst stuck a note to his computer screen as a 
daily reminder that the client’s business context (and business strategy) must 
feature in all the analysis and pay design work he was tasked with. Other senior 
analysts similarly referenced the importance of situating the numbers within a 
‘broader context’ or ‘the bigger picture.’ Once the analyst had a sense of the 
company’s strategy, the pitch deck was created, and checked by a senior member 
of the team.  
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5.5 Associates 
 
Associates operated at the nexus of technical and client-engagement work. 
Although associates carried out far fewer technical tasks, they were often 
responsible for ‘peer reviewing’ the analytical work done by analysts and senior 
analysts. As one associate recalled of her work as an analyst, ‘I was very technical 
and I wasn't very client facing.’ As an associate, the consultants were very client 
facing and not very technical, with an increasing focus on the stakeholder 
management. Their technical skill-set dulled as new client skills were sharpened.  
 
5.5.1 Client work 
 
The analyst and senior analyst work tasks had been in service of the client but not 
in interaction with the client. Interacting with the client directly was a central 
feature of associate level work, and the ability to couple market trends analysis 
with the client’s strategic focus was integral to their success: 
 
‘Everything is very high level. Everything is to do with strategy with people 
that lead those companies, with what they want to develop with how they 
want their companies to grow. It's quite top level. It has a big impact. You're 
discussing big issues with important people. Often times you will have access 
to confidential information about their strategy, their plans of how they want 
to develop themselves so they can motivate their people to achieve that.’ 
 
Associates straddled the two main dimensions of remuneration consulting work, 
in that they managed the data analysis work and client management work. 
Associates often likened to role to project managers as they delegated the data 
analysis tasks to the analyst level, checked outputs and incorporated the analysis 
into the product for the client: 
 
‘It's managing other people. It's explaining to the analyst what you need 
them to do… For example, we're going to do benchmarking for these 20 
roles, I tell the analyst what they needed to do, I checked their matches 
they came out with, they give me the data back, I check the data, and then I 
create a report talking about the findings and how they relate to the client.’ 
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This was importantly the level at which consultants started interacting directly 
with the client, usually the company secretary, HRD or HoR. As an associate 
recalled: 
 
‘You knew you were progressing because the clients weren't phoning the 
boss anymore, they were phoning you and asking you the questions and 
you were doing it and just kind of getting it signed off.’ 
 
Another associate described his work in relation to the client as follows: 
 
‘You need to be on top of things and be responsible to people. I think as 
you move up, it’s the ability to carry yourself and express yourself within 
the meeting… 
 
...it's hard to break into our job if you don't have the cultural polish’ 
 
The ‘cultural polish’ described here is the professionalism, which a consultant 
needed to thrive in interactions with an elite and demanding client. One of the 
challenges faced in the hierarchical progression of the consultant was that their 
data analytics - the ‘hard’ skills - were often easier to identify within candidates or 
build up through the apprenticeship mode. However, it was the ‘EQ’ 121  was 
importantly tested in client interactions and within the boardroom. Thus, the 
principal or partner was helping to shape the associates’ client communications. 
Associates would approach the partners to solicit feedback as to whether they had 
struck the right tone. As one associate described, ‘often I'll get feedback saying, 
"This is too aggressive, or this is too passive, or you need to make this a bit more 
like this way".’  
 
Associates were also likely to be interviewing the client to gauge their 
perspectives on pay strategy. While the background pack drew together all public 
sources of information on the client, incentive design decisions were importantly 
shaped by the views of the HRD, HoR, executive directors, company chairman 
and remuneration committee chair and members. Once ExComp won a pitch, 
                                                        
121 ‘Emotional quotient’ was a term used by one principal to describe the soft skills. 
While the etymology of this term is unknown to the researcher, it describes the emotional 
intelligence exercised by an individual in interactions with others. 
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associates scheduled interviews with some or all of these roles. As described by a 
consultant, questions included: 
‘Could you describe the current arrangements? …from your perspective, 
what works for you and what don't you like about it? What do you think is 
motivating for your team and what do you think isn't? How do you define 
success for the company over the next 3-5 years?’ 
 
As the consultants often attested, each client was different. And a fundamental 
difference was whether pay was seen to be a strategic tool of the firm or not. In 
client engagements in which pay strategy was seen to be a competitive advantage, 
consultants felt they had a greater opportunity for designing incentive structures, 
which responded to the internal mechanics of the firm, as opposed to box-
checking the demands of institutional investors.  
 
One associate described the process of designing a new incentive system as 
follows: 
 
‘The place that you normally start in that is saying "this is what you've currently 
got." "This is what you say in your annual reports and our interviews with you 
is your strategic goals, you know, what your philosophy on pay is. And these 
are the areas where they don't currently match." And then we'll say "here are 
some alternative options." We'll normally give at least a few more alternatives 
or at least give some pros and cons for different approaches, and then we'll 
say, you know, you could do A, B, or C. We really recommend B because of X, 
Y, and Z. But if you don't like A, B, and C about this option, then these are some 
of the alternative things that you could do.’ 
 
The associate had significant insight into the various tasks performed across the 
entire team. Yet, when the client was deeply concerned about an AGM vote, or 
troubled about a feature of the incentive design system, then it was the principal 
or partner with whom they wanted to speak. The client concerns, which 
intersected with the politicization of executive pay were often well suited to the 
partner’s extensive experience. However, in one example, where a client was 
unsure of a complex technical aspect of the work, the partner was not best suited 
to provide the answer as they are removed from the day-to-day technical work. 
However, this is where the trust, which is emplaced in the chosen adviser comes 
through.  
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5.6 Principals/Partners 
 
The principals and partners at ExComp led the engagement teams. It was typical 
for a principal to lead the consulting team for a FTSE 250 firm, and a partner to 
lead for a FTSE 100 firm. It was also the principals or partners who sat in on 
remuneration committee meetings. As a lead partner recalled: 
 
‘It's a privilege to be in the boardroom with clients. I've always thought 
that and still do. For anybody starting out…it's exciting. You're dealing with 
senior level people, demanding people, people who have high standards, 
so that's a good professional environment to be in.’ 
 
At the partner level of work, the philosophy of incentive design was debated, as 
well as how this philosophy intersected with governance guidelines and 
regulations. The partners were continually absorbing shifts in governance and 
regulation and in turn creating and innovating on new work tasks.  What has 
further confounded the pay design process is that institutional investor groups 
held different views on long-term incentives, holding periods, and performance 
criteria. As one partner recalled: 
 
'They don't speak with one voice. Even the Investment Association or the 
NAPF don't speak for all their members. One member wants this...Fidelity 
wants five-year shareholding...Standard Life likes EPS’ 
 
The shareholder vote on remuneration governance and the media attention, which 
high dissent votes122 attracted, also contributed to the conformity in pay design. 
One principal described two types of client reactions to ExComp’s approach to 
incentive design: 
 
"Well guys, what you're doing here is very market typical but I'm not 
sure it's the right thing for your organization." There were some that 
would kind of hug you and kiss you and be delighted because they'd 
always wondered why it was done this way, and others who would just 
get annoyed because, "Well, everybody else does it this way; why are 
you being so difficult?" 
 
                                                         
122 A vote outcome is considered ‘high dissent’ where greater than 20% of the 
shareholders vote against the remuneration report and policy.  
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The remuneration committee’s tolerance for the reputational effects of 
institutional investor backlash was often reflected in their pay policy. The pay 
policy was the boundaries in which the consultants operated. As recounted by an 
ExComp partner, a risk-averse remuneration committee chair often held the view: 
 
 “Design something simple, vanilla, that won't get us in trouble with 
shareholders and we will implement it” 
 
The client relied upon the remuneration consultant to navigate the divergent views 
of institutional investors. The consultants could either operate within the 
boundaries of governance guidelines or attempt client-specific incentive structures 
and risk ‘no’ votes at the AGM. During the 2016 AGM season, the ‘no’ votes 
received by BP with respect to its CEO Bob Dudley’s pay increase, and the ‘no’ 
vote received by Weir Group (believed to be because of its proposed introduction 
of restricted stock) were discussed at length at ExComp. The BP no vote was less 
clear and as such, revealed the ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995) processes used by 
consultants to interpret, understand and react to the vote outcome. Three 
explanations were talked about; the lack of independence of BP’s remuneration 
consultant, Gerritt Aronson. This lack of independence was premised on 
Aronson’s sole proprietorship, his exceptionally long tenure as BP’s pay 
consultant,123 and the fact that he had moved from in-house reward to the role of 
external adviser. Second, the pay increase was seen as unjustifiable given that 
shareholders had not received a suitable return on investment given the sharp fall 
in the price of oil. The third explanation suggested that the remuneration 
committee, although populated with some of the most respected individuals in 
corporate Britain, were out of touch with ‘reality.’ By this, the consultant meant 
that from their position at the top 1%, the committee members had lost touch with 
labour inequality in Britain by agreeing such a substantial pay increase.  
 
These accounts were not based on interactions with the investors who voted 
against BP’s report, although arguably investors also enact their own 
sensemaking. Instead, the consultants conversed about plausible explanations, 
                                                        
123 Gerritt Aronson had been listed as BP’s remuneration adviser since disclosure was 
first mandated in 2002. 
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‘infused with the politics of interpretation and conflicting interests and inhabited 
by people with multiple shifting identities’ (Weick, 1995, p.61). 
 
5.6.1 Shaping client attention 
 
When new governance guidelines were released or politicians or the media 
referenced, opined or criticised executive pay, these ‘sound bites’ were circulated 
in a daily electronic mail-out. For example, when the Investment Association’s 
working group released their draft, the partners ‘all got in a room…and had to 
brainstorm about what it might mean.’124 When the governance episode was more 
enduring or created greater levels of uncertainty amongst remuneration 
committees, ExComp partners hosted breakfast meetings in which institutional 
investors (namely their governance analysts), remuneration committee chairs and 
members, and human resource directors or heads of reward attended. These 
opportunities for field level dialogue on a range of remuneration related issues, 
was a means of identifying emergent governance and design preferences, and to 
road-test novel ideas or solutions generated by ExComp team members.  
 
Absorbing the current rhetoric, discourse or mood on pay design and governance 
was seen to be central in not only responding to client concerns but shaping client 
concerns. Given the similarity in the leading consultancies’ methodologies, the 
availability of executive director pay data, and the regulatory and governance 
constraints on incentive design, the existing knowledge pool was frequently and 
persistently being standardised. 
 
Thus, the brainstorming amongst the leading members of the teams created new 
forms of consciousness for the client-as-audience. For example, proxy adviser 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) released a white paper detailing three 
tests for pay for performance alignment in executive remuneration packages for 
European companies. These tests would form part of the proxy advisor’s AGM 
vote recommendations, and given the clout of ISS amongst large institutional 
                                                        
124 Interview with ExComp partner 
 163 
investors, ExComp was determined to react to the white paper. The three tests 
were as follows: 
 
Table 5.2 ISS’ Pay for Performance Tests 
 
(i) Relative Degree 
of Alignment (RDA) 
This relative measure compares the percentile 
ranks of a company’s CEO pay and TSR 
performance, relative to an industry-and-size 
derived comparison group, over a three-year 
period. 
 
(ii) Multiple of 
Median (MOM) 
This relative measure expresses the prior year’s 
CEO pay as a multiple of the median pay of its 
comparison group for the same period 
 
(iii) Pay-TSR 
Alignment (PTA) 
This absolute measure compares the trends of the 
CEO’s annual pay and the value of an investment 
in the company over the prior five-year period. 
 
 
 
While the comparison group used by ISS was not made publicly available, 
remuneration committees or the remuneration consultant could purchase the 
comparison group used by ISS for £10,000. For ExComp, rather than purchasing 
the peer group in order to better respond to ISS’ proxy advice, the team set out to 
replicate the ISS methodology, thereby generating the likely peer group for their 
clients. Once this peer group had been constructed, the ISS methodology was 
once more replicated in order to reproduce the tests for clients.  Initially, these 
services would be offered to clients at no additional cost. However, eventually, 
the goal was to monetise this service offering at a price point lower than ISS’ 
£10,000.  
 
Stakeholder management 
 
As ExComp prided itself on robust data analysis, and incentive structures suited to 
the client’s strategic goals, situations in which a client opted for ‘market typical’ 
to the detriment of their firm’s strategic goals, frustrated the consultants. A second 
source of frustration for consultants was situations in which clients made 
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incentive design choices in direct contradiction to the consultants’ advice, or in 
contravention to the governance guidelines. As a partner described: 
‘That's one of the frustrations that we have is that you read the DRR and it'll 
say, "We took advice from them," but they don't say "we completely 
ignored it”.’ 
 
The principals and partners were responsible for the tough conversations with 
clients.  These conversations might entail advice that the client’s pay benchmarks 
did not warrant a pay increase, or that introducing a restricted stock plan or 
applying upward discretion to a bonus payout would likely fail a shareholder vote 
at the AGM. As one partner described: 
 
I've got clients quite badly out of a jam where they've been about to do 
something and they've not told you and you're like, "You can't do that. You're 
going to be in a world of pain if you do that." They've not told because they 
know what we say to them. 
 
The hardest thing is when you've got that conflict and when they're looking at 
you to solve it or they're going to blame you if it doesn't get solved. I mean I 
got fired from an appointment about seven, eight years ago. The RemCo Chair 
said, "I'm shooting the messenger here. Bang, you're dead." 
 
Success or failure for the remuneration consultant was not as ambiguous as found 
in the related field of management consulting. In management consulting, the 
client engagement is often shrouded in non-disclosure agreements or the deeply 
embedded cultural logic of client-consultant confidentiality. As such, the outcome 
of work is not usually open to public scrutiny, and is also not easily measureable 
(Alvesson, 2004). For the executive remuneration consultant, however, success 
can typically be measured by the number of remuneration committee 
appointments a consultancy attains125, and failure measured by the magnitude of 
‘no’ votes a client receives on their remuneration policy and (implementation) 
report at the AGM.  
 
                                                        
125 Further, a FTSE 30 firm would appear more prestigious an appointment that a FTSE 
100 or 250 appointment. ExComp and the competing consultancies often included in their 
marketing materials a breakdown of the FTSE 30,50, 100, 250, etc. firms to which advice 
was given.  
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Where management consultants, for example, have been accused of selling empty 
envelopes, power point-slides and management fashion (Engwall & Kipping, 
2013), the remuneration consultants’ output is not ambiguous. When a company 
loses the remuneration vote, it is overwhelmingly the case that the remuneration 
consultancy loses the appointment. Given the high stakes for the consultancy, 
engaging with institutional investors is critically important to the partners’ work. 
In light of this, one might expect high dissent at an AGM to be anticipated. 
However, this is often not the case. An in-depth analysis of the shareholder vote 
and the consultant, institutional investor, and committee dynamic has been carded 
for future work. This is because further interviews with governance analysts and 
proxy advisors are imperative for this particular strand of the study. As described 
earlier, the institutions ‘do not speak with one voice’, and therefore a critical mass 
of empirical material must be achieved prior to constructing the narrative.  
 
Within the scope of this chapter’s ambitions, remuneration consulting work has 
been described in detail across the various levels of ExComp’s hierarchy. When 
taken in tandem with chapter 4’s analysis of the consultant’s tenuous claims to 
expertise, this chapter analyses the ways in which ExComp produces its relevance 
in executive pay design and governance. The following section summarises and 
discusses this in relation to academic discourses on the production of knowledge, 
expertise, and the role of routine work in expert claims.   
 
 
5.7 Discussion  
 
Executive remuneration consulting is a collection of norms and practices, centred 
on pay data analysis, incentive design work and client management. The corpus of 
data and client knowledge is embodied within an elite and professionalised team, 
and it is this body of knowledge, accepted by clients, regulators and investors, that 
reify the consultants’ claim to expertise.  
 
The career span of the remuneration consultant, as described in this chapter, 
progresses in a seemingly unproblematic fashion. Reasonably distinct work 
activities are associated with particular hierarchical levels. Executive 
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remuneration consulting draws heavily on the professional service firm model, 
which in turn draws on the training and apprenticeship models used within 
accounting and law professions. And much like management consulting, 
remuneration consulting ‘lacks the ‘corpus of abstract knowledge’ (Sharma, 1997) 
that differentiates and defines a profession. 
 
Scholars have been deeply interested in the unique set of conditions that enable 
certain work to be considered specialist knowledge and others as commonplace or 
routine work. Routine work has been seen as a threat to expert claims, with 
researchers attentive to the commodification of knowledge.126 While researchers 
are often more interested in how expert or knowledge workers abstract their 
knowledge in order to secure, reinforce or defend their work jurisdictions, it is 
argued in this chapter that the routine and highly monotonous tasks of data 
collection are also integral to the consultants’ body of knowledge. How routine 
tasks can constitute knowledge and expert claims has not been sufficiently 
explored in the academic discourse. As Alvesson (1994) noted, ‘it is not unlikely 
that a large part of the work of KIFOWs is not very complicated’ (p. 1005), which 
blurs the distinction between 'labour' and 'knowledge' (ibid).  
 
It is on the basis of the data which the consultant importantly negotiates the 
institutional legitimacy of their knowledge. It is not only in possessing the data 
which renders their knowledge acceptable to the client, it is the 
‘proceduralization’ (Power, 1996) of markets trends analysis and pay 
benchmarking practice; providing evidence of a client’s pay in comparison to 
peers which enabled the consultant to achieve relevance in remuneration 
governance.127  
                                                         
126 The commodification of knowledge is a tendency to reduce knowledge to a routinized 
and codified product (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2001). 
127  As previously described in chapters 3 and 4, remuneration committees were 
introduced to provide oversight in executive pay determination, and regulators 
encouraged the use of external pay data to bolster the committee’s understanding of ‘the 
going rate.’ The committee in turn latched onto external pay data as a means of justifying 
pay decisions. Thus, survey data transitioned from its roots in attracting and retaining 
talent (compensation and benefits) to justifying package (governance).   
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As there is no accreditation programmes, the ‘weak professionalism’ (Fincham, 
2006) of remuneration consulting means that consultants are nowhere near 
controlling occupational entry. Remuneration consultants possess ‘weak 
knowledge’ and thus continually face the need to negotiate with the client their 
status as ‘expert.’ Morris and Empson (1998) observe that ‘weak knowledge’ 
occupations face distinct challenges.  ExComp, operating within the walls of a 
psf, with remuneration consulting knowledge embodied within their consultants, 
is ‘simultaneously valuable and high vulnerable (Morris and Empson, 1998).  
Further, the allegations of the consultants’ role in the upward ratchet of pay have 
challenged their legitimacy in remuneration governance. Remuneration 
consultants are only temporally stable.  
 
In need of continually negotiating the legitimacy of their claims to expertise, 
ExComp pursued four key strategies to support their knowledge claims: (i) they 
recruit from elite universities, (ii) they have invested heavily in building a strong 
database and superior data analytics, (iii) they continue to innovate product and 
service offerings in response to market and governance shifts, and (iv) they appeal 
to the ideals of professionalism. These four will be discussed in turn.  
 
Elite Identity 
 
Remuneration consultants at ExComp are differentiated by drawing first on the 
elitism of their academic institution and second on ExComp’s reputation in the 
market. Management consulting and psfs are known for their selective recruitment 
procedures (Alvesson & Robertson, 2006). Yet, ExComp proved to be even more 
selective than this. Not only did they emphasise hiring from elite universities 
and/or quantitatively and analytically rigorous academic programmes, they also 
facilitated many more rounds of interviews than was typical of the psf model.  
 
As Alvesson and Robertson (2006) have observed, being tethered to an elite 
identity promotes self-discipline, which sustains the consultant’s desire to 
accomplish high standards. The strong technical and analytical skillsets, 
inculcated from induction and development processes, aid in further 
differentiating the consultants from their peers in competing firms. It has also 
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been observed in management consulting that those who are highly educated 
themselves, often willingly incorporate the firm’s elitist descriptions as long as 
they can confirm the reputational claims and through the beliefs of their 
colleagues (Alvesson & Robertson, 2006). This is very much the case at ExComp 
where there is an industry wide perception of the analytical prowess of the firm’s 
consultants.  
 
Reliance on methodological rigour 
 
Data - collected, stored and retrieved - from the in-houses databases, underpins 
remuneration consulting work. It enables the consultants’ claim that they ‘know’ 
the market. Understanding patterns in pay for FTSE 100 companies or a particular 
sector, for example gives the consultant a sense of what is normal in the design of 
incentive schemes. The consultant can make statements about the appropriate 
performance measures, the acceptable target levels, or the appropriate long-term 
vehicle (whether performance share plan or deferred stock options, for example). 
However, these highly repetitive and mundane tasks are pervasive practice across 
the competing firms. 
 
ExComp is a repository of knowledge through the routines and procedures (Cyert 
and March, 1963, cf. Morris and Empson, 1998), which have been 
institutionalized in their day-to-day practices. The methodologies used in data 
analysis across the competing consultancies are fundamentally the same. Similar 
to Power’s (1992a) observation of the field of brand accounting, there is an 
objectivity which ‘arises when a critical mass of practitioners follow an 
increasingly institutionalised methodology’ (p. 306). The need for objectivity in 
remuneration consulting work supports the consultants’ expert claims.  
 
The pursuit of objective, highly rational practices obscures the judgement required 
to both collect and analyse data. However, judgment is a necessary dimension of 
remuneration consulting work, even if it is not actively promoted to the client 
market. The role of judgement is discussed in section 5.8 which establishes links 
to chapter 6. Ultimately, the databases and data analytics help to secure an image 
which appeals to the market (Alvesson and Robertson, 2006).  And it is on this 
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basis that ExComp’s innovations are accepted by existing clients, and serve in 
securing new clients. 
 
Innovation 
 
While abstracting knowledge has not been actively pursued either by ExComp 
partners or the field generally, innovative data analytics are a source of 
competitive advantage. Hall et al (2015) describe a ‘perception of experts as the 
collectors, compilators and generators of ‘decision relevant’ information and that 
these experts strive to direct management attention and resources. Similarly, 
Morris and Empson (1998) find that psfs manage the client market through the 
generation and maintenance of demand for its services. In remuneration 
consulting, shifts in governance and regulation have been the more influential 
triggers for creating new domains of work, and new opportunities for 
consultancies to provide innovative solutions to the market.   
 
Thus, pursuing a central role in the discourse through breakfast meetings and 
NED dinners means that partners can help their clients ‘understand issues and 
trends in certain ways’ (Howard-Grenville, 2007). Similarly, Bender (2011) 
stated, ‘consultants do more than reflect the body of knowledge surrounding 
executive pay: they also help to create it’ (p.336). Sustaining their position in 
corporate governance has relied upon the continual innovation in incentive design 
and remuneration governance, despite the growing constraints presented by 
regulators and institutions.  
 
The conformity in pay design which decades of regulation and governance 
guidelines have precipitated have also undermined the role of the consultant as 
‘trusted adviser.’ In its stead, consultants have battled the ‘transactional’ image of 
their work. Ironically, in the face of uncertainty and personal and professional 
reputational risks, the credibility and trustworthiness of the advisory is doubly 
valued. Covaleski and Dirsmith (2015) suggest that ‘experts appear as mediators 
between clients and an increasingly complex world, who promise, with their 
specialized knowledge, to guide clients safely through difficult situations.’ With 
their firm footing on pay data, an enterprising spirit and an elite staff, the ideals of 
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professionalism are mostly achieved. Thus, it is a matter of professionalism ‘in 
appearance’ which rounds out the expert claims made by ExComp’s consultants. 
 
Professionalism 
 
Given the elevated status of the professional in society, remuneration consultants 
must appear professional, sound professional, and act professional in lieu of 
possessing a distinct professional qualification. As described in chapter 4, the field 
of remuneration consulting can now boast both a Code of Professional Conduct 
and a professional body, even if the latter predominantly fulfils a stewardship role 
with respect to the code.  
 
In constructing the image of the ‘trusted adviser’, the consultants are a blend of 
the management consultant and professional gatekeepers. The consultants’ advice, 
compiled within glossy reports or PowerPoint decks, are delivered by the 
‘professionally’ attired principal or partner, an individual with established 
reputational capital. The elite image of the management consultant aids in 
constructing that sense of the consultants’ special knowledge.  Furthermore, by 
mimicking the apprenticeship models used within the classic professions – such as 
law and accounting, - the field of remuneration consulting is seen to produce 
qualified and specialised labour. 
 
Accretive body of knowledge 
 
 
These four strategies, collectively, comprise the remuneration consultants’ system 
of knowledge. It is not the case that data collection is then superseded by data 
analysis and then client engagement work. Each phase of work influences and is 
influenced by successive phases of work (Power, 2015, p. 44).  It is the accretion 
of the consultants’ technical skill-set, absorbed and altered at the level of practice, 
and then delivered to the client by the ‘professionalised’ advisor which constitutes 
the remuneration consultants’ claim to executive pay knowledge and expertise.  
 
Arguably, the work tasks of auditors and lawyers – in their highly routinized and 
repetitive iterations may be no different from remuneration consulting’s work 
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tasks, or management consulting for that matter. That auditing can be described as 
a ‘system of knowledge’ (Power, 1996) – seemingly stable - while remuneration 
consulting is vulnerable, raises questions about the stability of professions’ 
knowledge systems, and whether these can be deemed systems. While there are 
seemingly effortless comparisons and contrasts to be made between remuneration 
consulting and management consulting, going forward, the researcher intends to 
more effectively engage with the similarities and differences between consultants’ 
and auditors’ systems of knowledge.  
 
 
5.8 Links to Chapter 6 
 
As described earlier, the consultants’ judgment is largely obscured in deference to 
promoting the objectivity and rigour of data analytics work. However, consultants 
make judgment calls at every step. Decisions around how and which data should 
be collected and inputted into a particular database are shaped by the availability 
of information, and the needs of the client. The role judgment is remuneration 
consulting work is closely in the context of pay benchmarking work in the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
Pay benchmarking: Art or Science? 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
Executive remuneration consultants have been implicated in the upward ratchet of 
executive pay for their role in selecting ‘skewed’128 peer groups and ‘chasing the 
median’129. Corporate governance scholars have repeatedly and invariably studied 
these phenomena through the lens of managerial capture theory (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003). In so doing, researchers have not been sufficiently attentive to the 
mechanisms or implications of pay benchmarking, such as peer group selection or 
the effect of ‘the median’ on executives’ perception of worth. This chapter makes 
two key contributions. First, it presents a conceptualisation of pay benchmarking 
practice as both ‘art and science’, elucidating how consultants draw on in-house 
methodology, institutional norms, and professional judgement in constructing the 
benchmark. Second, the chapter describes how ‘the median’ intersects with 
executives’ perception of worth, creating a culture of median pay which differs 
from hypotheses on rent extraction or executive greed. It is this culture of median 
pay which plays an important role in the upward ratchet of executive pay.  
 
To this end, the chapter questions ‘the “givens,” the unstated and often 
unrecognized assumptions that underlie ideas, situations or practices’ (Young, 
2006) in executive pay design and determination. Creating a pay benchmark relies 
on data from the ‘market for executive talent’ and the chosen peer group. Yet, 
both the market and the peer group have more or less been treated as a black box, 
which obfuscates the work of consultants, remuneration committees and 
executives in constructing both the market for executive talent and the peer group. 
The self-evidence of the market is problematised by challenging the suggestion 
that ‘consultants act as disseminators of information about compensation… as an 
appendage to the market, reporting on what they see and making                                                         
128 A concern with skewed comparator groups was ‘flagged’ in the Greenbury Report 
(1995), although at this time, the report did not link this concern with remuneration 
consultants or consulting work.  
129 The term ‘chasing the median’ is used when describing companies that benchmark 
executive pay packages at or above the median of the chosen peer group.  
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recommendations’ (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988).  It is argued that consultants 
do not merely ‘transport meaning without transformation’ (Latour, 2005).  Rather, 
by drawing on statistical tools, technologies, and representations, they produce 
‘facts’ about the market for executive talent. Pay benchmarks, in turn, rely on the 
stability of this market to ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning of 
the elements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour, 2005).  
 
 
6.1 Historical Linkages 
 
In pay benchmarking practice, pay for a particular role is positioned against the 
pay for a similar role found within the same or a similar sector. In the context of 
executive pay benchmarking, the pay package (base, bonus, LTIP and pension) 
for executive directors is positioned against the pay packages of executives in 
comparator (or peer) firms.  These comparator firms are either of similar size or 
similarly complex, or comprise both characteristics in relation to the benchmarked 
firm. By similarly complex, the remuneration consultants typically select firms in 
the same sector or industry group to comprise the ‘sector peers.’ 
 
Pay benchmarks are a stalwart in executive remuneration consulting work. As 
described in Chapter 5, it has become the object of criticism and derision from 
politicians, institutional investors, governance analysts and the High Pay Centre, 
among others. This section describes the factors, which contributed to the 
embedding of pay benchmarking practice in remuneration consulting work. It is 
these historical links, which shed light on the resilience of pay benchmarking 
work, in spite of the concerns with the upward ratchet of executive pay.  
 
The historical pre-conditions of pay benchmarking practice presented in this 
chapter first emerged in the United States with the rise of corporate executives in 
the 1920s.130 This was coupled with and followed by the rise of management 
consultants, executive stock options, and executive pay surveys. The growing 
importance of these actors intersected with firm-level concerns about designing                                                         
130 As contrasted to the owner-manager 
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optimal incentive systems, retaining top executive talent, and governing executive 
pay determination.  
 
It is the emergence of executive pay surveys in particular which laid the 
foundation for pay benchmarking work, as the survey enabled insights about the 
executive pay market against which executive roles could be compared. In the 
following subsections, several of these pre-condition to the institutionalisation of 
benchmarking practice, are described.  
 
6.1.1 US Context 
 
The rise of corporate executives as well as the pedagogic interest in corporate 
executives in the United States is linked with the separation of management and 
ownership in public companies. This emerging class of executives or professional 
managers – ‘lacking the legitimization of actual ownership’ (McDonald, 2013) – 
sought to strengthen their position within the corporations they were leading by 
soliciting advice from the nascent field of management consulting. The 
management accountants and engineers – the titles which preceded management 
consultants – positioned themselves as the able advisors to the corporate 
executive.  
 
From the 1920s, leading American firms were grappling with optimal incentive 
systems for their burgeoning class of senior managers. Leading the pack, Du Pont 
and General Motors (GM) were the first to introduce stock based compensation to 
correct for moral hazard problems anticipated when managers were no longer the 
sole or majority owners of the company (Holden, 2005). Du Pont and GM were 
also central in the rise of the multidivisional firm, the decentralisation of 
managerial autonomy and the increasing use of management consultants. Matthias 
Kipping (2011) describes the intersection of these events as follows: 
 
‘In response to the challenges of increasing size, diversification, and 
competition, from the 1920s onwards, American companies such as GM and 
Du Pont developed the multidivisional structure, or M-form. In its 
subsequent dissemination and popularization, consulting companies played 
an important role. The Great Depression probably also promoted the 
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increasing use of consultancies for industrial restructuring. In addition, the 
legal separation of investment and commercial banking meant that banks 
could no longer offer their business surveys, which provided independent 
service providers with new opportunities. The new generation of 
management consulting companies, which grew rapidly in importance and 
market share, were not linked to scientific management, but had its origin in 
a variety of other approaches, including contract research, accounting, and 
industrial psychology (p. 207).’ 
 
In spite of the Great Depression, or perhaps because of it, management consulting 
work and management consultancies grew substantially throughout the 1930s. 
Growth continued during the Second World War. One firm, which had risen to 
prominence, attaining and retaining iconic status, was McKinsey. Following the 
death of its founder, James O. McKinsey in the 1930s, the firm was strategically 
and impressively steered by Marvin Bower. Bower’s focus on ‘CEO-level 
assignments’ (Kipping, 2011) and its social and economic prominence were 
important pre-conditions for the immediate and widespread acceptance of 
executive pay surveys, which was introduced by McKinsey Director Arch Patton 
in 1951.  
 
Executive compensation 131  was garnering attention in the late 1940s, as 
companies struggled to hire and retain top executive talent in the post-war years. 
In order to attract the appropriate talent, companies were concerned with paying 
competitively, or paying the ‘going rate.’ Business writer and journalist, Duff 
McDonald (2013) describes the conditions from which Patton’s executive pay 
survey emerged: 
 
‘From 1948 to 1951, HBR 132  had one article a year on executive 
compensation. A few years later, the review was running five times that 
amount. This was actually a perfect moment for the new “field of study,” 
because in the post-World War II years, there was a shortage of executive 
talent and corporate leaders had begun poaching executives not just from 
the competition but also from entirely different sectors.’ 
 
It was against this backdrop that the first executive pay survey was published in 
1951. The American Management Association asked Arch Patton to conduct a                                                         
131 Compensation is the term typically used in the US in place of remuneration.  
132 Harvard Business Review 
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multi-industry executive pay survey. This survey was then published in the 
Harvard Business Review in 1951 and for more than a decade thereafter. Patton, 
an active business writer throughout his career, later recounted the role, which the 
survey played when it was introduced: 
 
‘The 1951 AMA survey provided, for the first time, data on top management 
compensation on an industry-by-industry basis in an organized form. Though 
limited in functional coverage and crude by today’s standards, the report 
opened a Pandora’s box. Key functional executives could now compare their 
income with the average for the same jobs within their industry. Prior to the 
survey, executive compensation data was one of the best-kept secrets in the 
average company. The only people who knew the figures were the chief 
executive, the board of directors, and a clerk who kept the records-and they 
didn’t talk.’ 
 
In addition to the increasing interest in executive compensation, the shape of 
executive pay in the United States was also transforming.  The concern with 
aligning management and owner interests persisted, encouraging the uptake of 
executive stock options, however such schemes were often prohibitively 
expensive for the shareholders and the executive. However, as part of the 1950 
Revenue Act, the US Congress granted favourable tax treatment to stock options, 
catalysing an explosion in restricted stock option use for corporate executives. It 
was this explosion in stock options and rising prevalence of executive pay data, 
which enabled the emergence of executive compensation consulting in the US. As 
former Tower Perrin Managing Director Bud Crystal stated, ‘executive 
compensation consulting, as an organized profession, did not get started in any 
meaningful way until the 1950s’ (p. 10). 
 
Crystal (1991) recalls compensation consulting work growing steadily, but 
unspectacularly, from the 1950s due to the proliferation of stock options and a 
strong and sustained ‘bull’ market. That is, until the oil crises of 1973 and 1977 
and the consequent stock market crash. These events precipitated a critical 
revaluation of the use of the stock price as a measure of performance, as company 
stock prices plummeted, and executive stock options stopped paying out. In place 
of stock prices, growth in earnings per share was an early popular alternative. In 
order to implement the new compensation plans, the economic value of existing 
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forms of compensation (such as stock options) needed to be measured, which in 
turn gave rise in the demand for ‘increasingly sophisticated compensation 
surveys’ (Crystal, 1991).  
 
Thus, compensation surveys were commonplace in the US by the 1970s. 
Although the term pay benchmark was not apparent in historical recaps of this 
period, the compensation survey is epistemologically similar to the pay 
benchmark, as it is understood today. The surveys essentially were a grouping of 
comparative information, upon which company executive and internal human 
resource functions could base their pay decisions.  
 
An important journey, however, had not yet been made. Compensation surveys 
(as it is termed in the US context) had yet to emerge as Remuneration surveys in 
the UK context. This was achieved with the movement on consulting firms into 
London in the 1970s, and importantly, the work of Towers Perrin in establishing 
executive pay surveys for a UK based clientele.  
 
6.1.2 UK Context 
Pay Surveys 
 
In the 1970s, American multinational companies were establishing subsidiaries in 
Britain and continental Europe. Management consulting firms from the US 
flocked to establish London offices in order to service these subsidiaries (Kipping, 
2001). Actuarial and benefits consultancies such as Towers Perrin and Mercer, 
were similarly establishing or expanding their European presence.  
 
These actuarial and benefits firms had, from the 1950s and 60s in the US, started 
reimagining their service offerings to include all elements of pay (actuarial, 
benefits, communications133  and direct pay134 ). It was these business streams 
around which the European practices were built. As described in chapter 3, 
Towers Perrin was the first prominent player in conducting executive pay surveys                                                         
133 Communications, such as brochures, sought to inform employees about pay, thereby 
improving employee understanding and the value, which they placed on compensation 
arrangements. 
134 Direct pay represented base, bonus and long-term incentive elements. 
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for large companies. Initially, Towers’ London office served US clients. As their 
reputation grew, Towers broke into the UK pay survey market, and within a 
matter of a few years, between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the firm’s ‘Top 
Executive Pay Survey’ comprised 80 of the top 100 UK companies.  
 
Also detailed in chapter 3, the shape of executive pay was changing in the UK in 
the 1980s. Executive pay packages, straitjacketed by the prohibitively high tax 
rates in force in the 1970s, underwent a marked transformation with the passing of 
the 1984 Finance Act. The Act significantly reduced taxes and encouraged the 
introduction of executive stock option schemes. The explosion in stock option use 
in the UK is not dissimilar from the US in terms of the favourable tax changes, 
which triggered US executive stock option use.  Yet, the shifts in UK executive 
pay practices were not simply a matter of replicating US practice. Executive stock 
options gained both popularity and infamy during the privatisation years.  
 
As remuneration consulting teams stabilised throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, 
and the demands for pay information surged, consultancies invested in 
establishing in-house databases. Through these in house databases, vast amounts 
of data were collected.  Pay data surveys were increasingly covering large swathes 
of companies, such as the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 350 or FTSE All Share.  
 
As Main (1992) noted, remuneration consultants ‘conduct general surveys of top 
executive pay, and then tailor these to suit particular companies by presenting 
analyses of comparator groups of companies.’ With the proliferation of data 
collection, there was now a need to define more carefully, the subset of the market 
‘relevant’ to the client. Instead of bespoke surveys, with data collection targeted at 
a select group of companies, as the first data surveys had been, the ever-growing 
supply of data meant that the consultants needed to carry out the task of extracting 
the peer or comparator group from the database. The consultants were best placed 
to carve out the peer group from the broader database.  
 
In the early 1990s, pay data, market trends analysis and the institutionalisation of 
pay benchmarking work was triggered by two governance episodes, the Cadbury 
Report and the Greenbury Report. The following section describes the 
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implications of these two reports in buttressing the oversight role of the 
remuneration committee through the use of pay benchmarking data.  
 
Corporate Governance Codes 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the Cadbury committee was convened in response to 
corporate failings at Polly Peck and BCCI.  During the committee’s deliberations, 
the Maxwell scandal came to a head, creating the added momentum for executive 
remuneration to be thrust upon Cadbury’s agenda. Committee attention focused 
on the shortcomings of non-executive directors in their monitoring and oversight 
role. Non-executive directors were seen to be at an informational disadvantage 
vis-a-vis internal directors (PRO NED, 1992). Thus, in order to effectively 
challenge executives, remuneration committee should be established, and 
populated predominantly with NEDs. For the remuneration committee, pay data 
would provide the justification necessary for remuneration committee members to 
opine on pay packages. 
 
Following the Cadbury Report, executive remuneration largely fell from public 
attention. It re-emerged in 1994 in response to the windfall gains being earned by 
executives in the newly privatised utilities companies. The public and political ire 
prompted the formation of the Greenbury Study Group. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, the corporate governance codes have relevance for the 
emergence of actors, documents, norms and practices in remuneration design and 
governance. In this chapter, the institutional practices which emerged within pay 
benchmarks were critically shaped by recommendations made within the 
Greenbury Report.  
 
Similar to the Cadbury committee, the Greenbury Study Group was concerned 
with the informational needs of the remuneration committee, recommending 
RemCos access reliable and up to date information about remuneration in other 
companies, for which remuneration consultancies were optimally placed to supply 
based on their pay surveys. The report also recommended that committees draw 
on outside advice and feel free to retain their own consultants separate from those 
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hired by the company’s management. It is Greenbury’s view of the market for 
executive talent, which this chapter problematises. The Greenbury Report stated: 
 
There is a market for executive talent. Market forces are especially apparent 
in certain industries, notably international industries, and in certain skills. 
There are also market-related lower limits for the remuneration of Directors 
and senior executives in the largest companies. Below these limits 
companies would have great difficulty in recruiting, retaining or motivating 
people of the right quality and expertise.  
 
However, the market is imperfect. Many Directors and senior executives 
spend much of their working lives with the same organization. The 
remuneration that they receive is determined by Boards and remuneration 
committees rather than directly by the market.135 These committees are 
often influenced by consultant surveys or information exchanges with other 
companies. However, there remains much scope for different interpretations 
and applications.  
 
While market forces set a broad framework, therefore, remuneration 
committees for the most part have quite a wide range of discretion in setting 
levels and forms of remuneration. Their task is not easy. It requires 
knowledge and judgement.  
 
The Report then went on to caution boards and remuneration committees to 
‘avoid paying more than is required,’ that remuneration committees are to 
‘consider carefully a range of issues.’ The issues included: 
 
‘(the committee’s) overall strategy for executive remuneration levels; the 
positioning of their company relative to other companies; the group of 
companies, if any, with which their company should be compared; the 
surveys and other information they need and the reliability of this 
information; the equivalent levels of jobs between their company and 
others…’   
 
These ‘issues’ are the inputs and assumptions for pay benchmarking work. The 
Greenbury Study Group’s recommendations, by and large, codified comparator 
groups as a key consideration in the determination of executive remuneration.  
And these concerns were all premised on the need to compensate for the 
                                                        
135  This was seen as appropriate since many executives spend much or all of their 
working lives with the same organization. 
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shortcoming of an imperfect market which possessed some objective reality. 
Greenbury had inadvertently ‘black boxed’ the market for executive talent.  
 
6.1.3 Problematising the market for executive pay 
 
Malsch et al. (2012, p.401) state that the remuneration market ‘is seen as natural, 
providing conditions of possibility that serve to establish fair compensation 
through the creation and enforcement of contracts.’ A common refrain from 
consultants when asked to describe the market for executive talent was that ‘the 
market is no one thing.’ The objective and seemingly stable market for executive 
talent, to which the Greenbury Report referred, is problematised136 throughout the 
remainder of the chapter. In this chapter, if the market is ‘no one thing,’ then it is 
an empirical question to establish the means by which the market is constructed, 
and the implications of its construction.  
 
An ‘imperfect’ market for executive talent is not the starting point from which 
executive pay packages are derived. Rather, the market is repeatedly constructed 
through the survey and market trends producing work of consultants, work that in 
turn is accepted by clients, regulators and the public. The historical emergence of 
executive pay benchmarking is essentially the emergence of ‘tailored’ executive 
pay surveys. This tailoring was required once pay data collection exceeded what 
was seen as relevant for the client’s pay comparison.   
 
Median pay philosophy 
 
According to Greenbury, two key principles inform pay decisions; flexibility in 
setting pay and avoidance of overpaying, facilitated by exercising care in 
positioning the company relative to comparable137 companies. The report further 
stated: 
                                                         
136 Foucault (1985) describes problematisation as an ‘endeavour to know how and to what 
extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of what is already known’ (pg. 9). 
137 Comparability should be determined based on factors of risk, challenges, complexity, 
diversity and international spread of business, and the special expertise and understanding 
required of its executives.  
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Companies should not pay above average 138  levels regardless of 
performance. They should also beware of basing remuneration levels on a 
skewed comparator group so as to justify higher remuneration levels. If 
companies generally pursue such policies, the effect will simply be to ratchet 
up the general level of executive remuneration.  
 
Further entrenching both the intense focus on the average or median were 
institutional shareholders. As one former managing partner recalled: 
 
‘It must've been about '96 or something like that, shareholders got this 
soundbite in their head that said you shouldn't pay for below average 
performance and so the median became the floor below which you couldn't 
pay. Of course what that does is it changes the thing so that actually you've 
only got a quarter of the possible performance outcomes which changed the 
amount you're paid. You're getting the maximum for the top quartile, you 
are getting nothing for the bottom two quartiles, and everything was varying 
in the third quartile. 
 
Similarly, in 1999 the ABI released guidelines, which Main (2006) described as ‘a 
fairly radical departure from what had gone before.’ In the 1999 Guidelines, the 
ABI placed markedly more emphasis on setting challenging performance criteria 
(or 'hurdles') before the executive stock options vest, and recommended that 
performance be judged on a relative basis, using peer groups or performance 
benchmarks (Main, 2006).  
 
Although the term average was often used by consultants in interviews, as well as 
in guidance or regulatory documents, the statistical reference point was the 
median. Since the mean allowed outliers to affect the average, and Greenbury had 
cited the potential ill effects of skewed comparator groups, it was the median, 
which became entrenched in executive pay practices. As one consultant described: 
 
‘What you're trying to do is you're trying to position the company at the 
middle of that group…I suppose it's pretty much entrenched now that most 
companies are aiming to be the middle…Effectively, you're always aiming to 
have a group kind of spread around that company…’ 
 
                                                        
138 Emphasis added 
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This emphasis on the median has come to shape what consultants described as the 
remuneration committee’s median pay philosophy. In order to achieve a median 
pay philosophy, the client company should be situated in the middle of their peer 
group, where half the peers are selected ‘above’ the client and half are selected 
‘below’. The remuneration committee then seeks to make a decision about the pay 
package with reference to the median pay levels for the different elements of pay. 
This is described in further detail in the next section.   
 
6.2 Pay Benchmarking Practice 
 
The following is a recount of a conversation between the researcher and the 
consultant, and captures several of the core dimensions of pay benchmarking 
practice:  
 
Researcher: Can you tell me about your pay 
benchmarking work? 
 
Consultant: Benchmarking in an annual exercise. The 
client asks us to figure out whether their people are 
being paid competitively to the market.  
 
Researcher: How do you go about getting data for the 
market? 
 
Consultant: Regardless of who is making the request 
– whether board or management – you go about it the 
same way. You can use survey data, public data 
 
 
It kind of depends on what the objective is to be 
honest. From the board’s perspective, you would take 
a more conservative approach according to their 
compensation philosophy.  
 
You will find the data for sectors that are more in 
common and you typically use a blend of survey data 
and public data.  
 
You then match up the different jobs to the title of 
the client, and then you produce the statistical 
distribution. Then you see where your client lies 
within that statistical distribution. 
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If the compensation philosophy is ‘median’, then 
you say the client is above or below median and by 
how much. 
 
And then recommend whether they should increase their 
fees or not based on a host of other contextual 
factors which needs to be taken into account. 
 
Researcher: What contextual factors? 
 
Consultant: How do the investors view it? 
 
If the gap to market is really big, is it the right 
answer to just bump up pay. You can bump base, which 
would have a roll on effective to the incentive 
opportunity.  
 
If there are a number of changes to a management team 
in a year and there have been one off payments that 
need to be disclosed, is it the right time? 
 
As you know, benchmarking is not a perfect science. 
There is some sort of art and judgement in it.  
 
Two jobs that are titled similarly, does not mean 
that the scope of the job is necessarily the same.  
 
You can size regress the information. You can try to 
evaluate the job, assign points and determine whether 
the points match up.  
 
In any of those approaches, there is a lot of 
judgement… 
 
 
In a somewhat stylised, albeit common, account of pay benchmarking work, the 
key steps are described by consultants as follows; (i) the client makes a request 
for a role(s)139 to be benchmarked, (ii) the consultant then compiles the peer group 
and reverts to the client, (iii) the client confirms the peer group and (iv) the 
consultant, with the aid of summary statistics, positions the role(s)’s current or 
proposed pay package against summary pay data for a similar role(s) within the 
peer group. 
                                                         
139  Typical roles include executive boards members, and the non-board executive 
committee roles. 
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6.2.1 Peer Group selection 
 
The common criterion by which a peer or comparator firm is selected is based on 
size and/or sector matching. This means, whether a potential peer is of 
comparable size, belongs to the same industry or sector, or fulfils both 
characteristics.  Consultants will typically assess an appropriate size match based 
on market capitalization, revenue, number of employees or a combination of these 
factors. For ease in identifying size matches, in the field site, analysts were trained 
to use EIKON and Bloomberg databases. The Induction’s technical skills training 
entailed an introduction to these databases, including how the database is used, 
the limits of the data, useful tickers and how data is exported to Excel. Further 
training on Excel introduced the analysts to typical functions and useful shortcuts. 
Once a senior analyst demonstrated the use of the programs, the analyst was 
tasked with pulling comparator firms’ pay data from the database for a 
benchmarking exercise. The database extraction was algorithmic in generating the 
list of peers for a client.   
 
In most cases, the senior team member (typically the principal or partner) of a 
client team had a particular preference as to how peers were selected. In one case, 
the analyst simply started with a Google search to identify peers. In another 
instance, the analyst ‘opened’ EIKON, put in the company name and used 
‘screeners’ to limit peers according to certain criteria, in that case, revenue or the 
number of employees.  
 
Generating an initial list of potential peers was not challenging work when using 
EIKON. When selecting size peers, an analyst might use as a rule of thumb, ’10 
above and 10 below’, that is, the analyst selected 10 companies larger than the 
client company and 10 companies smaller, based on market capitalisation. Market 
capitalisation was typically used as the proxy for size unless either the consultant 
or client believed that revenue was more appropriate.  
 
In some cases, the management team of the client company or the remuneration 
committee provided the peer group to their remuneration consultants. Although 
best practice governance guidelines stated that the remuneration committee should 
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be ‘rigorous in selecting an appropriate comparator group’ taking into account 
factors such as the size of the comparator companies; the complexity of the 
business; the industry sector; the degree of internationality; the number and type 
of employees and the management structure, it was seldom the case that the 
committee identified the peer group.  
 
One method used by senior analysts to bolster confidence in the selection of peers 
was a test for ‘resonance’ in their data set. Resonance measured the correlation 
amongst the log of monthly total shareholder returns for the selected peers, that is, 
it ‘looked at short term movements in TSR.’ Similarly, senior analysts also ran 
regression analysis in order to derive the R squared.  R Squared signalled the 
magnitude of the effect of external factors on a company’s total shareholder 
return. For example, an R squared of 74% meant that 74% of the client’s 
shareholder return movements were affected by similar factors as the peer group. 
The correlation often generated a higher result than the regression’s R squared, 
making the ‘optics look better.’ While this gives the impression of a system 
susceptible to gaming, the consultants were trying to describe the systems by 
which they demonstrated the objectivity of the peer selection processes.  
 
It was these actions which consultants considered the ‘science’ of pay 
benchmarking practice. By virtue of using the database and statistics, the 
consultants recognised the market was brought into being for a particular client. 
Given the consultants’ reliance on data, the peer group derived from the database 
represented the statistically and methodologically rigorous ‘market for executive 
talent.’  It is on this basis that one consultant opined ‘it’s not like we’re making 
things up.’ In the steps that followed, the consultants applied ‘judgement’ to the 
peer group selection; actions, which constituted the ‘art’ of pay benchmarking 
practice.  
 
6.2.2 Judgement in peer group selection 
 
In the analyst training session, peer group selection appeared almost formulaic. 
Yet, as the analyst gained more experience, it became clear that there were 
numerous situations in which ’10 above and 10 below’ didn’t suit. It was often the 
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case that at least one comparator firm generated from the database was removed 
from the peer group.  As one analyst described: 
 
You do need to go through companies on a case-by-case basis because you 
will often find a company that's in theory a good fit…they might have 
circumstances that would warrant its removal from the group. Cases such as 
a company having a CEO that's a large shareholder.  
Another example supplied by a principal, described his rationale for setting aside 
conventional wisdom in order to select more suitable peers: 
‘When you're doing a distribution business you can't just take revenue… You 
can't just go to a survey and say, "Well we've got $10 billion in revenue so 
we're going to pull the data for companies with $10 billion in revenue…" 
Because they’re distributors…they buy something and sell it for a small mark-
up, they're middlemen. 
…the economics of their business is so completely different than the 
economics of a manufacturer that has $10 billion in revenue, or a technology 
company that has $10 billion in revenue, but fifty percent margins. Totally 
different than a distributor that has one and a half percent margins.’  
The principal attributed his twenty years in pay consulting to his ability to 
‘understand, interpret, and evaluate the data.’ Also affecting year on year 
benchmarking for a client were possible takeovers, mergers, de mergers, delisting 
and suspensions of comparator firms or potential comparator firms, which might 
require an adjustment to the selected peer group. 
 
6.2.3 Communicating the benchmark 
 
The final output of the pay benchmark conceals the narrative of the many 
assumptions and decisions made throughout its construction. In the chart below, 
roles A to O for the client company were benchmarked against a group of 
comparator firms. The red marker indicated the total pay for the client’s executive 
directors and senior managers. The block represents a quartile analysis, where the 
darker orange block indicates the lower two quartiles, and the pale orange 
represents the upper two quartiles. The median is the point at which both blocks 
meet.  
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Once this visual is communicated, the assumptions required in its creation fall 
away, and the red marker in relation to the quartiles becomes central in the 
discussion. The client’s executives’ pay position is then spoken about as either 
above median, at median or below median. It is at this point in which the 
contextual factors and negotiation of the final pay package takes place.  
 
Figure 6.1: Pay Benchmark 
 
 
 
6.3 Reacting to the benchmark 
 
This section summarises the views of consultants as well as governance analysts, 
remuneration committee chairs and internal heads of reward, in response to the 
pay benchmark and the deliberations on executive pay packages, which ensue.  
In the interviews with consultants in which the benchmark was discussed, the 
responses were nearly identical on two fronts; (i) pay benchmarking is routine 
work and (ii) it is a starting point in the remuneration committee’s pay 
determination process. Consultants maintained that they provided advice, and at 
no point did they decide pay. Senior consultants felt governance helped strengthen 
their voice in the boardroom, as it was incumbent on them to flag committee or 
management choices that institutional investors were likely to vote against. 
However, challenging the executives was never an easy position for the consultant 
or the committee. As on consultant described: 
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‘We work with people and you might have to send them a message they 
won't particularly like. It's always a nice situation if you do a benchmarking 
for someone, let's say, and then they're well below the market and they can 
argue for an increase in pay. However it's a bit more difficult to deliver the 
message of, "Well, you're kind of overpaid so you might want to just stick to 
it for the moment”.’ 
 
However, just by virtue of arguing for an increase in pay, didn’t mean that the 
remuneration committee could agree to it. The ‘median’ had come to be 
interpreted as the position in which the executive was neither overpaid nor 
underpaid, however, as consultants amended: 
 
‘Simply being above median doesn't mean you're over paid, and simply being 
below median doesn't mean you're underpaid.’ 
 
Even then, there was still a bias implicit when a suggested pay package was 
‘above’ the median versus ‘below’. While ‘well below the market’ might warrant 
an increase, it was almost never the case that an executive’s pay would be reduced 
if they were described as ‘well above median’ or ‘overpaid.’  
 
It was common for the consultant and client to speak about pay increases in 
relation to the benchmark. One consultant recounted the ‘challenging 
conversations’ that were had with clients, reiterating that contextual factors were 
shaped by the internal dynamics and strategies of the client’s business. The 
consultant described relayed his recent interaction and advice to the client: 
 
‘You might compare yourself with a group of companies, and say, "Well, 
actually because we're trying to develop right now, and because there is a 
lot of work that we're undertaking compared to our peers, we should 
actually pay a bit above median to get the right people in these positions to 
drive our strategy forward." 
 
In other situations, his advice went the other way: 
 
‘ "Well, you know what? For this particular position the amount of work 
isn't as big as in the peers. Essentially the role of this person is split. He has 
only a few regions to look at as opposed to what we expect others to have, 
so because of that we don't think it should be above median." ‘ 
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This attention to contextual factors had also been influenced by institutional 
investors who had lost their appetite for pay increases premised on ‘below’ 
median’ benchmark results. The investors’ ability to exercise their voice by voting 
against the remuneration policy or report meant that both committees and 
consultants were listening carefully to the preferences of the relevant institutional 
investors. As described in chapter 4, consultants assumed a policing role in order 
to strengthen their gatekeeping presence. Institutional investors remained sceptical 
of the continued role of benchmarking in justifying pay choices, and the optics 
used in justifying pay increases: 
 
In terms of benchmarking instead of just calling it, "We're doing 
benchmarking," it is, "This guy is no longer competitively paid. This is a 
retention issue. He could be snatched away or he feels undervalued." It is the 
same thing really, but they're not calling it benchmarking anymore, because 
it's more emotive issue.’  
 
Contextual factors were a dimension of the ‘art’ applied in pay benchmarking, and 
a critical component of the dynamic process of deciding pay.  
 
 
6.4 The Upward Ratchet 
 
This section describes the mechanisms by which the upward ratchet of executive 
pay has occurred. First, the self-fulfilling prophesy which occurred with the 
consultants aging pay and inflation adjusting at unjustifiably high rates is 
described. Although this has since been curtailed, due to both public criticism and 
the gatekeeping role which emerged, the consultants still struggle to outpace these 
once dubious actions.  The second mechanism described is the role of disclosure 
in the upward ratchet of executive pay, and confusion between the benchmarking 
of a role and not the individual. Finally, the significant jumps which occurred in 
the ratchet are premised on the perceptions of worth which comparison generates.  
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Outpacing a dubious past 
 
In chapter 4, the allegations made of the consultants’ role in the upward ratchet of 
pay were not entirely baseless. Although the oft-used conflict of interest 
hypothesis was categorically dismissed by consultants, they conceded to their 
susceptibility in the past to acquiesce to the executives’ demands. Consultants 
were not blind to the dubious role their field once played in the upward ratchet of 
executive pay. As one former managing partner recounted: 
 
It was widespread practice when somebody said, "Can you benchmark this 
job?" for the consultants to gather the information, bearing in mind it was 
becoming increasingly more public because the disclosure standards were 
going up. To go to the information and then say everybody's increasing the 
pay rates by 6%. If we adjust it by 6% then it'll be current for when these job 
changes take place. The data comes out at various times in the year, which all 
sounded perfectly fair and reasonable until you stopped to think about it 
because actually what that became then was a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you 
project it and make your decisions on that basis then presto those decisions 
produce 6%. 
 
Pay inflation in the way described above disappeared during the global financial 
crisis, and the practice was abandoned as the Walker Review further implicated 
remuneration consultants in the upward ratchet of pay. Another practice from 
which the consultants wished to distance themselves was the practice whereby 
executives were approached with benchmarks illustrating the executive as 
underpaid in relation to the peer group. This practice was explicitly prohibited 
when the Code of Professional Conduct was established for executive 
remuneration consultants: 
 
‘Go back 20 years, it was not uncommon in some parts of the industry for chief 
executives to be presented with benchmarking analyses which suggested that 
they weren't paid enough. For them to then show them to their remuneration 
committees, and for their remuneration committees to then buckle under with 
a pay rise. I think the whole world's moved on now…I think that those 
problems are really problems of the past.’ 
 
However, these impressions of the consultant were difficult to shed. The 
public and political appetite for the shaming of executive pay packages and 
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those involved in the design and determination of pay meant consultants were 
unlikely to escape continued criticism and allegations of managerial or board 
capture.  
 
Disclosure 
 
When pay surveys were first introduced, executive pay was both competitively 
sensitive information and culturally sensitive, in that pay was seen as a private 
matter not to be discussed. Thus, surveys were anonymous, and would likely have 
remained anonymous had mandatory disclosure not been introduced in 2002, 
requiring executive directors remuneration details in the directors’ remuneration 
report. Disclosure was seen to enable investors and an interested public to peer 
into the blackbox of pay decisions. However, in so doing, it unwittingly opened 
Pandora’s Box. As one consultant recalled: 
Then everything was anonymous. Chief executives would find out they 
were paid X and that was on the scale and you could say, "Oh yeah but you 
were ... you're lower down the scale, but you're not running such a big 
company.” As soon as you have full disclosure, then they say, "She earns 
that much? My company's bigger than hers. I knew her, she used to report 
to me. How outrageous, I need more money," because it's all about that. 
There's a ratcheting up.  
 
Previously, benchmarks, derived from an anonymised stock of data, meant that it 
was the role that was benchmarked against a peer group, and not an individual.  
However, with the benchmarking for executive directors – namely the chief 
executive officer and the chief financial officer – pay packages were no longer 
easily dissociable from the executive in office. Given the high visibility of 
executive pay in public policy and the media, and disclosure around executive 
directors pay, all key actors had first-hand information as to the pay packages of 
executive directors in public companies.  
 
Thus, there were sentiments expressed by some consultants and executives that 
the starting point should be the fundamentals of the executive for whom the 
package was being designed. As one partner described: 
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‘I've never heard of people saying, "Let's look at what skills someone has and 
what skills we need, and give them money based on that." It's always about 
external benchmarking…external market practice.’  
 
Yet, how then is comparison achieved if benchmarks attempted to incorporate 
individual characteristics? Role-based benchmarks retained the objectivity of the 
model by drawing upon highly institutionalised facts such as market capitalisation 
or revenue as a proxy for size, and industry as a proxy for complexity. And as 
established in the previous chapter, projecting objectivity and rationality in 
remuneration consulting work was of paramount importance. 
Perceptions of executive worth 
 
Consultants, remuneration committees and governance analysts described how 
they understood executives’ reaction to median pay; as a statistical output of the 
pay benchmark and as a signal of their performance vis-à-vis their peer group. As 
one former head of reward, now turned external remuneration consultant, opined: 
 
‘Anyone appointed to a board position in a large British company has 
clearly had a successful career (ignoring a few cases of nepotism). Almost 
inevitably, these individuals have constantly been told that they are the 
best in their field. It is very difficult for those same individuals to accept 
that they are ‘only’ average, let alone below average. ‘ 
 
And yet, this was not universally believed. As one chief executive officer (FTSE 
350) who also held a remuneration committee chair position in another company 
declared: 
 
‘Too often people assume chief executives are irreplaceable. I'm not in that 
camp. For people to say, "You've got a star CEO and they're irreplaceable." 
I have no time for that at all, because I just don't believe that…  
 
…The world is full of good people wanting jobs, and the world is full of 
good executives wanting to get that CEO job, and yet there is this 
assumption you have to pay them an absolute fortune to do it. I just don't 
agree with that either.’ 
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Another RemCo chair (FTSE 100) commented: 
 
‘The number of candidates presenting themselves who you think is half 
suitable is quite limited. There's a tendency to say, "Well, it's only one 
person. I don't mind paying 2 million pounds to get this person." ‘ 
 
This RemCo chair continued describing the immateriality to the firm’s profits of 
paying £40 million for the executive team for a firm with £1 to £2 billion pounds 
in market capitalisation, and the shareholders acceptance of this once performance 
criteria was met. This is not to say that the remuneration package was decided 
entirely on this premise. Rather, it felt easy to make allowances for a requested 
increase when pay was perceived as an operating expense line item.  
 
The contrast among these three perspectives on pay design and determination 
captured the recurring tensions in negotiating a pay package. Personal views 
permeated professional positions. Malsch et al. (2012) similarly study the cultural 
logics, specifically for remuneration committees determining executive pay in the 
Canadian context.  The authors find that committee members ‘are genuinely doing 
their best to fulfil their responsibilities, according to their cultural beliefs.’ 
However a host of factors shape these cultural beliefs.  
 
Ezzamel and Watson (1997) found upward pressure exerted on executive pay 
when the executive was deemed ‘underpaid’ relative to the market. However, 
there was no reciprocal downward adjustment when the executive was deemed 
‘overpaid.’ There was a divergent opinion on the cause for this discrepancy, with 
some finding the committee beholden to the executive, while O’Reilly et al. 
(1998) argue that pay increases stem from self-referential social norms shaped by 
personal preferences. Thus, the act of ‘bidding up’ (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997) 
need not stem from one source of reasoning.  
 
 
6.5 Toward a theory of pay benchmarking 
 
Pay benchmarking is not conceptually akin to the benchmarking practices that 
emerged as part of the quality improvement initiatives that occurred in the 
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manufacturing sector. Although the quality control benchmarking literature does 
little to theoretically inform executive pay benchmarking practice, it is indicative 
of the challenges, which researchers have faced in theorising benchmarking 
practice.   
 
Academic research on benchmarks has overwhelmingly focused on applications 
of benchmarking in organizational practice. For the period 1994-2008, of the 406 
articles published in Benchmarking: An International Journal, only four percent 
were conceptual (Anand and Kodali, 2008), and none addressed the underlying 
nature of benchmarking (Moriarty and Smallman, 2009).   
In 2009, Moriarty and Smallman made a concerted effort to establish a theoretical 
base for benchmarking. Through a review of the major organisational 
perspectives, the authors established that benchmarking is a learning tool, 
executed for the purposes of improving organizational welfare. For their research, 
the concept of change was implicit in benchmarking practice. Yet the authors 
were not able to pin down the mechanism, which drove the change. Furthermore, 
the authors remained ambivalent as to whether the efforts made in pursuit of 
improvement were effective or ineffective. Ultimately, Moriarty and Smallman 
(2009) offered a provisional definition: 
 
Benchmarking is an exemplar driven teleological process operating within an 
organization with the objective of intentionally changing an existing state of 
affairs into a superior state of affairs.  
 
While an epistemology of benchmarking remains elusive, there are 
conceptualisations of benchmarking which prove helpful. Wolfram Cox et al. 
(1997) suggest that benchmarking is a mixed metaphor, entailing notions of 
competition and collaboration. In their analysis of competitive forces in 
benchmarking, there was a concern that the benchmark was reduced to just a 
‘mark’ or standard, rather than viewed as a process 140  for improvement. 
Measurement was related to ‘the empiricist view that a concept attains status and 
legitimacy if it can be counted or measured.’ A number of authors have attested to 
                                                        
140 All definitions imply that benchmarking is a process, that is, a sequence of activities 
that involves “process and assessment”.   
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the ‘embeddedness’ of measurement in the benchmarking process (Leibfried and 
McNair, 1992).  
 
It is this inherent emphasis on quantification, measurement and comparison that 
suggests that pay benchmarking has a strong affinity with the academic insights in 
the commensuration and rankings literature.  
 
6.5.1 Benchmarking: a system of ranking 
 
Pay benchmarks are fundamentally a ranking of pay packages for a particular role 
across a group of similarly sized and similarly complicated firms. Each company 
that appears in the benchmark is comparable to the rest of the group based on two 
core characteristics, size and sector. Given that size can be measured in multiple 
ways, norms have emerged in pay benchmarking practice whereby revenue and 
market capitalisation are the typical metrics by which comparably sized firms are 
selected.  
 
Commensuration 
 
By using market capitalization or revenue to proxy for firm size, and global 
distribution of operations, for example, to proxy the complexity of work, a 
process of commensuration is enacted. Commensuration is described as the ‘the 
transformation of different qualities into a common metric’ (Espeland and Sauder, 
2007 Espeland and Stevens, 1998, Sauder and Espeland, 2009). It is this process 
of commensuration which qualifies sufficiently comparable firms to constitute a 
single peer group.   
 
A second process of commensuration then occurs, whereby the scope and 
complexity of a particular role is made commensurable. While the titles of top 
executive positions have converged – for example, CEO, CFO, COO – there are a 
host of senior executive roles, which must be made commensurate with the roles 
within their peer group. This is not to say that there are negligible differences in 
CEO work, but rather the visibility and social acceptance of the title dissolves 
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perceivable differences. The benchmark then intensifies the comparability of the 
role, obscuring or concealing the differences.   
 
Commensuration relies upon the quantification of qualities. Thus, the following 
section describes the consultants’ role in creating the data – the facts – upon 
which the benchmark can then be constructed.  
 
The production of facts 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the members of the Greenbury Study Group 
perceived the market for executive talent as a functioning, albeit imperfect, supply 
of expert labour. The pay survey, markets trends analysis and pay benchmarks are 
the ‘networks of support’ (Power, 1996), which enable the consultants’ ‘project in 
fact building’ (ibid.). It is these products, compiled by the expert adviser, and 
accepted within the broader network of relevant actors, which mediate the market 
for executive talent.  
 
Pay surveys, trends analysis and benchmarks are embedded in a web of consulting 
work and remuneration governance work, which collectively represent a ‘fact 
producing institution’ (Power, 2015) upon which a stable and objective market for 
executive pay was perceived. Yet, it was not only a matter of collecting data and 
analysing it, which produced an objective market for executive talent. The 
consultants needed to produce a legitimate claim to pay expertise, which they 
achieved through processes of mimicking the profession of management 
consulting, appealing to the highly coveted board client, and critically having 
access to proprietary data.  
 
With respect to databases which consultancies built, it served in making their 
expertise more persuasive as expert claims were linked with what appeared to be 
objective facts (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987). The methodology 
employed in data collection, analytics and pay benchmarking is ‘closely tied to 
the claim that it can produce a factual and calculable knowledge of economic 
relations’ (Miller and O’Leary, 1993). There is something of a ‘circular reference’ 
in the perceived objectivity of the data, as the data contributed to the reifying of 
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the consultant as pay expert, and in turn the expert status of the consultant 
reinforced the objectivity and stability assumed of the pay surveys and market 
trends analysis. It is this circularity, which enabled the market for executive talent 
to appear stable and permanent, even if the supply of labour changed within it.  
 
In the context of the upward ratchet of executive pay, the consultants’ judgement 
in adding or removing comparator firms from the peer group is seen as 
manipulation of the group for the purposes of increasing the executives’ pay. 
Consultants’ judgement, much like remuneration committee’s upward discretion 
in the awarding of incentives, has become the object of investor ire. Yet, 
judgement is an inextricable dimension of pay benchmarking practice. Although 
consultants recognise the important of applying judgement to the peer group, they 
do not discuss it at length, document it or defend it publicly. Consultants invest 
far more time and energy in documenting their methodological approach, and the 
rigour of their methodology. Arguably, it is their vulnerable and tenuous status as 
pay expert that prompts the obfuscation of their judgement. Porter (1992), in 
describing accountants, stated: 
 
‘Accountants, operating in a highly contentious domain, lack the status and 
credibility that would permit them to rest their claims mainly on wisdom 
and insight. It is in large measure for broadly political reasons that a 
positivistic rhetoric of impersonal facts prevails in accounting’ (p. 638) 
 
Porter’s statement is arguably more applicable to the remuneration consultant than 
the accountant. Within the field of accounting, the audit client accepts the 
accountants’ system of knowledge as a function of their academic knowledge, 
specialist training and rigorous accreditation processes. The consultant, however, 
does not possess a similar foundation upon which to negotiate the acceptance of 
their judgement. Thus, the consultants emphasise their firm’s methodology, 
despite the ubiquity of methodological approaches across the leading consulting 
firms. Porter (1992) is again insightful when he notes that this insistence on 
standardizability, even where it violates the best judgment of expert practitioners, 
will rarely be found except in fields that are highly vulnerable to criticism from 
outsiders’ (p.639). Thus, the consultants’ databases and market trends analyses are 
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the ‘networks of support’, which enable their ‘project in fact building’ (Power, 
1996a).  
 
The benchmark, or ranking of executive pay, which results from the tailoring of 
the data has implications for the governance work of remuneration committees, 
the remuneration consultants’ gatekeeping role, the institutional investors 
stewardship role and the importantly, the pricing of the executive director. The 
pay package of the executive places a quantitative value on that executive, or put 
differently, it signals what the executive is worth to the company. Thus, it is not 
surprising that executives alter their behaviour in response to being evaluated, 
observed, measured by their employer, and furthermore ranked against a group of 
their peers.  
 
Given that rankings ‘change how internal and external constituencies’ (Sauder 
and Espeland, 2009, p.64) behave, the following section analyses the ‘reactivity’ 
of the key actors, by drawing further on the work of Espeland and Sauder (2007) 
and Sauder and Espeland (2009).  
 
6.5.2 Internalization of the pay benchmark 
 
Although argued by the consultants to be a reference point, or starting point, the 
benchmark is ultimately absorbed by the actors and its meaning negotiated within 
pay setting processes. Internalization, as described by Sauder and Espeland (2009) 
is ‘mediated through people’s emotional and cognitive responses to ranking, and 
through their distinctive and evolving interpretations of rankings’ (p. 74).    
 
Accountability 
 
While pay benchmarking, as a derivation of pay surveys, stems from a concern 
with attracting and retaining labour, the corporate governance codes in the early-
mid 1990s and the influence of these codes on remuneration committee 
governance work, transformed pay benchmarks into a tool of accountability. The 
newly established remuneration committees were accountable to shareholders for 
their executive pay decisions. Similar to other regulatory spaces subject to 
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increasing pressure to demonstrate their accountability via quantitative measures 
(Espeland and Sauder, 2009, Power, 1994), the remuneration committee drew 
heavily on the benchmark for the justification of its pay decisions. As Espeland 
and Sauder (2007) state, ‘quantitative authority and its link to accountability and 
evaluation are now so secure, so bound up with being modern, that we have 
trouble imagining other forms of coordination and discipline or other means of 
creating transparency and accountability’ (p. 5).  
 
Similar to the remuneration committee, accountability and stewardship was also 
being demanded of institutional investors and investor representative bodies. 
However, unlike the remuneration committee that relied upon the benchmark to 
justify their decisions, the investors resisted pay increases premised on below 
median benchmarks results. Thus, consultants had sought to de-emphasise the 
benchmark as a key reference point in pay decisions, however the very nature of 
rankings, and the obsession with rankings challenged such a shift from 
successfully occurring.  
 
Cultures of Median Pay 
 
The benchmark was meant to reflect pay, not change it. However, ‘the legibility, 
simplifications, and stratification that rankings create’ (Sauder and Espeland, 
2009, p.74), enabled executives to quickly and easily compare themselves with 
their peers. The benchmark, in reporting the pound value attached to the executive 
being benchmarked, symbolises the worth of that executive. However, this 
cultural logic comes into conflict with the remuneration committee’s 
accountability logic, the institutional investors’ shareholder logic and the 
consultant’s gatekeeping logic.   
Individual executive director’s sense of self-worth is poorly suited to processes of 
commensuration. This is because those individuals who have attained executive 
directorships have not done so on median performance, and yet, pay 
benchmarking has institutionalised median pay philosophies. As Porter (1995) 
observes, standardisation and the quest for the average still constitute important 
social forces (cf. Malsch et al., 2012, p.411). The remuneration committee partly 
conforms to this social force, and in so doing, create expectations for executives 
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to similarly conform to a median pay philosophy. Yet, the culture logic of the 
above-average, exceptional, star executive is irreconcilable with the term 
‘median.’ Words have meaning; top quartile pay is perceived as pay earned by top 
performers, and median pay by median performers. The size and complexity 
dimensions of the role and firm fall away in the final representation of the 
benchmark. 
 
The executives, acutely aware of the pay of their closest competitors are unable to 
disentangle their worth from the visual construct in which it is presented. The 
benchmark, was meant to innocuously position pay, when it in fact ‘ranks’ the 
executive, implicitly signalling pay points which are better and those which are 
worse. When those pay points are linked with the individuals in those positions, 
all the characteristics which are excluded from the process of commensuration are 
brought to the fore.  
 
Individuals are reflexive, continually interpreting meaning in their worlds. This is 
arguably even more the case for executives given their status in society, their high 
public visibility and the dire consequences when seen to have failed in their role. 
Their resistance to being paid at median is often perceived an egotistic, self-
serving, or greedy, and while there are certainly cases of such characteristics 
amongst executives, the upward ratchet of executive pay must also be analysed 
within the context of the logics that emerge in both the construction and 
interpretation of pay benchmarks. Words are embedded with cultural symbolism. 
Median pay is tantamount to average pay, which signals average quality and 
average worth vis-à-vis the peer group.   
 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
The chapter contributes to our understanding of the role, and more importantly, 
the agency of pay benchmarks in the dynamic processes of pay determination. 
Executive pay decisions have been rendered impossible in the absence of 
evaluation, measurement, and comparison.  Rankings, as a measure of 
performance, and the organizational responses to rankings have previously been 
 202 
studied (Sauder and Espeland, 2007). However, applying the concept of rankings 
to benchmarks is novel. What is left underexplored is the disciplinary power of 
pay benchmarks. This chapter touches briefly on the surveillance and 
normalisation processes which have emerged in response to pay benchmarking 
practice. However, further analysis would shed light on the ways in which the 
competing logics of the key actors shape these processes.  
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Chapter 7 
Risk in Remuneration Governance  
 
7.0 An impossible job 
 
Capturing the current sentiment in remuneration governance, an October 2016 
publication by Deloitte’s remuneration consulting practice stated: 
 
‘Remuneration committees find themselves in an almost impossible 
situation. Determining the structure and level of remuneration taking into 
account the needs and circumstances of the business, the shareholders and 
the executive directors is challenging enough. Add to this the media, 
political and wider social attention and the role of the non-executive 
remuneration committee member becomes a rather unattractive one.’ 
 
It is evident in the four substantive chapters that actors grapple with a host of 
pressures as they navigate the pay governance landscape. What is lost in this fray 
is the quintessential premise of incentives: to direct, motivate and reward 
executive directors. In the politicization of executive pay which has unfurled in 
recent decades, executive pay packages have been co-opted. The four substantive 
chapters, to varying degrees have described the relations, linkages and emergent 
interdependences amongst actors, tools and documents within the fields of 
remuneration consulting work and remuneration governance.  
 
Core and competing logics 
 
As described in the introductory chapter, logics are supra-organizational patterns, 
both symbolic and material, which order reality and provide meaning to actions 
and structure conflicts (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, and 
Lounsbury, 2012). In remuneration consulting work and remuneration 
governance, logics provide frames of reference and sources of meaning for the 
actions taken by the key actors studied in this thesis.  
 
Logics do not emerge within a vacuum. While the emergence of the core logics 
was traced historically, these logics often stemmed from adjacent fields. The 
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actors adopted, absorbed and transformed the logics from these adjacent fields 
(for example, the shareholder or gatekeeping logic from the field of corporate 
governance). The core logics identified in remuneration consulting work and 
remuneration governance were instrumental in shaping the norms, practices and 
behaviours of the key actors.  The following table summarises the core and often 
competing logics described in each of the four substantive chapters.  
 
Ch # Chapter Focus Logics 
 
3 
 
The emergence of executive 
remuneration consulting 
 
Market 
Gatekeeping 
 
 
4 
 
The co-emergence of remuneration 
committees and remuneration 
consultants 
 
Accountability 
Independence 
Gatekeeping 
Pay for Performance 
Shareholder 
 
 
5 
 
Remuneration consulting work:  
A field based study 
 
Market 
Profession 
Gatekeeping 
 
 
6 
 
Pay Benchmarking Practice 
 
Accountability 
Cultural – Perceptions of worth 
 
 
These logics operate at different levels, for example the market logic and 
professions logic shapes action at the level of practice, by focusing consultants’ 
attention to certain work activities over others, whereas the logic of accountability 
and independence shapes action at the institutional level. While terms such as 
accountability, independence, pay for performance, transparency were cited 
repeatedly in regulatory, governance and practice-related documents from the 
1990s, the term risk did not appear in a similar fashion until after the financial 
crisis in relation to the banking and financial sector.  
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Yet, actors’ concerns with personal and business risks have permeated 
remuneration governance work well before regulation documented the term, or 
practices explicitly referenced or reflected any ‘apparatus’141 (Power, 2013; cf. 
Gendron et al., 2015, pg. 552) of risk management. From stock dilution in the 
1980s, windfall gains and rewards for failure in the 1990s, and ‘no’ votes on the 
remuneration report at AGMs in the 2000s, there are a plethora of risks and 
uncertainties, which actors both prepare for and respond to. For instance, 
reputational and retention concerns led to conformity and rigidity in executive pay 
design, and shareholder engagement on long term incentive design.   
 
In the various ways in which remuneration design and governance have been 
studied in this thesis, there is a latent logic of risk, which pervades key actors’ 
choices and behaviours. Much social research on risk and risk management is 
attentive to the risk discourse, tools, management norms, practices and cultural 
meaning. Yet in those less obvious spheres of organisational and political life in 
which risk is not explicitly documented, its philosophy may percolate and pervade 
(Power, 2004).  This is not dissimilar from Power’s (2004) observation that the 
‘logic of secondary or reputational risk management is beginning to percolate and 
pervade internal control.’ Just as internal control and risk management came to be 
co-defined, remuneration governance may one day be co-defined with 
reputational and political risk. 
 
Interpretive constructivist researchers (Power and Gendron, 2015) often peel back 
the layers of risk in discourse and practice. It is less often the case that researchers 
are attentive to risk in instances where the notion of risk is pervasive, yet 
embedded within terms such as accountability, or obscured by concerns with 
personal and corporate reputation. With respect to the latter, Power (2004) noted 
that ‘categories such as "reputation" have emerged to characterize a newly visible 
kind of threat to organizations’ (p.62). Much as accountability has come to 
encompass terms such as transparency and regulatory efficiency. These ideals are 
                                                        
141 Gendron et al’s (2015) notion of ‘apparatus’, as shaped by Power (2013),  is used to 
designate risk management’s loose and eclectic collection of principles, rational myths, 
instruments and practices. 
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then ‘achieved’ by risk assessments, pay benchmarks and best practices, while 
reliant upon performance measures such as key risk indicators and rankings.  
Thus, the thesis taken collectively, demonstrates that risk is a latent, yet no less 
dominant logic, than the other core logics identified within the substantive 
chapters. Had risk not come to pervade regulation, corporate governance and 
corporate life, such an assertion may appear tenuous. However, risk has been an 
organising logic in UK regulatory systems for several decades. It is therefore 
surprising that risk has not been deeply implicated in executive pay governance 
prior to this. 
 
It is embedded within the specific cultures related to remuneration design and 
governance (Douglas, 1992). Yet, its character is constantly in flux as it absorbs 
and responds to other core and competing logics. As Gendron et al. (2015) note 
‘the meaning of risk and risk management is not fixed and objective but varies in 
time and space’ (p.553). Thus, it is not solely through a process of labelling 
uncertainty as ‘risk’ that risk is brought into being. It is the permeability of the 
idea of risk, the behaviour it affects, the practices it mobilises, and the actions, 
which it shapes. In ‘the risk management of everything’ (Power, 2004), risk by 
any other name still produces performance measurement systems, demands the 
‘responsibilization’ of actors and assigns blame.  
 
The following sections describe the rise of risk in society, regulation, corporate 
governance (more generally), and remuneration governance (more specifically). 
By whittling from the broader discourse of risk in society to risk in remuneration 
governance, it becomes clearer why a risk logic has largely remained 
undocumented, yet dominate actors sense-making processes.  
 
 
7.1 Risk in Society  
 
Risk studies have ‘exploded’ over the last few decades. The proliferation of risk 
studies prompted Hunt  (2001) to comment on ‘the rise and rise of risk 
management’, Power on the ‘risk management of everything’ and Rothstein et al. 
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(2006) to coin the term ‘risk colonisation’ as a means of describing the 
pervasiveness of risk logics.  
The academic, regulatory and practical uptake of risk and risk management has 
been attributed to its ambiguous nature. Wynne noted value in ambiguous terms 
of discourse, suggesting ‘these terms are more effective than artificially precise, 
apparently unambiguous ones for the difficult task of representing the objects of 
interest to, and creating bridges of common purpose and meaning across 
otherwise differentiated social worlds’ (2002, p.461). Risk has also been 
described as multi-dimensional, including psychological, sociological, political, 
medical, engineering, physical, statistical, biological, regulatory, and 
philosophical facets (Macgill and Siu, 2004). 
 
In social studies of risk, there has been considerable work on the 
conceptualisations of risk in society142, regulation143 and governance, and the 
emergence of risk as an organising concept in both public and private sectors. The 
notion of risk is seen to organise social interactions and relations; influencing 
processes, practices and behaviours. Risk, as an organising logic, became a fixture 
in regulatory discourse in the early 2000s. Hutter (2005) links the government’s 
adoption of risk management to the publication of the National Audit Report 
(2000), which in turn was influenced by the corporate governance codes 
introduced in the 1990s.  
 
 
7.2 Risk in Regulation 
 
From the mid-1990s onwards, government in the UK became less direct and less 
visible (Hutter 2005) in what some scholars have described as the rise of the 
regulatory state (Majone 1994; Loughlin and Scott 1997). The consequence for 
the UK was a fragmentation of the regulatory landscape to one involving the state, 
                                                        
142 Beck (1992): risk society (suspension of time and space; risk relations versus class 
relations; inability to attribute blame to an individual; focus on technological, health and 
environmental risks).  
143 Risk Based Regulation – Julia Black, Robert Baldwin; Risk in regulation, governance 
- Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, Bridget Hutter 
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self-regulatory bodies 144 , and governance and monitoring bodies 145 . This 
fragmentation was precipitated by the introduction of best practice codes in 
corporate governance and the ‘comply or explain’ doctrine introduced in the 
Cadbury report. The National Audit Report, which Hutter (2005) identified as a 
critical episode in linking risk and regulation, was influenced by the Cadbury 
Report (1992), Hampel Report (1998), and notably the Turnbull Report (1999) 
which specifically set out recommendations for best practice on internal control 
for UK companies. 
 
This fragmented regulatory space was ripe for welcoming the logic of risk and 
risk management. The calls for transparency and accountability, in a period of 
new public management where business sector logics of efficiency were elevated, 
provided a fertile ground for risk to take root in regulation. 146 In what has been 
termed risk-based regulation, risk-based approaches are used as a means of 
rationalising and justifying the regulator’s choice. Rothstein et al. (2012) state, 
that ‘risk-based approaches are held to improve the accountability of decision 
making by providing formal ex-ante rationalizations of the limits of what 
governance interventions can, and should, seek to achieve.’ With respect to the 
remuneration committee, drawing on market data in determining the ‘going rate’ 
for executives does not go far enough to appease politicians or the public. The 
politics of executive pay setting is such that the due diligence exercised by the 
remuneration committee is insufficient where institutional investors have a 
difference in opinion. As Power (2007) explains, risk based approaches enable a 
regulator - subject to increased scrutiny and legitimacy challenges - to stand                                                         
144 Examples include national and international standard setting bodies 
145 Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Institutional Voting Information Services 
(IVIS) (a part of the Investment Association).   
146  Considerable work has been done on the rise of risk based approaches in UK 
regulation, including the following: B. Hutter, The Attractions of Risk-based Regulation: 
accounting for the emergence of risk ideas in regulation (London: Centre for analysis of 
risk and regulation, 2005); J. Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-based Regulation and the 
New Public Risk Management in the UK’ (2005) PL 512; H. Rothstein, M. Huber and G. 
Gaskell, ‘A theory of risk colonisation: the spiralling regulatory logics of societal and 
institutional risk’ (2006) 35 Economy and Society 91; J. Black, ‘Risk Based Regulation: 
Choices, Practices and Lessons Learnt’ in Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the 
Governance of Risk (Paris: Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
2010); J. Black and R. Baldwin, ‘Really Responsive Risk Based Regulation’ (2010) 32 
Law and Policy 181. 
 209 
behind defensible rationales, which may only be technocratic in appearance. 
Market trends data and pay benchmarks are such technocratic tools.    
 
The emotive nature of executive pay, the growing public policy concerns with 
wage inequality and a socially fragmented Britain have fuelled an ‘expectations 
gap’.  Despite a committee’s best efforts to determine pay, executive pay 
packages remain controversial, and the reputational effects can be severe when 
corporations, committees and their advisors are seen to get pay packages ‘wrong’. 
The shareholder ‘revolts’ for Bob Dudley’s pay increase in a year in which oil 
prices fell dramatically and shareholders return were abysmal, or Martin Sorrel’s 
70 million pound package in spite of WPP’s strong shareholder returns illustrate 
this ‘expectations gap.’ Rothstein et al. (2012) statement about the association 
between risk and accountability rings true in the remuneration setting. The authors 
stated, ‘in contrast to the conventional wisdom that risk is an independent variable 
on which the character of accountability depends, accountability demands may be 
an independent variable on which the growth and application of risk ideas 
depend.’  
 
To close such an expectations gap, the choices made by the regulator (or 
appropriate governing body) must arguably align with societal expectations. In 
pursuit of this, regulatory and governance bodies are constantly making choices 
about the management of risks, resources and reputation (Black, 2012). Black 
(2012) argues that successfully managing all three simultaneously can prove 
impossible. 
 
 
7.3 Risk in Remuneration Governance 
 
On the one hand, it is surprising that the pervasiveness of risk and risk 
management in ‘organizational life at all levels of society’ (Power, 2004, pg. 64), 
and notably corporate governance and new public management did not similarly 
appear in remuneration governance until after the financial crisis. This, especially 
given that remuneration governance absorbed the logics of accountability and 
transparency, which accompanied risk in other spheres of governance.  
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On the other hand, the ambiguity and multivalence of the term ‘risk’ meant it 
could be absorbed in a plethora of other rhetorical devices. As Burgess (2005) 
noted, ‘there is no evidence that the risk management of everything brings 
tangible benefits to corporate and institutional actors, suggesting its appeal lies in 
satisfying less clear needs and insecurities.’ Reputational risk is amplified by such 
ambiguity. It is not entirely clear how investor relations might be impacted by a 
negative vote on remuneration, or how the market might react to public 
indignation over an executives’ pay package. Malsch et al. (2012) have suggested 
that the work of remuneration committees should be understood as more and more 
about risk management. Arguably, all the key actors engaged in the governance of 
executive pay are managing risks.  
 
The core risks, detailed in Table 7.2 have ‘ebbed and flowed’ in the 25 years since 
the Cadbury Report first recommended the introduction of remuneration 
committees. Both the remuneration committees and remuneration consultancies 
have emerged as the ‘centres for processing and handling risk’ (Hutter & Power, 
2005, pg.1), while nevertheless remaining ‘hostage to the institutional 
environment in which they operate’ (Power, 2004, p.61).  
 
It is also the case that reputational risks conflict amongst the key actors. 
Regulatory and governance actors perceive shareholder activism in the form of 
‘no’ votes as symbolic of institutional investor engagement and stewardship, and 
therefore regulatory success. Remuneration committees and remuneration 
consultants perceive the ‘no’ vote as a failure in their governance-work, the 
outcome of which is particularly costly for the consultant as they typically lose 
their post.  
 
Executive pay governance is a field ever expanding. As new actors engage in 
remuneration design and governance, the net of accountability and 
‘responsibilization’ widens. With a ‘solution’ to the executive pay problem out of 
reach, the opportunities for researchers are immense.  
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Table 7.2: Summary of key risks in remuneration design and governance 
 
Timeline 
 
Risk147 
Threats/ 
Concerns as identified/ 
driven by: 
 
Description 
Mid-late 1980s Economic 
 
State actors Thatcher’s privatisation agenda was linked to market ideals and 
profit related pay. Executive stock options would serve two 
functions: 
(i) reward employees for increased profitability 
(ii) align executives and shareholders 
 
Incentive Consultants 
 
 
Incentive pay was meant to override union mind-set.  
Retention 
 
 
 
Companies Increasing presence of American (and Japanese) subsidiaries in the 
UK, as well as the deregulation of the Financial Services Sector 
exacerbated company concerns with securing and retaining top 
talent.  
 
Early 1990s ‘Reward for failure’  ABI, NAPF Executives at newly privatised companies benefitting from windfall 
gains.  
 
Accountability 
 
State actors Public disquiet and media attention on corporate failings and 
historically high pay packages. Prompted the Cadbury Report to 
address remuneration governance. Cadbury emphasis transparency 
and accountability via board oversight.                                                          
147 Labelled by the researcher, and influenced by the data. 
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Mid 1990s Societal Shareholders/Public A pig was brought to the British Gas AGM, and labelled the ‘trough 
of privatisation’. The disparity between executive pay and the 
British workforce prompts public outcry. It is this social anxiety, 
which prompts the formation of the Greenbury Study Group. 
 
Mid-Late 1990s Incentive  
(Short-termism) 
Greenbury,  
ABI, NAPF 
In order to avoid rewarding executives for favourable stock market 
volatility, performance-based long-term incentives were 
introduced; stock options lost favour. 
 
Late 1990s Accountability State actors Moral panic re-emerges 
 
Early 2000s Accountability State actors Corporate failures trigger re-evaluation of governance system. 
Accountability and pay for performance logics all furthered with the 
publication of the DRRR (2002). 
 
State also introduces mandatory vote on the remuneration report.  
 
Late 2000s Financial  State actors, media, public 
 
Incentive systems were implicated in excessive risk taking, the 
subsequent collapse of the financial system, and the deepening of 
the financial crisis 
 
Early 2010s Pay for performance Management In response to the public loss of confidence in corporate Britain, 
companies introduced more strategic measure in short term 
incentives, and introduce malus and clawback.  
 
2009/2010 Reputational Remuneration consultants, 
Governance actors (Walker 
Review) 
Consultants introduced the Remuneration Consultants Group and 
the Remuneration Consulting Code of Professional Conduct to stave 
off state-led regulation of remuneration consultants.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
8.0 Research questions revisited 
 
In Chapter 1, the research questions were detailed as follows: 
 
(I) How did executive remuneration consultants become central in the 
design and governance of executive pay in UK public companies? 
 
(II) How do remuneration consultants design and governance executive 
pay?   
 
Drawing on a genealogical approach, Chapter 3 addressed research question (I) by 
tracing the emergence of remuneration consulting work from the 1970s. Chapter 4 
presents an account of the emergence of the remuneration committee and argues 
that the consultant and committee become inextricably linked in their governance 
work from the early 2000s.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 addressed research question (II). Chapter 5 drew on a participant 
observation as well as interviews at the fieldsite, described remuneration 
consulting. While Chapter 6 drew on archives, interview and field data to 
construct an account of pay benchmarking practice. The findings from these four 
substantive chapters are presented in section 8.2 below.  
 
The empirical accounts in this thesis are both voluminous and overwhelmingly 
original. However, rich and detailed empirical accounts came at the expense of 
stronger theoretical contributions to academic discourse. The following subsection 
describes the key limitations of this research, while later sections in the chapter 
detail the avenues for future research and theory development.  
 
 
8.1 Research Limitations 
 
As in all research endeavours, the insights presented throughout the thesis were 
both enabled and constrained by the scope of the research project. This research 
study principally focused on the executive remuneration consultant. It was not to 
the exclusion of other central actors, as remuneration committees were also 
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importantly described and analysed, however, institutional investors and the 
internal reward function were not sufficiently investigated. Greater attention to 
their role and their work in pay design and governance is needed going forward.  
 
As noted above, while this thesis presents original and novel insights, the 
theoretical points of connection need further development. This is in part because 
the thesis was not written as a monograph in which a single line of argument 
permeated the entire of body of research and thus, no single theoretical frontier 
was challenged or furthered. The strong empirical contribution came at the 
expense of a strong theoretical contribution. It is the researcher’s intention that 
this trade-off will be rectified when the chapters are converted into stand-alone 
academic papers.  
 
Another limitation identified in the thesis was the construction of Chapter 5’s 
written account, as based on the participant observation. As Ahrens and Mollona 
(2007) note of the ethnographic account: 
 
‘Underlying those texts is, however, a period of shared practical experience 
between the participant observer and the ethnography’s subjects during 
which they had occasion to share at least aspects of a way of life’ (p.312) 
 
It is arguably this shared experience of the field that played a role in the ambiguity 
evident in the writing of Chapter 5. It is not always clear to the reader what was 
observed as opposed to what was interpreted by the researcher. Greater care also 
needs to be taken in delineating the voice of the informants, and the voice of the 
researcher in the field. Both the clarity of the account, and the validity of the 
account, is impacted by such ambiguity in field-based accounts.  
 
Finally, in the public policy pursuit of a cohesive Britain, a bright light has been 
turned on pay at all levels of the workforce. Equal pay and equitable pay are at the 
forefront of the current debate.148 The academic literature on pay equity was only 
                                                        
148 For example, the Gender Pay Gap reporting regulations came into effect 5 April 2017, 
with organisations with over 250 employees being required to publish their results on 
their website and upload them to a Government website by 4 April 2018.   
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briefly presented in the Literature Review (Chapter 1). However, it is a dimension 
of the thinking on executive pay that cannot be marginalised going forward, 
especially in light of recent political rhetoric and policy, and the social 
consciousness centred on pay inequality.  
 
 
8.2 Key Contributions 
 
As described in the introductory and research methods chapters, the theoretical 
points of connection emerged in the process of data analysis, writing and 
conceptual leaping. The table below, also found in the introductory chapter, is 
retitled to reflect the notion of ‘zooming in and out’ (Nicolini, 2009), which 
occurred in this study.  
 
 
Table 8.1 Contributions to academic discourse 
Chapter “Zooming in” “Zooming out” 
3 The emergence of executive 
remuneration consulting 
The emergence of occupations, the 
sociology of occupational groupings 
 
4 The co-emergence of 
remuneration consultants 
and remuneration 
committees 
 
Auditor independence; Accountability, 
Gatekeepers and corporate governance 
5 Field based study of 
Remuneration consulting 
work 
Social construction of knowledge and 
expertise; Elite identities; Knowledge-
intensive firms, organizations and work 
(KIFOW) 
  
6 Pay benchmarking practice Social processes of commensuration, 
Theory of pay benchmarking 
 
7 Risk in Remuneration 
Governance 
Risk in society, Risk management in 
corporate governance 
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Chapter 3 
 
By tracing the emergence of executive remuneration consulting work from the 
1970s, Chapter 3 highlighted the social, economic and political conditions, which 
enabled the occupation to flourish and stabilise by the mid-2000s. While prior 
research has described the consultants’ emergence as a professionalisation project 
(Adamson et al., 2015), this chapter presented the antithesis of the traditional 
professionalisation story. In place of the disinterested expert driven by a ‘service 
ideal’, remuneration consultants are shaped by a dominant market logic. 
Consultants have not sought the hallmarks of professional status; rather 
consultants emulate the knowledge worker producing services within a 
‘managerial professional business’ (Abbott, 1988; Dirsmith et al., 2015).  
 
Future research will position this research on the emergence of a new occupation 
within a broader discourse on local, ‘glocal’ (Gibassier and El Omari, 2017) and 
transglobal (Falconbridge and Muzio, 2012) occupational emergence. Future 
work will explore whether the localised account presented in Chapter 3 is perhaps 
less local than originally imagined given its roots in the United States, and the 
spread of remuneration consulting work to other Anglo-American nations such as 
Canada. It has been noted in recent research on globalised professions that the 
interaction between the local and the global is a key relationship for the 
understanding of contemporary professional projects (Carruthers and Halliday, 
2006 as cited in Gibassier and El Omari, 2017). Falconbridge and Muzio (2012), 
Fourcade (2012), and Gibassier and El Omari (2017) are key points of reference 
for the development of Chapter 3’s discussion as these studies all explore, to 
varying degrees, globalised professionalisation projects.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 traces the emergence of non-executive directors and later the rise of the 
RemCo in remuneration governance. Implicit throughout the narrative is a 
concern with the committee and consultants’ independence. When the 
independence of remuneration committees was challenged in the early 2000s, 
regulators sought to strengthen pay governance by recommending that the 
committees appoint pay advisors independent of management. The remuneration 
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consultant, already the well-established provider of pay data to FTSE companies, 
ascended to RemCo-appointed adviser, their quasi-gatekeeping role bolstering the 
remuneration committee’s claims to independence in executive pay determination. 
Thus, it was in the wake of the DRRR (2002) that the independence of the 
remuneration committee and the expert claims and independence of the 
remuneration consultant became importantly interlinked. 
 
These interlinkages were further reinforced when nearly a decade later - as the 
global financial crisis unfurled - both remuneration committees and remuneration 
consultants were implicated in allowing, or at the very least, not deterring 
incentive systems, which encouraged executives to take actions that deepened the 
crisis. In response to public and political indignation, remuneration consultants’ 
sought to bolster their gatekeeping role.  
 
While the chapter sheds some light on ways in which remuneration consultants 
appeal to the logic of independence, further work is needed here to unpack the 
nature of independence in remuneration consulting, especially as it contrasts to 
auditor independence. It can also be studied as a corollary to gatekeepers’ 
independence.  
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 describes the ways in which executive remuneration consultants build 
knowledge and lay claim to expert status. The chapter argues that executive 
remuneration consulting draws heavily on the professional service firm model, 
which in turn draws on the training and apprenticeship models used within 
accounting and law professions. And much like management consulting, 
remuneration consulting ‘lacks the ‘corpus of abstract knowledge’ (Sharma, 1997) 
that differentiates and defines a profession. Remuneration consultants possess 
‘weak knowledge’ and thus continually face the need to negotiate with the client 
their status as ‘expert.’ In need of continually negotiating the legitimacy of their 
claims to expertise, ExComp pursued four key strategies to support their 
knowledge claims: (i) they recruit from elite universities, (ii) they have invested 
heavily in building a strong database and superior data analytics, (iii) they 
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continue to innovate product and service offerings in response to market and 
governance shifts, and (iv) they appeal to the ideals of professionalism. 
 
These four strategies, collectively, comprise the remuneration consultants’ system 
of knowledge. It is not the case that data collection is then superseded by data 
analysis and then client engagement work. Each phase of work influences and is 
influenced by successive phases of work (Power, 2015, p. 44).  It is the accretion 
of the consultants’ technical skill-set, absorbed and altered at the level of practice, 
and then delivered to the client by the ‘professionalised’ advisor which constitutes 
the remuneration consultants’ claim to executive pay knowledge and expertise. 
Going forward, the researcher intends to more effectively engage with the 
similarities and differences between consultants’ and auditors’ systems of 
knowledge. 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
In Chapter 6, the consultants’ tools – namely pay surveys and pay benchmarks - 
were investigated for their role in constructing the market for executive talent and, 
in part, enabling the upward ratchet of executive pay. Pay benchmarking, like 
accounting, ‘accords a particular form of visibility to events and processes, and in 
so doing helps to change them’ (Miller, 1994, p. 2). The chapter contributes to our 
understanding of the role, and more importantly, the agency of pay benchmarks in 
the dynamic processes of pay determination.  
 
What is left underexplored is the disciplinary power of pay benchmarks. This 
chapter touches briefly on the surveillance and normalisation processes which 
have emerged in response to pay benchmarking practice. Further analysis would 
explore the benchmark’s ability to translate qualities into quantities, which is not 
dissimilar from the study of accounting or statistics, which also demonstrates this 
ability to translate.  
  
There is the aspiration to develop a fuller account of the agency of the benchmark. 
In the extant remuneration literature, there has been an emphasis on human actors. 
However scholars (especially in ANT and STS) have challenged the dichotomy of 
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human and material action. In what has been described as a ‘flattening’ of the 
social world, actor network theorists do not privilege human actors over material 
actors. As Callon and Law (1997) noted: 
 
‘Often in practice we bracket off non-human materials, assuming they have a 
status which differs from that of a human. So materials become resources or 
constraints; they are said to be passive; to be active only when they are 
mobilized by flesh and blood actors...But why should we start out by 
assuming that some of these have no active role to play in social dynamics?’ 
(p.168). 
 
Future iterations of this chapter will be more attentive to the material actors and 
their agency is executive pay practices, and furthermore, the performativity of the 
pay benchmark.   
 
 
8.4 Future Work 
 
In addition to the future work identified within each substantive chapter and 
reiterated or furthered above, there are two additional avenues for future work. 
First, as this thesis only presents a partial network of actors engaged in executive 
pay design and governance, the aspiration to develop the network of actors more 
fully remains at the forefront of my mind. In the scope of this thesis, greater depth 
was achieved in describing and analysing remuneration consultants and 
remuneration committees.  
 
There is much more which can be done in analysing institutional investors as well 
as the internal reward function. With respect to the latter, there is an opportunity 
to develop a comparative narrative between the internal HR function and the 
external consultant. Given that the field of human resources/ reward management 
have pursued a professionalisation project, it is an interesting setting in which to 
compare and contrast their work activities and relevance vis-à-vis the external pay 
consultant.  
 
Second, there are important links to be made with the management control 
systems literature. Within an organisation, incentive design choices are often 
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premised on a deeply rooted concern with motivating executive to achieve desired 
performance outcomes, for which they are in turn rewarded. The link between 
task and achievement must be tightly linked for incentive systems to work. Yet, 
time and again, consultants have commented that executives simply are not 
‘motivated by the money.’ While research has largely sought answers to whether 
pay is linked to performance, it may be that scholars must revisit fundamental and 
foundational assumptions about what intrinsically motivates executives leading 
public companies.  
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Appendix A: Archival Data Sources    
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Appendix B: Fieldwork dates 
 
WK. Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
1 
 Day 1 
22 March 2016 
9:45am-4:30pm 
Day 2  
March 23, 2016 
10:00am-5:00pm 
Day 3 
24 March. 2016   
10:00am-4:30pm 
 
2 
Bank Holiday Day 4 
29 March 2016   
9:30-6:00pm 
Day 5 
30 March, 2016   
8:00-3:30pm 
Day 6  
31 March, 2016 
10:00am-5:30pm 
 
3 
Day 7 
4 April, 2016 
8:30am-3:30pm 
Day 8  
5 April 2016 
9:00-11:00am 
Day 9  
6 April 2016 
10:15am-5:15pm 
Day 10  
April 7, 2016 
11:00am-12:00pm 
 
4 
Day 11 
11 April 2016   
8:00am – 4:00pm 
Day 12  
12 April 2016   
8:00am-2:00pm 
Day 13  
13 April 2016   
9:30-4:30pm 
  
5 
Day 14  
18 April 2016  
8:00am-4:00pm 
Day 13  
19 April 2016 
8:00am – 5:00pm 
Day 14  
20 April 2016 
12:00-4:00pm 
Day 15  
21 April 2016   
11:00am-4:30pm 
 
6 
  Day 16  
27 April 2016   
7:30-10:30am 
Day 17 
28 April 2016  
10:00am-1:30pm 
Day 18  
28 April 2016 
11:00am-
4:00pm 
7 
 Day 19  
3 May 2016   
8:00am-4:00pm 
Day 20  
4 May 2016  
1:00-4:30pm 
 Day 21  
6 May 2016  
9:00am-3:00pm 
8 
  Day 22 
11 May 2016 
10:00am – 4:00pm 
Day 23  
12 May 2016  
9:00am-4:00pm 
Day 24  
13 May 2016   
8:45am-2:00pm 
9 
Day 25  
16 May 2016  
10:30am-4:30pm 
Day 26  
17 May 2016  
9:30am-2:00pm 
  Day 27  
20 May 2016 
10:00am-
6:00pm 
10 
Day 28  
23 May 2016 
12:45-4:45pm 
Day 29  
24 May 2016   
1:00-7:00pm 
Day 30  
25 May 2016  
7:45am-4:45pm 
  
11 
Bank Holiday Day 31  
31 May 2016  
8:15am-4:45pm 
Day 32  
1 June 2016  
2:00-4:30pm 
Day 33  
2 June 2016  
8am-3pm 
Day 34 
3 June 2016  
2:00-5:45pm 
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Appendix C: Interviews with ExComp Consultants 
 
# ROLE DATE 
1 Managing Partner 15 July, 2016 
2 Partner 19 April 2016 
3 Partner 4 May 2016   
4 Principal 21 May 2015 
5 Principal 6 May 2016 
6 Principal 23 May 2016 
7 Principal 29 August 2017 
8 Associate  5 April 2016 
9 Associate  6 April 2016 
10 Associate  20 April 2016  
11 Associate 13 May 2016 
12 Senior Analyst 9 May 2016 
13 Senior Analyst  12 April 2016 
14 Senior Analyst  19 April 2016 
15 Senior Analyst  4 May 2016 
16 Senior Analyst  10 May 2017 
17 Analyst  18 April 2016 
18 Analyst  20 April 2016 
19 Analyst  27 June 2016 
20 Analyst  29 August 2017 
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Appendix D: List of internal documents (In alphabetical order) 
 
DOCUMENT 
Background pack 
Benchmarking Methodology 
Clawback clause 
Consultant’s Confirmation of Objectivity and Independence  
Institutional History (recapped) 
LTI Comparison 
LTI prevalence levels 
LTI usage trends 
New Starter training schedule 
Option Overview 
Performance measures  
Periodical publications (2000-2015) 
TSR Calculation Methodology 
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